The Making of India’s Resilient Opposition in the 1970s

Abstract

This article seeks to focus on the changing nature of India’s parliamentary opposition in the 1970s. The article argues that, unlike the previous decades, the Opposition in India was resilient, even if not organised in the face of the authoritarian tendencies of Indira Gandhi pre- and during the Emergency. The analytical framework helps to understand the reasons for the growing opposition’s resilience. The manifestation of this resilience can be traced to the programmes and actions of the opposition parties undertaken in the 1970s inside and outside the parliament as the crisis of democratic governance deepened, as explained in this article. This article attempts to make sense of parliamentary opposition in the 1970s, unlike any other existing study that either focused on the Congress, party system, or emergency per se. This article brings the spotlight on the Opposition as a category that lacks constitutional safeguards, thereby missing the ‘equality of conditions’ in a democratic framework. An emphasis is given to analytically understanding the political processes that played a significant role in the government–opposition relationship. The study has been conducted with the help of primary archival materials, newspaper reportings, memoirs, commentaries and governmental records such as parliamentary debates, along with existing academic works (though scarcely) on the making and functioning of the Opposition in India. The analytical approach in studying this particular moment in the political history of India helps us to understand the primacy, effectiveness, limitations and failures of democratic governance from the Opposition’s standpoint.

Not a single day pass[ed] without an event of anxiety. Unbearably high prices, unavailability of essential articles and commodities at reasonable prices, the angry youth, growing social and economic disparities and injustice, regional imbalances, unlimited increase in population, rampant corruption, free operation of black money, expensive election system, defective educational pattern and bureaucratic delays and hurdles.

—Dharia, 1975, p. 1 ¹

The Context

The Congress harped back into its electoral strength on resolute leadership, socialistic-oriented policies like abolishing privy purses, nationalisation of banks, revisiting the land reforms and promising to eradicate poverty (Garibi Hatao) in the 1971 General elections. The 10-point socioeconomic programmes were aggressively backed by the Congress Socialist Forum and Young Turks.

The Opposition’s ‘Grand Alliance’ of Socialists, Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD), Congress (O) and Jana Sangh were vanquished in the 1971 national election by Indira Gandhi-led Congress. The opposition parties were yet again divided and unstable. The fragmented opposition was in search of alternative political programmes to take on the government. As Indira Gandhi’s populist election promises in 1971 turned topsy-turvy, the Opposition tried to evolve a functional programmatic unity among various parties. The Socialist Party was at its lowest ebb with multiple factions operating; the Jana Sangh and BKD (Bharatiya Lok Dal after the merger of SSP, Pragati Dal and a faction of Swatantra Party in 1974 onwards) were in talks; the Swatantra Party was shrinking after emerging the biggest opposition group in 1967 and simply disappeared (Yadav, 2020, p. 16); the Communist parties were politically contained (Yadav, 2020, p. 16) and the Congress (O) was politically stagnant with limited geographical reach.

The discontent of the 1970s had grave implications for institutions and democratic political processes. The opposition realised the urgency to address some of the systemic issues, and so did some of the Young Turks leaders of the Congress (I). The internal churning in the Congress was nudged by the Young Turk leaders like Chandra Shekar, Mohan Dharia and C. Subramanian. ‘The party would be wiped out from the political scene if it went on befooling the people and did not implement the pledge given to them’ (Times of India, 28 May 1970), warned the Young Turks. Mohan Dharia advocated for a kind of party that is not ‘merely an election machine’ but ‘an effective instrument for achievement of social objectives’ (Times of India, 25 September 1972). The government–opposition relationship in the pre-Emergency 1970s was at its lowest ebb. In effect, the government–opposition sphere was short-circuited in absence of any cohesive parliamentary deliberations. Indira Gandhi had abandoned the mirage of Nehruvian consensus in governing the nation. The way parliamentary setup had evolved in the Nehruvian era over the years under the predominant one-party system, created no possible no avenues for the Opposition to have a substantial say in the matter of law, policymaking and governance other than the ruling party’s own volition to engage with the Opposition to ensure a consensus. The fundamental divergence between Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s regimes lies in the fact that the latter willingly traded off democracy in the name of governance.

This article presents an analysis of parliamentary opposition in the 1970s, unlike any other existing study that either focused on the Congress, party system, or emergency per se. This article brings the spotlight on the Opposition as a category in a parliamentary democracy. Using 1970s as a moment, the article highlights the vulnerability of the opposition from the two standpoints: First, the lack of constitutional safeguards for the opposition, thereby missing the ‘equality of conditions’ in a democratic framework; and second, the inadequate organisational strength of the opposition. Therefore, emphasis is given to understand the political processes that played a significant role in the government–opposition relationship in the 1970s, despite these two vulnerabilities. The study has been conducted with the help of archival materials such as party documents, in-depth newspaper reportage, memoirs of opposition leaders, commentaries and governmental records such as parliamentary debates along with existing academic works (though scarcely) on the making and functioning of the Opposition in India. This approach in studying this particular moment in the political history of India helps us to understand the primacy, effectiveness, limitations and failures of democratic governance from the Opposition’s standpoint.

Kothari (1973) argued that opposition in India should be understood in context of consensual polity. There were patterns of consensus and dissensus where the ruling class itself incorporate oppositional elite. Kothari argued that ‘the opposition proved more effectively in pressing their differences on matters of polity and implementation where the structure of authority is stable and continuous’ (1973).

The Issues: Failure of Governance

These crises ranged from the failure of the ‘Garibi Hatao’ slogan to price rise to relegating corruption charges against the then Haryana Chief Minister Bansi Lal to high levels of unemployment to the abrogation of Article 370 to ensuring a minimum wage for workers to liberate the Harijans from social repression to failure or lethargy of the government to enact the anti-defection law. The absence of a viable political alternative compelled the opposition to move from earlier unprincipled or opportunistic alliances and rhetorical idioms such as ‘Indira Hatao’ to formulate a programme based on formidable issues like joblessness, economic crisis, inflation, growing centralisation of power and deinstitutionalisation. However, it is to be keep in mind that the opposition was discrete, factional and personalised in nature often short-lived. The limitation was that the oppositional activity fails to aggregate into an effection force… leading to frustration and fragmentation. Kothari reiterates the role of opposition in structuring the internal operations of ruling party. This is in extension of Kothari’s Congress system, wherein he emphasised on the ‘internalisation of opposition’ (Kothari, 1974, p. 1041). Though, parties in the Opposition were organisationally saturated and programmatically stagnant, yet simmering with the possibility to expend their appeal to increasing representational assertion in the society.

