Abstract
The British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade should be characterised as elite due to its adaptability. An advanced level of training made paratroopers into high-quality, elite soldiers who were able to adapt both during an operation and between operations. This adaptation was successful during its period of offensive actions, specifically Operations Hasty, Dragoon, and Manna. The piece contributes to the military effectiveness debate through an analysis of a single elite unit. It further challenges the overemphasis of studying Second World War British airborne operations in North-Western Europe alone, adding to the underdeveloped study of the Mediterranean theatre's Allied airborne units.
Introduction
Moltke the Elder famously noted that even the best plans fail to survive contact with the enemy. 1 Therefore, adaptability – the ability to respond to ‘utterly unpredictable’ and ‘entirely unknown’ challenges – is crucial for highly effective combat units to succeed in battle. 2 It is a major factor which makes an elite fighting unit elite. These units should be intra-operationally adaptable – adapting to unforeseen circumstances within an operation to successfully complete their operational objectives, falling back on their elevated level of training to do so. They should also be inter-operationally adaptable – being able to adapt between different types of operations: from raiding to counterinsurgency operations. For the British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade, the quality of adaptability, stemming from individual and collective training, set this elite unit apart from other conventional forces of the period. 3
Elite units are the highest-quality units a military has to offer, characterised by their highly trained personnel and their outstanding combat effectiveness, thereby facilitating operational success. 4 Although many elite units are defined by their unique specialisations, their relative qualitative advantage differentiates them from perceived regular troops, both at a unit and individual level. 5 This capacious definition of elite troops has led to their conflation with special forces troops, with the term being misused as a byword for special forces. 6 Consequently, conventional elite units have remained overlooked and understudied. Defining elite units is further problematised as the term is often applied to a unit retrospectively. Recent studies of modern units have focused on analysing what characteristics define modern elite units, such as James White's analysis of the Royal Marines Commandos which highlights the need for troops to be adaptable in combat. 7 However, many historians label units as elite without examining the varying characteristics that define these higher-quality forces. 8 This approach has left the literature detailing what makes historical elite units so effective in combat rather neglected and needing further research.
Existing literature analysing combat effectiveness is broad, as exemplified by Jonathan Fennell's wide-ranging analysis of how the 8th Army solved the morale crisis in North Africa, with the quality of command, training, and technology all being important to provide successful battlefield performance. 9 Both older works on historical conflicts and modern works on contemporary armies have focused on an army's grand strategic adaptability, adjusting to a certain style of war, plotting the learning curve of a particular combatant in a conflict. 10 The debate has recently widened from purely conventional units to an investigation into how smaller special forces units proved effective in combat, especially in the peripheral theatres of the Second World War such as the Mediterranean. 11 However, conventional elite units, like the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade, have received little investigation regarding their proficiency in combat operations.
The 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade gained little fame during and after the Second World War, even though it undertook many operations after its detachment from 1st Airborne Division in November 1943. The Brigade was given scant attention in Terence Otway's official history of airborne operations in the Second World War, covered in only a single chapter. Instead, he devoted most of the book to the major actions of the 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions, particularly those in North-Western Europe. 12 This approach became common in the historiography of airborne operations. Both academic and popular works mainly focus on North-Western Europe in 1944, omitting operations in peripheral theatres like the Mediterranean. 13 Most historians are fixated on Operation Market Garden, particularly the failure at Arnhem in September 1944, finding it far easier to learn lessons about combat proficiency from what went wrong in a singular operation. 14 However, it is worthwhile to also examine what led to military effectiveness in successful operations. The key characteristics that ensured success throughout a range of challenging circumstances can be highlighted by expanding the study to the multiple, geographically widespread, Mediterranean operations of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade.
Few historians study the role of airborne forces in the Mediterranean Theatre after Operation Husky. 15 John Greenacre, however, has pioneered the academic study of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade's role in the latter period of the war. 16 His later work covered the unit in Operation Manna, arguing that British airborne units were ‘Flexible Enough to Adapt’ to undertake post-conflict stabilisation missions. 17 By focusing solely on post-conflict stabilisation missions conducted by multiple British parachute units, he does not effectively illustrate an elite unit's experience of inter-operational adaptation to a range of different operational styles. Instead, he leaves this analysis to be based on an assumptive comparison to a conventional airborne mission. Furthermore, little analysis is conducted concerning the fighting actions which the Brigade undertook between 1944 and 1945. Hence, his work does not fully address the tactical issues faced by the Brigade's men nor their consequent intra-operational tactical adaptations, somewhat limiting Greenacre's analysis. Thus, this piece will expand on Greenacre's thesis by using untapped primary sources to explore how an elite unit could adapt both inter-operationally and intra-operationally, alongside how this adaptability could be induced through training.
