Morally and procedurally justified argument for the moral obligations of physicians toward pregnant women (and fetuses) in the context of maternal–fetal surgery

Abstract

In the context of maternal–fetal surgery (MFS), an attempt to justify pregnant women and physicians’ moral obligations toward the fetus has been made based on the concept of ‘the fetus as a patient’. Somewhere else, we have questioned the internal coherence and consistency of this position. Here, we propose an alternative to the concept of ‘the fetus as a patient’, as the foundation of physicians’ moral obligations in the context of MFS. In light of Deryck Beyleveld’s interpretation of the precautionary principle and in light of Alan Gewirth’s theory of human rights, we propose what we think is a morally and procedurally justified argument for the existence of physicians’ moral obligations toward the women and fetuses they care for in the context of MFS.