Kothari’s conceptualisation of ‘non-party opposition’ (1973) enabled the process of bargaining and alignment between different kinds of opposition and groups within ruling party. However, this was deteriorating sharply under Indira Gandhi due to the growing tendency towards centralisation of power leading to institutional malfunctioning. The onslaught on the judiciary was unprecedented. The democratic necessity for the opposition was to counter the growing centralising tendency of Indira Gandhi and misgovernance. Consequentially, the concentration of power in the government and the party became a norm, leading to the imposition of the national emergency in 1975. Indira Gandhi blamed the opposition for hindering economic progress by trying to destabilise the system through protests and strikes. The protests on deteriorating economic conditions and failing promises of the government fueled the protests by the opposition camp. Confrontations between the ruling party and opposition parties became a norm in the first half of the 1970s.

Opposition’s lack of programmatic alternatives, unviable alliances and failing unity efforts, the only avenue for them was to resort to issue-based criticisms of the ruling party’s promises, which also acted as the only adhesive to forge a functional united front. The leaders of Congress (O), Swatantra Party, Jana Sangh, Socialist Party and CPI (M) boycotted the Presidential address in 1973 due to the government’s failure on the economic front, police repression against the demand for statehood for Telangana and corruption issues. While debating the Motion of Thanks in the Lok Sabha, the Opposition functionally galvanised together to target the Congress government. In response to the government’s motion thanking the President for the Address, Atal Bihari Vajpayee ironically retorted,

I beg to move that at the end of the motion, the following is added, namely, but regret that there is no mention in the Address of a definite time-bound programme to eradicate unemployment; and but regret that there is no mention in the Address of effective steps planned to eliminate black-money; and, but regret that there is no mention in the Address of immediate re-distribution of surplus and cultivable waste-lands with priority to landless persons among the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Ex-soldiers, with special agencies to cater to their financial requirements. (Lok Sabha Debates [LSD], 21 February 1973, pp. 278–282)

The opposition’s attack on the government left Indira Gandhi rattled, and she started blaming them for ‘galloping rhetoric in the House and outside they have been encouraging disruptive activities of every kind’ (LSD, 27 February 1973, p. 295) and weakening the will of the people (LSD, 27 February 1973, p. 314). At the same time, she did not want either ‘a convenient Opposition’ or a ‘silent opposition’ (LSD, 27 February 1973, p. 315), but was shocked to see the unity among them despite so much ideological distinctiveness and differences.

The Response: Opposition’s Protests and Building Resilience

The early 1970s witnessed an array of scattered protests, such as those organised by the Jana Sangh on the water problem in Rajkot or Congress (O) agitation on a price rise or both parties supporting the anti-levy movement by the peasants. The large-scale protests started in January 1974 in Gujarat and sometime later in Bihar. These protests erupted in an unorganised way, primarily by university students, union leaders, ABVP and Samajwadi Yuvajana Sabha (SSP-affiliated) on issues related to ‘amenities on campuses, reduction in fees, concession in cinema tickets’ (Shah, 1977, p. 85), hostel fee, mess bill, unemployment, price rise, corruption and civil liberties. The protests in Gujarat ² led to the removal of the Congress Chief Minister by Indira Gandhi. Similarly, Bihar also witnessed protests by peasants and landless labourers followed by ‘teachers, government employees and urban middle class against price rise...[.] and implementation of professional tax’ (Shah, 1977, pp. 83–84). These staggered protests were being organised by Jana Sangh, Socialists and Left parties in the wake of people’s growing frustration against the Indira Gandhi government. Eventually, an all-opposition party front called Samyukta Sangharsh Samiti consisting of the CPI, CPM, SSP, Jana Sangh and others began to raise issues like price rise and the need for essential commodities (Shah, 1977, p. 84). All kinds of protests and demonstrations were demonised, be it the railway strike of 1974 or student movement or even locally organised by political parties.

Jayaprakash Narayan was not a central figure in the Gujarat protests; instead, he was actively involved in the Sarvodaya campaign demanding electoral and educational reforms. Nevertheless, opposition parties like Socialist, Congress (O) and Swatantra Party, time and again, were constantly appealing to Jayaprakash Narayan to make serious attempts not only to unite the Opposition against Indira Gandhi but also to support these parties’ respective campaigns, such as demand for decentralisation, revocation of MISA, removal of external emergency (imposed in 1971) and raise the issues of deteriorating economy and joblessness.

Amidst growing confrontation inside and outside the parliament, opposition parties were seriously evaluating not only their effectiveness but also the relevance. However, in pursuit of a cohesive Opposition, Biju Patnaik met Jayaprakash Narayan to ‘persuade him to take the lead in the arduous and thankless job of uniting the fragmented Opposition’ (Limaye, 1988, p. 369). Rather than the Opposition unity, what was troubling Jayaprakash Narayan was the ‘rapid erosion of democratic values, the centralisation of power in the hands of one person and the alarming system of hand-picked Chief Ministers’ (Limaye, 1988, p. 369). Though Jayaprakash Narayan had retired decades ago from active or electoral politics, his conception of a vibrant parliamentary democracy was in jeopardy. However, the gradual erosion of democratic values compelled him to lend moral support to the opposition parties. The looming danger to the democratic fabric of the parliamentary system concerned Jayaprakash Narayan. In such a tumultuous scenario, Jayaprakash Narayan responded to Biju Patnaik’s request to consolidate the Opposition stating that,

looking at the picture as it is, it seems impossible that the scattered political fragments of the opposition with their fierce controversies, their widely differing and often contradictory ideologies, personal ambitions and conflicting interests of its leaders can be expected to come together to form an alternative in any viable manner. The Opposition to be effective must necessarily support forces of radical, even revolutionary change...[.]adher[ing] strictly to peaceful and democratic means. (Prasad, 2009, pp. 98–99)