Across the seven months from June 1944 to January 1945, the Brigade undertook three major operations and successfully adapted to many more operational styles than most regular units during that time. 18 The article will initially investigate the training which promoted adaptability, then cover the Brigade's operations chronologically to illustrate its inter-operational adaptations. After leaving the front lines where the paratroops had been used as conventional infantry, their first engagement was Operation Hasty, occurring between 1 and 7 June 1944. It was a small diversionary raiding operation near Sora, Italy in support of a larger Allied offensive. Although not entirely successful, it provided many lessons to be learned from. The Brigade, after a period of training, then took part in Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France. It was the only conventional parachute operation undertaken, aiming to capture and hold the strategic roads through Le Muy. The Brigade entered France on 15 August 1944 and was withdrawn by 26 August. Although short, this highly successful operation was beset by many issues, providing an excellent case study in intra-operational adaptation. After another period of training, the Brigade entered Greece starting with the capture of Megara airfield by C Company, 4th Battalion, on 12 October 1944, with the majority of the Brigade arriving later on 14 and 16 October by air. This operation, Manna, aimed to expedite the German withdrawal, provide humanitarian aid, and prevent civil war from erupting. This early phase of the operation ended with the predominantly communist Greek guerrilla group Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós (ELAS) uprising in Athens, prompting the Brigade to vanguard a counterinsurgency in support of the British-backed Greek Government, with this final action occurring between early December 1944 and January 1945. 19 These operations saw the Brigade efficiently learn from the challenges it faced and proficiently adapt its planning and training to become more effective for its subsequent operations. Moreover, when put into an unknown situation, the Brigade's paratroopers were able to quickly recalibrate by drawing on past experiences, prior training, or their high quality of mental agility to successfully solve these challenges. The Brigade's elite nature was hallmarked by its superior ability to swiftly adapt to a vast range of operational styles alongside rapidly adjusting to the reality faced within an operation, relying on its high-quality, well-trained soldiers to provide battlefield success.
Training for Quality
Although paratroopers were trained to journey into battle by air, parachuting constituted only one part of their preparation and was only relevant at the very start of operations. 20 Far more time was spent training for, and participating in, fighting on the ground. Therefore, this section focuses on the Brigade's ground-based training for fighting, which honed key skills of all ranks in the unit for their upcoming operations. Elite units, like the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade, are defined by their high-quality individual soldiers, who are preserved as a potent, cohesive unit via training. Regular advanced training helped enhance and maintain the basic qualities of mental and physical resilience alongside reinforcing more specific skills, consequently providing the Brigade with highly effective soldiers who could adapt to the realities they faced in battle.
Brigadier Charles Hilary Vaughan Pritchard, commander of the 2nd Brigade, had always highlighted that the unit's performance rested on its ‘first-class’ soldiers, who had been trained to a high degree to develop a range of skills and characteristics. 21 This degree of instruction differed greatly from the standard training most conscripts received when originally joining the army. Emma Newland noted that basic training was designed to make a civilian into a soldier, inculcating the need for new troops to rely on their superiors to give them orders to carry out in unison with the rest of their unit. 22 Although this system productively created social cohesion within a group of men, it also aimed to break down individual thought and action. This approach heavily impacted regular units, leading to a lack of initiative in battle alongside a failure to adapt effectively to problems they faced. 23 Instead, the Brigade valued independent thinking, high-quality individuals fighting cohesively. Its training regime emphasised these characteristics to ensure both the large pre-existing core of veterans and the varying quality of new recruits were mentally and physically agile during combat. 24
One aspect of this intensified preparation was a focus on the individual, which was especially pertinent for paratroopers. Men would regularly be isolated from their comrades after parachuting into battle; hence many soldiers would have to act independently before rendezvousing with the rest of their unit. These circumstances meant that men would have to be motivated to fight on an individual level, not merely out of the social cohesion which the soldier-turned-historian S.L.A. Marshall saw as compelling many Allied units. 25 Therefore, it was essential to train men so that they felt competent fighting alone. 26 From June 1944, the Brigade regularly spent time outside the front line, allowing far more time to be spent training than most regular units, thus increasing its soldiers’ quality. 27
Adaptable individual soldiers required the mental acuity to formulate effective solutions when confronted with unforeseen challenges. By 1944, the unit exclusively recruited volunteers from the Mediterranean theatre to replace its operational losses sustained during earlier fighting in Italy, differing from the Brigade's initial composition of both volunteers and men from converted standard line infantry units. 28 As part of the rigorous selection process, new officers underwent interviews conducted by the brigade to assess their character, ensuring that only those deemed sufficiently mentally resilient to command in demanding operational environments were accepted. 29 Additionally, those who struggled with the psychological demands of parachuting either withdrew voluntarily or were removed before completing their training. 30 This process ensured that only those with the requisite mental resilience and ability to think decisively under pressure were accepted into the Brigade. Consequently, paratroopers were prepared to confront challenges immediately upon landing, rather than becoming overwhelmed by the psychological demands of their airborne entry into battle.
