Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine organ trafficking and transplant management from a supplier’s or vendor’s perspective, and identify its corresponding health policy implications. A probability sample of living organ vendors from Colombia was surveyed using interviewer-administered questionnaires. The study found that trafficking and relative abundance in the supply of human organs in developing countries, like Colombia, are encouraged by brokered and compensation-based markets involving unrelated organ buyers and sellers, many of whom were foreigners at the time of this study. The state’s regulatory capacity is undermined by patron-client ties, ineffectiveness and corruption in law-enforcement, public tolerance/indifference and the unintended consequences of health policies. A proactive and developmental role for the state requires efficient and creative monitoring and regulatory approaches in light of ever-changing trading rules and operations. Without directly addressing the ambiguity and continuity of underground and legitimate organ transplantation systems, reform efforts will achieve limited success against the backdrop of perfect supply elasticities associated with living donors.
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