Jayaprakash Narayan ‘gave a decisive turn’ (Shah, 1977, p. 4) by assuming a central role in Bihar protests after witnessing large-scale violence between the police and student protestors, resulting in several deaths in Bihar on 18 March 1974. The pre-Jayaprakash Narayan phase of the agitation was devoid of planned programmes and agendas, instead having a motive to ‘overthrow corrupt politicians’ (Shah, 1977, p. 4). Even Charan Singh, the President of Bharatiya Lok Dal (erstwhile Bharatiya Kranti Dal) raised the issue of democratic decay under Indira Gandhi, saying that

democracy in the country is being eroded in various ways (besides money power in elections) like through mutilating the Constitution, weakening the basic rights, stifling public opinion, subjugating freedom of the press, robbing judiciary’s independence, undermining cabinet system, reducing parliament to irrelevance...[.] installing a committed civil service (Bharatiya Lok Dal Presidential Address, 29 August 1974) were contributing towards authoritarian rule.

The leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan had extended moral legitimacy to the movements and provided a common terrain for the opposition parties to build solidarity by participating in them instead of widening their chasm in conflict. Most importantly, even though Jayaprakash Narayan was not involved in direct negotiation with the opposition parties’ day-to-day political affairs, his support had a plastering effect on the actions of these parties. Jayaprakash Narayan slowly and gradually transformed this abrupt youth agitation into a constructive movement by proposing what he called ‘Janata Sarkar’ ³ or people’s administration, gradually culminating in a call for ‘Sampurna Kranti’ or total revolution. One of the main demands was to dismiss the Bihar government and call for fresh elections. The Opposition parties gravitated under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan. They planned to expand the ‘Bihar-type movement for the reassertion of democratic rights…to prevent authoritarian regime’ (Johal, 1977, p. 43). As the movement consolidated, the then-Bihar Chief Minister Abdul Ghafoor threatened action against Jayaprakash Narayan. Indira Gandhi did not shy away from bringing extraordinary laws like MISA ⁴ in 1971, later employed to curb civil liberties and organised movements such as the Railway Workers’ Strike and other protests spearheaded by the Opposition parties. The Congress government tried to bring an amendment to the MISA ⁵ in May 1975 without even consulting the opposition leaders, just a month before the emergency. The provision was to detain any person for as long as 2 years without reference to the Advisory board and denote a specific geographical area as a ‘disturbed area’ (LSD, 7 May 1975, p. 251). However, this attempt was foiled by the opposition leaders, as it was alleged that this provision would be misused to detain trade union leaders for participating in strikes and protests. The veteran socialist leader, Madhu Limaye had already predicted ‘a large scale arrests of Opposition and trade union leaders [along with] Jayaprakash Narayan’ (The Statesman, 30 January 1975). Even Jayaprakash Narayan was not ignoring such warnings by the government; for instance, speaking about his apprehensive arrest, he instructed the Chhatra Sansharsha Samiti ⁶ and opposition leaders to adhere to the non-violent principles and peaceful modes of protests (Prasad, 2009, p. 380). The Indira Gandhi government branded the opposition as ‘anti-national’ and a hindrance to national development.

This was an unusual development in the government–opposition relationship after independence. Adding insult to injury, Indira Gandhi refused to indulge in dialogue with the opposition parties. She asked, ‘Dialogue with whom?’, ‘Dialogue for what’ (LSD, 26 March 1975, p. 377). However, she has earlier engaged in dialogue with Jayaprakash Narayan to discuss the Sarvodaya movement’s demand for electoral reforms to reduce the voting age, right to recall, election expenditure and changing composition of the Election Commission, but not with the Opposition. The indifference to the opposition’s grievances entrenched the distrust of the government. Mohan Dharia was perhaps the only proponent for a democratic dialogue between the government and the opposition to resolve the longstanding issues, for which he paid a price in form of dismissal as minister from the Gandhi Council and later expulsion from Congress (I) for his continuous insistence on resolving the conflict by deliberation. Dharia held that ‘non-implementation of [government’s] pledges and programmes was the basic reason for the people’s agitations’ (Dharia, 1975, p. 11). Dharia contended that such ‘massive problems... involving the masses... [.] naturally calls for a national dialogue with all national political parties, labour organisations, associations of industries and commerce and national leaders of the stature of Jayaprakash Narayan, Sheikh Abdullah and others’ (Dharia, 1975, p. 12). At the same time, Dharia was also critical of Jayaprakash Narayan’s demand for the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly and education boycott by the youth. He termed it as ‘anti-democratic’ (Times of India, 14 July 1974) and called for dialogue as it is the essence of parliamentary democracy (Times of India, 6 March 1975). Similarly, Chandra Shekhar was asking ‘to take effective measures to execute the programmes announced by the Congress (I) and also to check the mounting corruption (Times of India, 8 July 1974). The democratic trust in the relationship between the government and the opposition had dried up. Both the opposition and the government blamed each other for being fascist. Opposition leaders like S. N. Mishra moved a resolution in Lok Sabha stating the growth of fascism in the country. ⁷ The Opposition members charged that personality cult and growing intolerance towards political opposition are contributing to fascism. The opposition’s grievance against the government was the repetitive abuse of laws like the Defence of India Rules and MISA against the trade union leaders and protestors, including various political leaders. The Opposition was at the receiving end. Rajni Kothari explained that

the political process [since 1974], particularly the manner in which dissent, discontent and disengagement were expressed, had begun to operate more outside than inside the basic framework of the polity, and it was felt by some in positions of power that the only way of dealing with such a political system was to suspend it…. [but when] politics get suspended, the exercise of power and authority becomes arbitrary and unpredictable…as happened during the emergency. (Kothari, 1989, p. 262)

