Many arguments can be made for or against various regulatory approaches towards germ-line gene therapy and its associated research. A popular conclusion is that it ought to be prohibited, and this is commonly defended by use of a slippery slope argument. This paper will begin by outlining the regulatory approaches adopted towards germ-line gene therapy in EU countries, demonstrating the popularity of the restrictive approach. The slippery slope argument will then be examined. A number of variants of the slippery slope argument will be distinguished, highlighting the conceptually different claims made by each. Finally, examples of slippery slope arguments often invoked to support the prohibition of germ-line gene therapy will be examined with regard to the conditions that each must satisfy to form a theoretically sound argument. I will argue that these conditions are rarely given sufficient consideration.
For the purposes of this paper, “germ-line gene therapy” is defined as the deliberate genetic modification of germ cells (sperm or oocytes), their precursors, or the cells of early embryos where the germ-line1 has yet to be segregated.
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References
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BergerEdward M., and GertBernard M. (1991). “Genetic Disorders and the Ethical Status of Germ-line Gene Therapy.”Journal of Medicine and Philosophy16: 667–683.
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BeyleveldDeryck. (1997). "The Trouble with Tendential Slippery Slope Arguments.”
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French AndersonW. (1989). “Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line?”Journal of Medicine and Philosophy14: 681–693.
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GardnerWardner (1995). “Can Human Genetic Enhancement be Prohibited?”Journal of Medicine and Philosophy201: 65–84.
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PattinsonShaun D. (1999). “Wrongful Life Actions as a Means of Regulating Use of Genetic and Reproductive Technologies.”Health Law Journal7: 19–32.
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18.
The “germ-line” is the part that can be passed on to future generations.
19.
See Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b for a more detailed explanation of the laws of EU countries. Much of the information in this section was derived from this, although it has been updated and modified for use here. English translations of some of these laws can be found in Bulletin of Medical Ethics: German law (December 1990, 9-11) and Finnish law (February 2000, 7-8).
20.
For a discussion of some private law responses to the developing reproductive and genetic technologies, see Pattinson 1999.
21.
Act on Procreative Medicine 275/1992, s. 9(2); Law No. 460 of 1997; Law 94-653 of 29 July 1994, which asserts Article 16-4 of The Civil Code; Embryo Protection Act 1990, s. 5(1)/(2); and Law 115 of 1991, s.2; respectively.
22.
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Sch. 2, para. 1(4)), and Sch. 2, para. 3(4).
23.
Law 35 of November 1988, s. 15(2)(b).
24.
Medical Research Act No. 488 of 1999, s. 15.
25.
In Italy the National Bioethics Committee (CNB) has published a document accepting somatic gene therapy while condemning germ-line gene therapy. There is a “Disengno di legge” (project of law) addressing medically assisted reproduction, which was passed by the Lower Chamber of the Italian Parliament in May 26 1999, but this has yet to be passed by the Upper Chamber and does not directly address germ-line gene therapy. (Information provided by Roberto Mordacci.)
26.
The Convention has been signed by ten countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden), of which three have also ratified it (Denmark, Greece, and Spain). It has not yet been signed by Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, or the UK.
27.
The Declaration also declares that all procedures affecting an individual's genome should only be undertaken after “rigorous and prior assessment of the potential risks and benefits” (Article 5(a)).
28.
The literature offers many alternative, and generally complementary, classificatory structures for slippery slope arguments. Therefore, many features of the classificatory framework offered here have already been anticipated. See, e.g., Williams 1985 (who distinguished between “horrible result” and “arbitrary result” slippery slope arguments); Walton 1992 (who distinguishes between “Sorites,” “causal,” and “precedent” slippery slope arguments); Lamb 1988 (who discusses a wide range of distinctions); van der Burg 1991 (who distinguishes between empirical and logical slippery slope arguments; although his empirical version is narrower than mine); Holtug 1993 (who supports van der Burg's distinctions); McGleenan 1995 (who distinguishes between logical and rhetorical slippery slope arguments).
29.
The versions outlined above are not comprehensive. Another example is the rhetorical version, which is not really an argument at all but merely a rhetorical device warning of the dangers inherent in any new knowledge or technology. Other versions are not explored in this paper.
30.
The vast majority of what I say will, however, also apply to slippery slope arguments of type (ii).
31.
Due to lack of space, I have had to avoid addressing many of the moral issues raised. Some relevant issues are explored in Pattinson 1999, and Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000a.
32.
This point is made in Beyleveld 1997 with regard to what the author terms “tendential slippery slope arguments”.
33.
French Anderson (1989, 682) presents such an argument where A is allowing somatic cell therapy.
34.
Gardner also presents a more complex slippery slope argument of his own, arguing that a ban on genetic enhancement won't be sufficient to prevent its occurrence. The bottom of this argument's slope, the undermining of any ban on genetic enhancement, will clearly be considered morally impermissible for those who wish to prohibit genetic enhancement. What is, perhaps, more problematic is the limited empirical evidence linking A and B. Nonetheless, given the apparent limited conclusion that Gardner wishes to draw from this evidence—that we ought to carefully consider what enforcement mechanisms to use—this does not appear to be overly problematic.
35.
There are numerous subjects of germ-line therapy, including the entity on which the manipulation is performed and that entity's future offspring.
