This study examines the way in which economic and non-economic factors impact the outcome of international FTA negotiations from an industrial sector perspective. This study demonstrates that the result of negotiations, as measured by the share of duty free tariff lines, is significantly affected by both non-economic and economic factors. The results from the study showed that five of the eight variables tested were statistically significant, of which two were non-economic (union membership and ruling party ideology) and three were economic (import penetration, industrial sector unemployment rate and the most favoured nation rate of duty free tariff lines) in nature. This empirical study also draws a number of conclusions as to the implications of these findings.
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