Hence, the need for the opposition was to be resilient in face of repressive measures. Even if the opposition was not cohesive, formidable and organised but reflecting the resilience in the face of an extremely hostile government ensured the spirit of a democracy whose essence is valued in the existence of dissent, differences and political heterogeneity. The protests in Gujarat and Bihar provided a transitory plank for the opposition to raise demands and grievances in unison. Jayaprakash Narayan was fed up with the Opposition’s chronic attitude towards fragmentation and differences in the face of mounting political adversities and democratic deficit. For instance, Charan Singh had rejected the proposal for a ‘united bloc of opposition parties in parliament’ (Times of India, 9 December 1974) as he favoured only a complete merger into a single opposition party that could become a national alternative. The bitter experience of erstwhile Samyukta Vidhayak Dal governments in various states between 1967 and 1971 had left no hope for building yet another misalliance of the opposition parties, so a merger was seen as the only alternative, to the extent that Charan Singh was even willing to reconsider the Bharatiya Lok Dal’s ‘policy statement that stands in the way of joining hands’ (Times of India, 9 December 1974) with the Jana Sangh. However, Jana Sangh was not ready for an ‘immediate merger of national and democratic parties’ (Limaye, 1988, p. 568), but was only interested in making of federal party. ⁸ So far, all sorts of party alliances, seat sharing, electoral understanding and pre-poll and post-poll alliances among opposition parties were tasted and tried for a dismal electoral success (1962, 1967, 1971); therefore, to realise the potential of ‘non-Congressism’ (Limaye, 1988) had to be realised from a complete merger.

The looming crisis for the Opposition was their inability to replace the Congress by forming a formidable alternative. In absence of organisational reach and resources at an all-India level, the only alternative was to evolve a workable unity, be it an alliance or a merger. However, previous experience with electoral alliances (pre or post) had not been pleasant either after 1967 or 1971. When the opposition parties failed electorally, they bickered and fell apart. When the opposition won or managed to form a government in post-electoral alliances, opportunism and power ambition dominated the concern to sustain a non-Congress state government in the absence of programmatic fusion. The Opposition lacked resilience. The glue called ‘non-Congressism’ in practice appeared feeble. Even Jayaprakash Narayan contended that,

[the opposition parties] have a responsibility to create a national alternative. If they fail to do so, the opposition groups will be held responsible of bringing fascism to India. Therefore, it is imperative that they come together to produce an alternative to the Congress. Their differences are not such...[.] that they cannot join together [as] there is no great controversy amongst them about what is to be done.... (Limaye, 1994, p. 79)

The prospects for any kind of opposition unity remained hinged on the winnability factor in the elections. Jayaprakash Narayan was aware of the functional limitations of such electoral alliances. If the opposition loses, the unity and alliance bickered. Jayaprakash Narayan argued, ‘if the Janata Front loses, the unity displayed by the opposition in the Gujarat poll may never be repeated’ (Prasad, 2009, p. 461). However, defeat of the Congress (I) in the midterm Gujarat assembly election by a rainbow coalition of the opposition parties, namely the Janata Morcha ⁹ rejuvenated the opposition politics.

As the Jayaprakash Narayan movement was losing its momentum in Bihar, parallel attempts were being made to form a similar Sangarsh Samiti in Uttar Pradesh where, in a non-CPI opposition meeting, a decision was taken to form a ‘volunteer corps of students and youth from the age of 14 to 30 on the lines of the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini of Bihar and of a non-party Citizen’s Struggle Forum’ (Indian Express, 10 June 1975). Meanwhile, in a different matter, the Allahabad High Court Judgment declaring Indira Gandhi’s election illegal and forbidding her for 6 years to contest any election boosted the opposition’s plan. The prompt step was to organise a countrywide ‘Resignation Demand Week’ along with summoning the parliament and meeting the president (Indian Express, 13 June 1973). This was a watershed moment. It not only rejuvenated the popular movement but also raised questions about the legitimacy of Indira Gandhi to remain the Prime Minister. The structure and network erected during the popular mass movements could be used by the Opposition to percolate this message to the grassroots.

The non-CPI opposition parties were not ready to settle for anything less than Indira Gandhi’s resignation. By now, the time for longstanding dialogue between the government and the opposition was over. As the moment for any constructive dialogue was long over, the opposition was in no mood to compromise over the election judgment. The Congress (O), BLD, Jana Sangh, Socialist Party and Akali Dal formed the Lok Sangharsha Samiti to organise pan-India protests against Indira Gandhi. Jayaprakash Narayan took it as an opportunity to expand the Sampurna Kranti outside Bihar and Gujarat. He even acknowledged that,

I have gone from one end of the country to another [.] in search of struggle. But struggle has been organised only in two states, Bihar and UP and now, this struggle has presented itself. How can I keep out of it? (Prasad, 2009, p. 464)

Jayaprakash Narayan called for disobedience by the police and armed forces of any governmental order. The opposition reiterated that Indira Gandhi was ‘trying to establish a dictatorship’ (Prasad, 2009, p. 464). The Lok Sangharsha Samiti gave a call for nationwide Satyagraha followed by a weeklong demonstration from 29 June 1975 to ‘force Indira Gandhi’s resignation’ (Indian Express, 25 June 1975) as she not only refused to step down but also organised a parallel show of her political strength. The zone of the political struggle was outside the parliament. Except for the CPI, all other parties were planning, executing and organising the protests seamlessly under one banner.

Sieging the Opposition: Retrogression and Subversion

On the intervening night of 25–26th June 1975, several opposition leaders, students and youth leaders, including many journalists were illegally arrested. The electricity of the various newspaper printing presses was cut off to stop their publication. It took some time to realise that Indira Gandhi has imposed an internal emergency suspending the fundamental rights of the people, including press freedom, and the right to protest and demonstrate. The triggering reason for the proclamation of the internal emergency was set back from the Supreme Court and the increasing momentum of the opposition’s protests. Opposition was silenced with the imposition of emergency. The Opposition’s resilience shown in the face of centralisation of power and weaponising the State’s machinery was momentarily vanquished by Indira Gandhi by inaugurating authoritarianism using a constitutional provision. Madhu Limaye described the situation as the ‘silence of a graveyard’ (Limaye, 1994, p. 2), and so did Jayaprakash Narayan in his Prison Diary (Narayan, 1977, p. 2). Just to give you an idea, ‘eleven million Indians were sterilised and 11,000 locked up. In Delhi alone, of the city’s five million citizens, 700,000 were displaced by the gentrification drive and 161,000 sterilised in programmes masterminded by Sanjay [Gandhi]’ (Jaffrelot & Anil, 2020).