Both veterans and new recruits were continually trained to stay mentally sharp. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and specific lower ranks would be put through three Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT) per month. 31 These exercises could be set up to wargame a wide range of enemy actions the Brigade may have had to meet, either by using maps or in the field. 32 TEWTs challenged the Brigade's commanders to formulate an effective, albeit hypothetical, response. For example, TEWT ‘Holdfast’ saw selected members of the Brigade spend a day wargaming a scenario similar to the upcoming Operation Dragoon, testing them on how to first organise and then defend key roads and their battalion areas. 33 This exercise went into great detail, ranging from being tasked with positioning guns and strong points in the most advantageous places to conducting the correct drills in order to occupy their positions after dropping. 34 Regular TEWTs, like ‘Holdfast’, ensured the commanders’ tactical decision-making could be regularly tested, making sure lessons had been learned and ensuring commanders would have the mental ability to adapt and adroitly respond to the challenges faced during battle.
Men were also kept physically fit to meet the challenges they might face in battle. During their time in advanced training, new recruits were kept fit by daily personal training and boxing. 35 This high-intensity physical regimen was similar for veterans of the unit, who were sent on weekly route marches. 36 The men's physical skills were further tested in less typical styles. For example, athletic events were held to promote competition among the soldiers, pushing them to be the best individuals in terms of physical fitness. 37 This variety of exercises helped build up paratroopers’ fitness to such a point that they could tackle challenging landscapes or long-distance marches after being dropped wide. This preparation was proven effective with the Brigade's experiences in Operation Hasty, where paratroopers traversed the physically demanding Italian Apennines with relative ease to get from their drop zones to their mountain strong points and then return to Allied front lines under German fire. 38 Therefore, by being trained to be at the peak of physical performance, paratroopers’ bodies were able to adapt to the challenges they faced during operations.
Paratroopers were further physically challenged during more recreational breaks. They played sports, such as football and rugby, during their training time at Italian beaches. 39 Team games helped create social cohesion in a less regimented way than standard marches and drills, as men formed social bonds and relied on their fellow soldiers to win against their opponents. This recreational preparation helped build up the Brigade's morale, so they remained motivated to fight when called upon. These breaks also enabled a slowdown in training, giving soldiers a change from the intensive regimen they had experienced. Thus, when men were called upon to fight, they were fresh, mentally sharp, and highly motivated in battle, rather than suffering from poor morale due to exhaustion caused by overtraining. 40
The practice of extensive battle drill was also incorporated to maintain morale, ensuring men were increasingly proficient in complex battlecraft at a tactical level. 41 The Brigade did this adeptly, heavily investing time and effort into each soldier. Every new volunteer had to complete advanced training at the Brigade’s own battle school, which was significantly more thorough than the basic instruction most regular troops received. 42 Volunteers in advanced training spent most of the twelve-day course practising new drills and learning how to fire their weapons accurately during both day and night. 43 Night-firing drills were crucial for paratroopers, who would regularly jump into combat at night or half-light, with the most important fighting occurring in the dark. Moreover, when actively serving in the unit, men spent a large proportion of time on the range perfecting their firing techniques and were subsequently tested by taking part in rifle-shooting competitions. 44 These events further encouraged men to prove themselves as being the best individual rifleman or best machine-gun squad in terms of accurate, effective firing. This training aimed to make these actions second nature during actual combat for all ranks, allowing more time to be spent on thinking how to defeat their enemy. 45 This approach built up each paratrooper's self-confidence, allowing soldiers to adapt to the realities they faced while seamlessly using their weapons and combat drills at the correct time, irrespective of the time of day or their levels of fear. This approach paid dividends during active battle. As Pritchard's men had been instructed to fire accurately and had been taught the practice of aiming ahead thoroughly, paratroopers could proficiently hit moving targets at range as they quickly adapted to use the practice of sniping during the Athens insurrection. 46
