The present day business environment characterized by excessive competition, rapidly changing business cycle and increased uncertainty about outcomes, etc. have added to the complexity of the job of a CEO and other executive directors. Given the complexity of their job, it is essential that they must be adequately remunerated. But the astronomical level of compensation directors are getting is among the various issues which have been the source of concern for the societies across the world. The objective of this paper is to examine a linkage between corporate performance and the executive compensation. Net profits, earning per share and return of equity as measures of corporate performance and total assets as a measure of corporate size have been used. Executive compensation has been found to be associated significantly with earning per share and total assets.
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