Indira Gandhi launched a two-pronged attack on the opposition parties. First, the Emergency powers enshrined in the constitution under Article 352 were deployed for the ulterior motive of suppressing the activities, plans and programmes of the parliamentary opposition; and second, launched an all-out attack in the absence of ‘equality of conditions’ and asymmetric enforcement of governmental power to obliterate the opposition. Seeing the absence of organic protests by civil society against the emergency, Jayaprakash Narayan realised that,

the people [were] still ignorant of and unconcerned about their rights and duties as citizens of an independent and democratic country. A rather glaring proof of this was their complete passivity when their fundamental rights of speech, association, movement were suddenly taken away…. Had the people been conscious of their rights, in spite of the emergency, there would have been countrywide protests and demonstrations. (Limaye, 1994, p. 7)

To divert attention from the abuse of civil and political liberties, Indira Gandhi launched propaganda to equate the opposition with that of Naxalites and Communists. She defended the emergency as a ‘disciplinary’ measure to tame the opposition. For Indira Gandhi, one of the reasons for the emergency was to discipline the otherwise undisciplined opposition as it was ‘not fulfilling the obligations which democracy imposed on it’ (Indian Express, 3 July 1975). She opined, ‘democracy had given too much liberty to people, whether it were newspaper or the opposition, they were trying to misuse it and weaken the nation’s confidence’ (Indian Express, 3 July 1975). Moreover, she described the imposition of emergency ‘within the constitutional framework’ (LSD, 22 July 1975, p. 52) meant to preserve the constitution and safeguard democracy. The government defended the Emergency in order ‘to preserve order [and] democracy, protect the social revolution and preserve the national integrity’ (Austin, 1999, p. 295). The hostility against the parliamentary opposition, press freedom, civil society organisations like the RSS, democratic traditions and institutions was apparent from the actions of the Congress government during the emergency.

Once done with the stifling of civil and political liberties of opposition outside the parliament, Indira Gandhi brought the might of the state inside the House by suspending (LSD, 21 July 1975, p. 27) significant parliamentary rules and procedures like the Question Hour, Calling Attention Motions and Private Members’ Bills used by the legislature to scrutiny the government for one session. Those opposition MPs who attended the session had no autonomy to raise issues other than the government’s wish. Mohan Dharia called it a ‘virtual surrender of the sovereign parliament to the executive’ (LSD, 21 July 1975, p. 44). Somnath Chatterrjee referred to it as an act of ‘monstrosity being perpetrated on Parliament in the name of so-called emergency’ (LSD, 21 July 1975, p. 54). Another member ¹⁰ used the metaphor of a ‘muted museum’ to denote the parliament. The parliament was turned into a rubber stamp of the executive. Despite this, the opposition’s decision to attend the session was a tactical decision to broadcast their dissenting opinion to the masses by public radio and press, but in vain, as dissenting speeches and the opposition’s Emergency resolution were censored as ‘no criticism of the government or the Congress Party, however, mild is allowed to be published’ (LSD, 22 July 1975, p. 90). Even the parliamentary proceedings were neither published, reported nor broadcasted in toto to the masses, but redacted heavily, specifically the opposition member’s speeches.

Democratic Resilience and Opposition

The emergency was politically and legally directed against the opposition. But the government’s narrative was articulated in terms of safeguarding democracy from the opposition. The description of the Emergency varies; for instance, Rajni Kothari called it a phase of ‘suspension of the political processes in India’ (Kothari, 1977) and ‘a phase of depoliticalisation’ (Kothari, 1977), where political participation was substituted by ‘instruments of management and control’ (Kothari, 1977) and was seen ‘as an efficient instrument of crisis management’ (Kothari, 1977). The suspension of the political system, according to Kothari, assumed that ‘the government of the country can be detached from politics of the country and carried on through some simple instruments of control and coercion’ (Kothari, 1977). But this strategy does not work; as Kothari said, ‘when politics is suspended, the exercise of power and authority becomes arbitrary and unpredictable and soon gets out of hand’ (Kothari, 1977), as was the case during the emergency. At the same time, he viewed the suspension of the political process as a measure of relief as,

the whole atmosphere of chaos and confrontation, of gheraos and bandhs that used to take place day in and day out without rhyme or reason, of the senseless dramatics and disorder in the conduct of parliamentarians who had lost all sense of decency and dignity of the House and behaved like frustrated adolescents, of highly paid engineers holding whole regions to ransom by refusing to operate power plants, of students being used to coerce and intimidate legislators causing them to resign their seats in the state assemblies... [.] and its suspension has not been regretted by many. (Kothari, 1977)

To an extent, Kothari believed that the opposition’s agitational methods were also responsible for the growing centralisation of the political process. Moreover, bandhs and gheraos were seen as a ‘new language of politics’ (Kothari, 1977). Kothari’s narrative goes well with the Congress narrative; for instance, the government claimed that radical measures were necessary to save the economy; however, these were not possible as the opposition parties were involved in a perpetual state of obstruction and destruction by hampering the functions of the government. The ruling Congress accused the opposition of becoming a hurdle in the ‘nation’s progress’ and contributing to anarchy and lawlessness. One must not disregard the fact that the concerns and grievances of the Opposition parties were completely ignored by Indira Gandhi to an extent that even the legislature was sidelined for governance.

However, one must remember that the suspension of the political process was specifically targeted against the opposition parties, their leaders and political activities, not towards the ruling party in any manner. This asymmetric manifestation of state power for Indira Gandhi’s political party was meant to harden the bedrock of authoritarianism in India. The Congress and CPI (it was supporting Congress) (Lockwood, 2016, pp. 121–125) indulged in their political activities by being in government, unlike other parties. The ruling party was not in the domain of suppression at all. The ‘equality of conditions’ was missing as the opposition voices were susceptible to state repression, whereas the ruling party had the state protection at their disposal. The constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights had been snatched. The political asymmetry in absence of any legal or institutional safeguards left the opposition vulnerable. The democratic process was replaced with authoritarianism.

