Abstract
The anti-dumping agreement is a major agreement in the rules segment of the Uruguay Round package, although some versions of the anti-dumping code precede the Uruguay Round. Dumping is defined as exporting a product at lower than its 'normal value', interpreted as exporting below the sales price in the domestic market, below the sales price in a third market, or below cost of production plus mark-ups. An act of dumping can lead to imposition of anti-dumping duties provided that dumping leads to injury to domestic industry and the causal link is established. Although the Uruguay Round anti-dumping agreement is an improvement on earlier versions, there continue to be problems with interpretation, and anti-dumping duties legitimize protectionism with attendant welfare losses. While the anti-dumping agreement can be improved, this paper argues that if competition policy issues (including predatory intent) are properly addressed, the anti-dumping agreement can be scrapped.
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