Taxes have always been an indispensable part of state revenue. They have existed as old as the existence of civilizations themselves. The question of enforcing compliance has always been an aspiring goal for the exchequer. Compliance is not everything about enforcement for tax collections alone; it carries attempts of modern-day states to build an obedient and self-policing society. While a host of empirical research efforts have solicited tax compliance problem, soliciting its dynamics from taxpayers’ perspective has not been adequately focused upon. The present study postulates a three-dimensional holistic model of taxpayers’ compliance attitude defining tax payee’s relationship (both economic and non-economic dimensions) with the state. The proposed scale would contribute in studying the compliance problem in a comprehensive framework.
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