Another plausible justification for the emergency and persecution of the parliamentary opposition emerges by pitting governance (development) against democracy. To date, this narrative is deployed for a limited defence of emergency in India without realising that the opposition’s contribution is imperative in parliament for legislative and policy matters, even if they are electorally insignificant. The choice given to the people was: if they want economic progress, employment and to get rid of inflation and price rises, the opposition have to suspend their political activities, programmes and all grievances against the government. From a political consensus in which a parliamentary opposition is essential for governance as well as to maintain a substantive democracy, a situation arose where the opposition was projected as an impediment to developmental activities and policies that could only be corrected by doing away with democratic safeguards guaranteed in the constitution.

During the emergency, several amendments were undertaken by Indira Gandhi that fundamentally altered the form and framework of the Indian constitution. For instance, judicial review of proclamations of emergency was barred by the 38th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA); the 39th CAA protected Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from any prospective judgement from her pending election case in Supreme Court and inserted a clause due to which Supreme Court cannot decide on election petitions and put the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House, President and Vice-President beyond the judiciary’s ambit of authority to decide on election petitions. The 42nd CAA, as Austin (1999) puts it, ‘to further protect Indira Gandhi from legal challenges in the election case, to strengthen the central government vis-a-vis the state governments and its capability to rule the country as a unitary, not a federal system, to give maximum protection from judicial challenge to social revolutionary legislation, [and] to trim the judiciary’ (p. 371). All these provisions could have jeopardised the framework of doing politics in India. The Constitution was certainly misconfigured during the Emergency, violating the foundational consensus enshrined in the making of the republic.

Along with this, Indira Gandhi extended the period of Lok Sabha term. When Indira Gandhi announced the dissolution of the Lok Sabha on 18 January 1977, the opposition leaders were worried about the contesting elections at such short notice as they were not prepared due to their imprisonment and ban on the political activities of the parties. To be precise, the advent of the Emergency was the moment of sieging the Opposition’s political processes and organisations, be it inside or outside the parliament.

Opposition’s Resilience to Functional Unity

The Opposition raised questions attached to self-respect and dignity of the group, community and individuals like issues of joblessness, food crisis, low income and poverty. The political assertion of the 1970s articulated the grievances in terms of improving ‘primary goods’ such as demanding greater opportunities and powers in institutions for decision-making. The increasing representativeness of parliament contributed to the broadening of the opposition as representatives from hitherto marginalised groups mobilised their constituencies to participate in the political and electoral processes. Thus, one sees the issue of reservations for backward classes being raised by leaders like Charan Singh and Lohiaite leaders, and qualitative decentralisation by the socialists. These faultlines were getting reflected in terms of political assertions demanding representation. As Yogendra Yadav writes,

as more and more participants came to see the game as their own, they brought their own expectations, demands and beliefs. At least some of the sections hitherto excluded from centres of power thought it was time they had a say in framing the rules of the game. The most notable group among these were the peasant-proprietors belonging to the middle castes, well below the ‘twice-born’ (dwija) caste but distinctly above the ex-Untouchables...[.] This phenomenon took the form of new political parties like the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh, the DMK in Tamil Nadu and the Vishal Haryana Party in Haryana. (Yadav, 2020, p. 16)

The appetite for greater representativeness compelled the opposition to think beyond a ritualistic electoral unity in the 1970s. For instance, if Bharatiya Lok Dal was representing the dominant caste peasants, it was also raising the issue of backward class reservation. Incidentally, this could be realised due to large-scale protests and demonstrations highlighting the systemic malaise and political grievances in the day-to-day affairs of governance.

The easiest way to formulate a common political programme was to counter the government’s authoritarian measures and repression in absence of a longstanding ideological conciliation among Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal and the Socialists. All the opposition parties stood for a reconfiguration of a democratic and participatory path of governance. The goal was to operate between the guardrails of democracy and good governance without resorting to any repressive measures. The Opposition’s resilience attained durability by flourishing representation and participation in the actual decision-making process. The assertion of greater representation of society aligned with the aspects of broadening opposition. The massive dissatisfaction from the Congress de facto gave the opposition an opportunity for substantive representation. The resiliency of the opposition had to be reflected in how democratic their conduct could be in such circumstances and how effectively they could reach a compromise by overcoming the obvious ideological and programmatic conflicts. The formation of the Janata Party was an outcome of urgency by the resilient opposition parties, followed by primarily compromising with their respective policies, programmes and ideologies. The exigencies demanded the opposition to be ready for an electoral contest whenever the general election is announced in the wake of the post-emergency phase.

The first step in alliance-making is often to evolve a functional unity by reaching a consensus inside the parliament on legislative and policy matters. At the height of the emergency, yet another attempt was made in December 1975 to forge a front for functional unity, but could not work as the parliament was reduced to a rubber stamp. Those Opposition leaders who were either released or had not been arrested negotiated with other parties to formulate a policy of unity or alliance during the emergency. This deliberative process was gradual but often indecisive. However, a sense of urgency was there in search of an alternative political solution that could last longer in terms of practice and principles, unlike the previous attempts in the 1950s and 1960s. The primary aim of the opposition parties was to ensure a revival of democracy, restoration of the constitution and its values, fundamental rights, civil liberties and reconfiguration of public institutions.

The return of Jayaprakash Narayan ¹¹ in March 1976 proved to be ‘a beginning of a new phase in the endeavour to bring about non-Congress unity’ (Limaye, 1994, p. 79) among the persecuted opposition parties. During the emergency, Opposition leaders like Charan Singh (BLD), N. G. Goray (SP), H. M. Patel (BLD), Shanti Bhushan (Congress-O), Om Prakash Tyagi (Jana Sangh), Tridip Chaudhary (RSP), Narayan Desai (Sarvodaya), S. M. Joshi (SP), Nijalingappa (Congress-O) and Acharya Kripalani started the deliberative process as Jayaprakash Narayan called for giving up ad-hocism and submerging their identities to constitute a single party to challenge the Congress.