The Brigade's men were also trained to handle a wide range of weapons. Recruits were instructed how to use their personal and heavier weapons such as rifles, machine guns, and mortars, along with measures for hand-to-hand combat. 47 Furthermore, paratroopers were expected to know how to use enemy weapons they may find in enemy territory when behind the lines. Thus, all ranks were instructed in handling and firing enemy weapons, with a five-day course being provided to familiarise themselves with their operation. 48 This preparation enabled each man to become increasingly proficient in a wide range of weaponry, which would allow even standard riflemen to adapt quickly to operate machine guns and mortars if operational circumstances required it. The effectiveness of this training was later demonstrated in Athens, where British paratroopers successfully engaged ELAS fighters using Breda machine guns that had been captured from the insurgents. 49
Adapting from Hasty
The value of training was emphasised in Operation Hasty. As its name suggests, the operation was hastily conceived in forty-eight hours. 50 Consequently, the Brigade only had time to prepare 60 men who had not been trained directly in the asymmetrical style of warfare they had to employ during this raiding operation. 51 The raiding groups had some successes attacking Wehrmacht trucks retreating down the main road in the valley between Sora and Avezzano using mines, grenades, and machine gun fire. 52 It also diverted a battalion of enemy troops away from, and potentially expediting, the main Allied attack on the enemy's frontline in the surrounding area. 53 However, the raiding parties were consequently overpowered by this more numerous and better equipped Wehrmacht force, with the paratroopers failing to extract themselves effectively as they had not been trained for this circumstance. 54
Other than a lack of training, the Brigade was poorly suited to the asymmetrical style of warfare it adopted during Operation Hasty, its first airborne mission. The plan dictated the use of Pritchard's paratroopers as unconventional guerrilla troops fighting against a much larger enemy force. It was completely antithetical to the conceptual plans Pritchard had drawn up for the General Staff in the Mediterranean, arguing that paratroopers needed to be used in a conventional role rather than being sent on ‘cloak and dagger’ special forces missions. 55 Using such a small force meant that when the force was attacked it was unable to put up its own resistance, which was further diluted by splitting into small fighting groups of 20 men or fewer. 56 The decision led to a high casualty rate, as only around half of the force returned to allied lines. 57 Commanders noted that this imperfect force size would be altered for similar subsequent airborne operations, with a Battalion or Brigade sized force to be utilised. 58 A larger force would allow the raiding group to act conventionally to withstand strong enemy counterattacks on British strong points and take a more aggressive approach to attacking withdrawing Wehrmacht units. The plans for possible larger raiding operations near Florence instead envisioned a larger force to conventionally attack Wehrmacht columns and defend against resulting counterattacks. 59 If the whole Brigade was to be used productively during the subsequent operations, it would need more time to prepare for action, allowing for trained men to be employed. 60 This extra time would allow a larger force to be prepared to a much higher level and be far more potent when deployed, preventing a repeat of the high casualty rate seen during Operation Hasty. This change was clearly implemented before Operation Dragoon, as the Brigade was given over a month to prime its men for the assault, including specific operational exercises such as Exercise Confidence. 61 This additional training enabled Pritchard's men to adapt and respond effectively to the challenges they faced as part of the larger First Airborne Task Force during Operation Dragoon, a conventional airborne operation where the Brigade captured and held key roads using strong points against Wehrmacht counterattacks far more effectively than in Operation Hasty. 62
Operation Hasty also reiterated the need for surprise and the psychological impact of airborne forces upon the enemy. Even before June 1944, Pritchard had noted that the success of any airborne operation was reliant on the use of surprise to destabilise one's enemies. 63 Although the group was able to rendezvous and set up defences unmolested, they deliberately lost the element of surprise to masquerade as a larger force. This result was facilitated by dropping 200 dummy parachutists along with the small group of paratroopers, causing German Command to believe a much larger force of paratroopers had landed behind their lines. 64 The action aimed to divert more Wehrmacht troops away from the frontline to attack the parachute force and hasten the wider Wehrmacht retreat. 