The study inspects how ownership structure and cash holdings (CETA) impact corporate financial performance (CFP) in Indian non-financial firms. The study uses quantile regression for panel data with Markov Chain Monte Carlo on six years of data from 78 non-financial firms in India. The results indicate that a U-shaped relationship exists between ownership, in general, and CFP. It means initially, a negative association exists to a minimum threshold, and then it exhibits a positive association. Additionally, promoters’ ownership moderates the effects of CETA on CFP positively, while institutional ownership exhibits a negative moderation. The study signifies that the aforementioned results follow the principles of agency theory.
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