A committee headed by a Socialist leader N. G. Goray was formed to formulate a policy of ‘collective opposition’ or the possibility of a single party. This committee ¹² envisioned a single party to restore democracy and ensure democratic governance. BLD leader Charan Singh was not in favour of a party that emphasises agitational methods but wanted to adhere to constitutional means of restoring the political process. He also objected to biased labour policy, planning and Jayaprakash Narayan’s insistence on carrying forward the total revolution. BLD wanted to revitalise the agricultural programme and asserted the urgency to look into the Kaka Kalelkar Committee Report on Backward Classes so that effective measures should be taken to improve their socio-economic conditions. Unlike BLD, the Socialist Party wanted to keep the Janata Party ’resistance oriented and not geared to parliamentary politics’ (Limaye, 1994, p. 136). The discussion on the policy questions opened a terrain of possibilities to evolve a deeper understanding among the negotiating parties without entangling in the cobwebs of ideological faultlines. For instance, Socialists were campaigning for decentralisation, whereas Jana Sangh was an advocate of giving more powers to the centre. Similarly, they differed on the questions of the reservation to the people of deprived sections as well. So, discussion on these questions was imperative if they wanted to come up with a sustainable political alternative to form One-Party.

The exigencies of the Emergency compelled the opposition to merge for a larger objective to safeguard the democratic institutions and parliamentary system from authoritarianism. It was an easier way to shrug off the ideological differences among opposition parties. The Emergency provided an overarching layer for democratic necessity on which non-Congress parties could come together and merge without really pondering upon the fundamental political differences among the opposition parties. The immediate threat of authoritarianism was to be blunted by a formidable opposition party, so the respective party nuances could be postponed for later negotiation. Opposition leaders like Charan Singh and Morarji Desai, among others, were clear about this particular issue. There was no confusion that the merger of the opposition parties into one would be the outcome of complete consensus or be bereft of the contentious issues. There were deep differences in ideological and policy matters. The unity was an outcome of resilience shaped due to the prevailing political processes in the 1970s. Despite this, an array of deliberative processes ultimately manifested into an agenda-based understanding. The Janata Party was shaped by this deliberative process. Once the workable consensus among the opposition parties was reached, Jayaprakash Narayan announced the formation of a new national party in the middle of the emergency comprising the Congress-O, Jana Sangh, BLD and Socialist party. However, the formal announcement was supposed to follow later. Meanwhile, the plan was to form all-party representative forums at the Taluka, District, State and National levels to consolidate the proposed party. The attempt was to form a single party and avoid any kind of alliance or coalition arrangement. The objective of the Janata Party was,

the resolution of civil liberties, of the freedom of the press, of the independence and the dignity of the judiciary, the establishment of a genuine egalitarian social order, the formulation and implementation of an economic policy designed to eliminate unemployment and maximise production, agricultural and industrial while safeguarding the just and fair claims in particular of small and marginal farmers, of the agricultural labour, of the industrial worker, and of the weaker sections generally. (Limaye, 1994, p. 155)

However, inter-party differences on fundamental principles lingered in the absence of many senior leaders despite a preliminary unity of programmes as stated above. Adding insult to injury, respective state units of various opposition parties were often at loggerheads with each other, for instance, Jana Sangh and BLD in Uttar Pradesh and between Jana Sangh and the Socialists.

Amidst these irresolvable questions, the leadership issue of the proposed Janata party was trouble growing in posteriority. So, after the initial plan in May 1976, the merger plan was practically abandoned followed by which the Socialist party individually kept on working closely with other parties and Charan Singh became wary of RSS workers and began advocating that ‘no RSS volunteer can join the new party and no member of the new party can join the RSS’ (Limaye, 1994, p. 158). The final push for the merger was given by the DMK at the end of 1976. By then, Jana Sangh was in favour of an unconditional merger to form a single party to evolve a democratic national alternative (Limaye, 1994, p. 165) instead of a federal party.

Indira Gandhi in her public broadcast on 18 January 1977 talked about dissolving the Lok Sabha and called for a general election. Political and fundamental rights were also going to be restored after 19 months of the Internal Emergency. The context in which the election was called showed the weakness of the opposition parties in the absence of absolute unity of organisation, programme and election strategy. It was a moment of rejoicing for the opposition as they expected the revocation of the Emergency soon. Even then, most of the opposition leaders were in jail. The Janata Party was not yet formally launched as the plan was left in limbo in 1976. The sudden announcement of the election compelled opposition leaders to huddle together to take a final decision on the merger. Besides, the opposition parties found it difficult to contest the general election on such short notice as they were disorganised, jailed and bereft of financial contributions during the emergency. The suffering and detention of various leaders acted as a unifying force for the opposition to not only come together but contest under one symbol. Jayaprakash Narayan had also threatened to dissociate himself from supporting the opposition parties in elections if they did not merge into a single party (Prasad, 2009, p. 637). The political stand of Jayaprakash Narayan was quite clear that he would in no case associate with the opposition parties in the election if they do not contest as a single party. To stop the ruling Congress from coming to power by consolidating the non-Congress votes was one thing, but to transform a merger into a political alternative and sustain a new party having programmes and policies was altogether another matter. A single party was the conclusive outcome of the resilience shown by the opposition parties despite acknowledging the existing wedge among them. Therefore, the success of a merger should not be measured by its longevity but by its ability to immediately undo constitutional retrogression and revamp the political institutions.

On 23 January, the formation of the Janata Party was formally announced. This decision was reached, ‘for the purpose of the proposed elections’ (Limaye, 1994, p. 213). Charan Singh, Asoka Mehta, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Surendra Mohan played a significant role in the political process (Ankit, 2017, p. 41). The qualitative expansion plan of the party was supposed to happen after the 1977 election. The leadership question between Morarji Desai and Charan Singh was temporarily resolved. In place of the word ‘Congress’ in the new party, Desai was made the president (on Jayaprakash Narayan’s advice), as he was rigid on it and Charan Singh was vice president of the Janata Party. Perhaps this was the only way to make the Janata Party work, as ‘Morarji Desai was not interested in the formation of a new party, [instead] wanted all to join the Congress (O)’ (The Illustrated Weekly of India, 8 May 1983). The CPM made an electoral adjustment with the Janata Party to avoid mutual contests. Once the Emergency was revoked, Jagjivan Ram, who ironically had moved the Emergency resolution in the Lok Sabha and defended it as a minister, left the Congress to form his forum ‘Congress for Democracy,’ (CFD) to contest in alliance with the Janata Party and its symbol against Indira Gandhi.