65 The raid succeeded in creating confusion among German Command, which diverted at least one battalion to search for the paratrooper force. Critically, however, it failed to prevent the destruction of key bridges and was relatively costly in high-quality manpower for such a small gain. 66 Nonetheless, the raid illustrated two key points to the Brigade. Firstly, the element of surprise was critical to enable the force to organise, move towards, and then attack its targets while Wehrmacht troops were unprepared. This approach would allow for a small number of British paratroopers to defeat a larger enemy force. Secondly, it proved the effectiveness of dummy parachutists as an active force multiplier to the Brigade. Diversions confused German commanders and duped them into deploying valuable resources against these simulated airborne landings. These lessons were productively implemented during Operation Dragoon, with the landings around Le Muy taking the German Command by surprise, who then failed to provide an effective counterattack to the British airborne landings due to the confusion of command created by simulated parachute drops near Toulouse. 67 Although operationally ineffectual, the Brigade was able to make use of the lessons learned during Operation Hasty. Rather than continuing to make the same mistakes, the unit proved its elite nature by swiftly rectifying these issues through adjustments to its planning and training regimes. This learning curve enabled subsequent airborne operations, like Dragoon, to be highly successful, underscoring the Brigade's impactful inter-operational adaptability.
Adapting in Dragoon
Beyond these inter-operational adaptations, such as those between Hasty and Dragoon, elite units are potent as they can quickly adapt to the realities faced on the ground during an operation, changing their responses to successfully overcome unforeseen challenges and achieve their operational objectives. For the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade, Operation Dragoon's main phase of fighting between 15 and 17 August 1944 provides a key case study to show the Brigade's tactical adaptability within an operation – intra-operational adaptability. 68 Unlike many regular British troops, the Brigade quickly adapted to the challenges they faced when in action. 69 Individuals proved themselves to be mentally and physically resilient while efficiently drawing on a wide range of training to effectively complete their operational objective of preventing Wehrmacht reserves from pushing through the Le Muy area to attack the nascent Allied beachhead between Cavalaire and Agay. Although facing second-rate Wehrmacht troops, Pritchard's Brigade adapted to a range of challenges: the response of well-motivated paratroopers who had been dropped wide; the main body changing their actions to counteract the low number of troops dropped in the correct area; or taking measures to operate capably with American airborne troops. The Brigade's soldiers fell back on their training to effectively adapt and overcome the challenges they faced to complete their operational objectives, showcasing the unit's elite nature.
The most critical issue faced by Pritchard during Operation Dragoon was that a large proportion of his Brigade was delivered inaccurately. The dawn drop on 15 August was plagued by bad weather for a parachute operation. Thick fog meant that Troop Carrier Command's pilots were unable to navigate using visual aids and relied upon their new Eureka-Rebecca navigational aids. 70 For the operation overall, this new system worked very well, with 85% of the Anglo-American First Airborne Task Force being dropped in the correct position. 71 However, the British contingent fared far worse: the failure of the Rebecca system on the lead aircraft of one group saw approximately 25 aircraft drop most of the 5th Battalion and about one-third of the 4th Battalion around Fayence, 15 to 20 miles to the north-west of the drop zone north of Le Muy. 72 The Brigade itself was severely weakened, operating at less than 60% strength by 10:15 a.m., about five hours after the initial landings. 73 These circumstances were far worse for the Brigade than those of the planned accurate drop. Therefore, it was vital that both the main body and returning groups of the Brigade adapted to successfully fulfil their operational objectives.
The men who had been dropped in the wrong area had to react to their isolated positions in enemy territory, far removed from their own main objective. Before the operation, the Brigade's men had been ordered to return to the rendezvous point without engaging the enemy in order to quickly concentrate manpower and hold the critical nodal point around Le Muy. 74 Some paratroopers who were dropped wide did heed these orders and returned quickly to their units. Many had to first work out where they had landed. Captain Harold Coxen, the 4th Battalion's commander, asked a civilian for a road map to return to Le Muy and then walked to the rendezvous point as his own military map did not even cover the area in which he was dropped. 75 Another paratrooper, Major Dan Calvert, instead used his initiative to quickly return to the rendezvous area near Le Muy. Rather than walking he took the local bus, with French locals concealing him with cabbages so that he could quickly pass unnoticed through a Wehrmacht checkpoint. 76 The elite nature of the unit's men could be demonstrated by their mental fitness, being both resilient and able to think quickly on their feet. When faced with being dropped far from their objective in enemy territory, they used their initiative to return to their unit with speed, intending to fight rather than just surrender.