The Janata manifesto promised to repeal all the constitutional amendments introduced by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency and to amend the constitution making it difficult for an Emergency to be imposed so easily by any future government. It also pledged to repeal the MISA. The substantive issues raised by the opposition, in its election campaign, sought to make people aware of the choice between slavery and freedom, democracy and dictatorship, abdicating the power of the people or asserting it. Besides, the manifesto advocated decentralisation as the centralisation of power goes against the very essence of democracy. The Janata Party won the Lok Sabha election by defeating Indira Gandhi’s Congress. It was historic in the sense that after independence, it was the first non-Congress government at the centre with almost 43% vote share. It had succeeded as a ‘vote-catching device’ (LSD, 31 March 1977, pp. 74–77). The Janata got 298 seats (43% vote share), including Jagjivan Ram’s CFD. The Congress party particularly performed dismally in the North Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and other states like Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Kerala, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Delhi and Odisha.

Conclusion: Reconfiguration of the Framework of Politics

The Janata Party formed the government in 1977. The new government was to restore the constitution by undoing the undemocratic and arbitrary amendments during the Emergency. Another resolve was to ensure stringent measures to make the imposition of emergency difficult by any future government, dismantling the MISA and other draconian rules brought by Congress. Arguably, restoring the political process hardly made sense without restoring the harm committed to democratic institutions and the Constitution. A win for Congress would have maintained ¹³ the status quo of the constitutional amendments enacted during the Emergency that rendered absolute power to the executive over the judiciary and legislature. So, a substantive restoration required a non-Congress government to revamp the democratic system, going beyond merely restoring the political process. The first Presidential address after the formation of the Janata government strongly asserted the urgency to remove the curbs placed on fundamental freedoms and civil liberties, to restore the rule of law and freedom of the press (Presidential Address to the Parliament, 28 March 1977) in other words, to correct the harm done to the very foundation of the democracy and politics. The resilience of the Janata Party had to be reflected in rectifying these harms.

The Janata Party proceeded with the reconfiguration of institutions and the constitution. Some of the crucial legislations that restored the dignity of the Indian Constitution had to do with repealing the ‘Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matters Act’ which prohibited the press from reporting the parliamentary proceedings. Moreover, the Janata government also repealed much-abused MISA and amended the Representation of Peoples Act to nullify the amendment done by the Congress government during emergency, which put the Prime Minister beyond the ambit of judicial scrutiny. To reconfigure the political system, the Janata Party envisioned a restoration of the ‘balance between the people and Parliament, Parliament and the Judiciary, the Judiciary and the Executive, the States and the Centre, the Citizen and the government’ (Presidential Address to the Parliament, 28 March 1977). However, the difference between the plan and the practice, and the extent to which they could achieve such a reconfiguration of institutions and constitutional provisions, lies in the story of the fissioning of the Janata party. Nevertheless, the Janata government could successfully revoke the Emergency, repeal various Constitutional Amendments ¹⁴ introduced during the Emergency, make the Emergency provisions more stringent, set up commissions of SCs, STs and minorities, improve press freedom, constitute the Mandal Commission (headed by B. P. Mandal) to suggest ways of improving the socio-economic backward classes. After the Congress regime, the Janata Party rushed through various sociopolitical reforms and constitutional measures to redeem the institutions of democratic governance despite an unstable government due to factionalism and the looming leadership crisis.

As stated earlier, some of the fundamental issues of the respective opposition parties were left unaddressed, which eventually proved to be an Achilles heel. The fragmentation of opposition parties was predicted by various leaders and later even Socialists like Madhu Limaye and Jana Sangh dissident Balraj Madhok, given its grotesque formation in a hurry and unyielding of organisational/ideological issues by the respective parties. In reality, the Janata Party never became a homogeneous organisation in terms of its structure or function, for instance, the trade unions, youth and student organisations of various erstwhile parties not only continued to exist as they were before the merger but also criticising and opposing each other and actively involved in demonstrations and mobilisation against the Janata government. Though the merger of principal parties was somehow realised as a measure of resilience, their respective subsidiary organisations were left to work independently and autonomously. This contributed to the proliferation of factions in the Janata Party as the issue of leadership was already simmering between Morarji Desai and Charan Singh besides other ideological and programmatic differences.

This article shows that the resilience of the Opposition was neither based on the mirage of the absolute unity of policies and programmes nor yielding respective parties’ ideology, but on the unity of purpose meant to restore constitutional democracy. Therefore, there was a chasm that could widen anytime leading to the fragmentation of these parties, as happened in 1980 with the Janata Party. The unity of purpose was betrayed by power-grabbing, respective political ambitions and opportunism, leaving a fragmented and exasperated Opposition in the aftermath of the ‘second coming of Indira’ in 1980 (Gould, 1980). The opposition’s resilience shaped in the 1970s under the authoritarian spectacle of the Congress government has limited yet significant achievements by undoing the permanent harm done to the form, substance and framework of the Indian democracy. Indira Gandhi’s ‘regime incontrovertibly enjoyed carte blanche to recast institutions, and even society’ (Jaffrelot & Anil, 2020), was undone by the resilient Opposition. The opposition’s resilience proved to be a prerequisite in defeating the Congress. Being organised and being resilient are two different expressions. Despite lacking organisational strength, repetitive failure of electoral alliances and disunity on policy and programmes in the Opposition camps that affected their cohesiveness; their resilience and solidarity were the outcomes of the onslaught by Indira Gandhi. Policy questions such as the issue of reservation, double membership of RSS and erstwhile Jana Sangh members, and growing conflict between the urban middle class and rural aspirations, also contributed to non-performance and factionalism leading to the fall of the government and disintegration of the Janata party. This phenomenon fragmented Opposition politics vis-a-vis the Congress. The Opposition’s resilience became a possibility after acknowledging the differences in ideology, policy, programme or even the political approach of the opposition parties.