Much of the mental agility used by these returning paratroopers had been instilled by dedicated assembly training. 77 Exercise Menace, taking place from 28 to 29 July 1944, saw a realistic rehearsal for Operation Dragoon for the 5th Battalion. Troops had to assemble at a rendezvous point, move to their objectives in tactical groups and then undertake key tasks to protect their objectives, all the time while being under attack from the 6th Battalion acting as the enemy. 78 Other training included drop zone drills and reassembly practice, further helping troops become accustomed to what would be expected of them during operations. 79 The key skills of effective return and assembly to the rendezvous point was further reinforced with Exercise Cumbersome, which provided a realistic simulation of a brigade sized parachute operation, enabling men to gain foreknowledge of the confusion created by a whole brigade being dropped into the drop zone and needing to reassemble efficiently. 80 Although paratroopers had not been prepared for such wide drops, the surprise and fear of active battle was largely overcome by training. It helped ensure men instinctively knew what to do when returning to and assembling at the rendezvous point, irrespective of where these men had been dropped or whether they were being fired at. 81
Furthermore, many of those from the 4th and 5th Battalions returning from being dropped wide near Fayence took matters into their own hands, forming into larger groups to return to Le Muy. Many of these groups met Wehrmacht resistance while returning and disregarded orders to not engage, choosing instead to attack these Wehrmacht reserve columns moving towards Le Muy. For example, in the mid-morning of 15 August, an Anglo-American force of 25 men ambushed a convoy of ‘about 15’ enemy vehicles and were quickly joined by Major Blackwood's group which contained most of D Company. With supporting machine gun and mortar fire, they inflicted ‘heavy casualties’ on the force of 60 to 70 Wehrmacht troops, heavily damaged ‘several’ vehicles, and forced this Wehrmacht column to withdraw. 82 On the morning of 16 August Lieutenant Holden's group prevented another batch of 15 enemy vehicles from pushing south to Le Muy via an ambush. 83 Although Holden's force had to withdraw to the hills, as a larger enemy infantry force than his own pushed in, the enemy infantry were forced to disperse and the enemy vehicles were abandoned. 84 These returning ambush-setting parties adapted by realising that the importance of the major operational objective outweighed their tactical orders not to engage. Hence these groups engaged to prevent Wehrmacht forces from pushing their reserves towards Le Muy to try and break through and attack the nascent American beachhead. 85 By using their own initiative, these returning raiding parties were able to add real value in the crucial early stages of the operation by acting aggressively, rather than passively returning and arriving too late to help the main body repulse these attacks nearer to Le Muy. By adapting and ambushing Wehrmacht reserves, these groups caught the Wehrmacht columns by surprise, forcing them to retreat and preventing them from attacking the main body around Le Muy, thus helping deliver the operational objective of dominating the village.
These returning parties applied much of their training in these actions, drawing on exercises which had prepared them for ambushing enemy columns. Exercise Confidence, taking place a month and a half before Dragoon, focused on realistic training similar to the situation encountered during the latter operation. 86 The exercise instilled the need to stay quiet, concealed, and camouflaged when in enemy territory in order to take the enemy by surprise and, critically, to take offensive action before the enemy unit could attack them. 87 These lessons gave these men the skills required to perform a successful ambush. The large amount of physical preparation further aided these returning men, who were prepared to cover the relatively large distance in a short amount of time and still have the mental endurance to lay ambushes, alongside the physical ability to attack Wehrmacht reserves. 88 Therefore, extensive training facilitated these soldiers to adapt, and profit from, the circumstances faced while returning to Le Muy by aggressively ambushing enemy columns.
The units of the Brigade around Le Muy, which the ambushing groups were returning to, proved themselves to be elite by adapting to their unplanned numerical disadvantage to successfully complete their objectives in the operation. Although planning for the Brigade rested on the assumption that 75% of the force would be available to fight near Le Muy within the first six hours after landing, Pritchard's main force was operating far below this assumed figure at just under 60%. 89 However, the Brigade's primary objectives were quickly fulfilled, focusing on the operational objectives of dominating the nodal point of Le Muy and holding the Landing Zone for reserves to land in gliders. 90 The 6th Battalion was 70% intact, thus took its objectives of La Motte and Clastron quickly, taking the latter at the cost of one man while capturing 87 enemy prisoners. 91 However, the 4th Battalion was left far worse off upon regrouping, as only 30% to 40% reported to the rendezvous on time. 92 Although numbers were severely weakened, the high quality of the unit enabled it to complete the majority of its tasks on time. Half of B Company took Hill 113.5 against light opposition by 7 a.m. and held it against small Wehrmacht counterattacks throughout the day, allowing the Brigade to control the high ground dominating Le Muy. 93 The qualitative advantage of Pritchard's paratroopers was proven by the fact that these objectives were captured by a small number of British paratroopers, who themselves took very few casualties but caused disproportionately high losses to Wehrmacht units.
The 4th Battalion's C Company was also able to take Les Serres by 10 a.m.; however, this was achieved with relatively heavy Wehrmacht resistance. 94 Although low on men, the British paratroopers were able to clear their enemy from a group of well-defended buildings behind a 10-foot-high wall. Captain Geoffrey Mortimer noted how they used mortars to suppress the defenders and cover their frontal attack over the wall to take the field post office and bakery in hand-to-hand fighting, killing 16 enemies and taking 29 prisoners for the loss of 14 British casualties. 95 Moreover, the action facilitated the capture of the bridge over the River Nartuby ahead of schedule, opening up the route to Le Muy by noon on 15 August. 96 The fight for Les Serres, once again, showed the qualitative advantage of these elite British troops. They were able to dislodge their enemy from well-defended positions by falling back on their extensive training which had taken place before the operation. The men had been appropriately prepared, refreshing the skills they learned during the advanced infantry training course. Over July 1944, the men attended lectures on critical fighting techniques and practised the firing of personal and heavy weapons, including mortars. 97 This long period of preparation ensured that each man was readied to a high standard of combat effectiveness before entering active combat and was able to choose the most productive course of action to efficiently satisfy their objectives.
Furthermore, the Royal Engineer detachments completed their tasks of setting up roadblocks and laying mines across the key roads and bridges around Le Muy by 10:15 a.m. on D-Day and continued to do so once key routes were captured. These actions prevented any chance for Wehrmacht reserves to quickly thrust through these main roads to counterattack the main seaborne invasion. 98 The engineers relied on their simulated training to perform this task to a high standard, having mastered how to create roadblocks using mines in training. They learned how to do this both during the daytime and at night in Exercise Menace, which simulated the capture and holding of roads as would be required during Dragoon. 99 This preparation elevated the confidence of these men, who were well prepared to efficiently carry out their tasks in combat to quickly succeed in completing their main objectives.
The mining of key roads by the Royal Engineers, alongside the capture of the high ground and major access roads into Le Muy by the 4th and 6th Battalions prevented any Wehrmacht forces from moving into or out of the village through their sectors. The 5th Battalion reinforced these actions. The Battalion was severely weakened by the inaccurate dropping, with just under one company's worth of men dropped near the rendezvous. They were too low on numbers to carry out their main task of taking and holding St. Michel d’Esclans, preventing enemy transit through the sector. 100 Nevertheless, this small group used their initiative and adapted to this set of circumstances by acting as the Brigade HQ's Defence Company. 101 By the mid-morning, the small group from the 5th Battalion, with the support of the men of the Field Battery at the rendezvous, had established patrols to the east and north of the landing zone. These enabled critical glider landings to take place protected from enemy attack on D-Day, bringing in reserves for the Brigade in the morning and the Brigade's artillery and American manpower with the 550th Battalion in the evening. 102 These patrols meant that there was a sufficient presence of men around St. Michel d’Esclans to ensure the road through this area was blocked and bound to stall any Wehrmacht counterattack. The Brigade was able to complete its major tasks of dominating the nodal point of Le Muy, along with holding the critical landing zone while at 60% of the Brigade's manpower, 15% below what was expected when the operation was planned. 103 These elite troops were able to adapt to the circumstances of being heavily undermanned and make the right decisions to still successfully achieve their objectives, showing a great deal of mental resilience to do so.
However, the Brigade had to adapt further to respond to the unexpected Wehrmacht force disposition and reaction to the airborne landing. The Brigade's planning for Dragoon assumed its paratroopers would be attacked quickly by mobile armoured Wehrmacht reserves from outside Le Muy, reflecting the usual response to airborne landings. 104 However, in these critical early hours, the Wehrmacht command was paralysed by confusion over the intended Allied objective due to the diversionary simulated airborne drops near Toulouse and the widespread dropping of the airborne force itself, making the operational force seem far larger and more dangerous. 105 Therefore, the expected Wehrmacht mobile counterattack failed to materialise, apart from small groups of motorised infantry which were easily neutralised by groups of returning paratroopers and the forces around Le Muy. 106 Instead, Le Muy was defended far better than had been expected, well-fortified by a garrison of 200 men who, although mainly second-rate troops, had positioned men and machine guns to maximise the impact of their small force. 107 Furthermore, planning envisioned that the 4th Battalion, supported by the 5th Battalion and the Brigade's artillery, would seize Le Muy. 108 However, both Battalions were heavily undermanned throughout D-Day, and the Brigade lacked full artillery support due to the late landing of the Brigade's own field battery and anti-tank guns. 109 Therefore, any chance of capturing Le Muy alone without excessive casualties was unrealistic. 110 Pritchard's response to this issue proved that adaptability was vital at the highest levels of command in addition to the lower ranks who were actively engaged in fighting the Brigade's enemies. He adapted by conserving his weakened force and correctly prioritised completing his primary operational orders of dominating Le Muy and securing the landing zone for the 550th US Glider Battalion, rather than squandering his forces by attacking Le Muy and leaving the landing zones undefended. 111 Consequently, this decision allowed the 550th Battalion to land safely with few casualties and then focus fully on attacking Le Muy with artillery support provided by the Brigade, resulting in a successful attack on Le Muy late on 16 August 1944. 112
Pritchard's Brigade also showed its elite credentials by operating with its American allies effectively after they had landed to successfully complete their joint objective of controlling the nodal point of Le Muy. Interoperability was critical for the Brigade during the operation as it was the only British unit in the wider Anglo-American First Airborne Task Force, which was only formed a little more than a month before Operation Dragoon. 113 Pritchard's British Brigade needed to work closely with American airborne units to complete both their respective objectives: most importantly working with the American 550th Battalion to capture Le Muy. 114 One 6-pounder anti-tank gun was brought up to destroy the strong point which had repulsed the first attempt on Le Muy on the night of 15 and 16 August, usefully supporting the 550th Battalion's attack later in the morning to start relatively unhindered. 115 Furthermore, this attack saw the American Battalion rely on both British artillery support and the British 4th and 6th Battalions to block off any escape routes from Le Muy. 116 American and British forces worked together to fruitfully destroy this Wehrmacht force and complete their second phase objective. British forward observers provided accurate fire support as they had been trained in US techniques and signals, and they were subsequently tested on a joint exercise on 4 August 1944. 117 Consequently, British artillery could successfully communicate with the Americans and support their attack into Le Muy.
The Brigade also operated with the Americans in a far more impromptu manner, with the flexibility to operate with their allies further demonstrating the elite nature of the unit. Many Americans who were dropped wide were subsequently put into service by their British counterparts. For example, Major Hargreaves noted how the 4th Battalion found a group of 27 Americans who had been dropped in the British zone of operations and were duly put under British command, fighting with the 4th Battalion until the evening of 16 August. 118 This type of occurrence was common, with one Anglo-American party returning from Fayence being able to skilfully co-ordinate an ambush of Wehrmacht reserves. 119 This basic level of interoperability was enabled by a basic level of training. Pritchard's men had gained a certain amount of exposure to their American counterparts. For example, the 2nd Battalion of the American 517th Regimental Combat Team visited the 5th Battalion and shared details on weaponry and techniques with one another. However, they did not complete any major joint exercises together due to the short amount of preparation time between the establishment of the Task Force and the operation. 120 This basic training and knowledge transfer enabled British and American troops of the First Airborne Task Force to successfully fight alongside one another, regardless of whether it was planned or not. By having a basic understanding of how one's allies fought, these elite forces could adapt to fight effectively together to make an impact in the critical first phases of the operation to dominate, and later capture, Le Muy.
Adapting to Manna
Nearly two months after entering southern France, the Brigade had to adapt from this conventional style of operations to its novel role as a policing force in Greece during Operation Manna. Greenacre argues that they adapted well to cope with the dispersion of the whole Brigade into small groups across Greece to try to prevent the eruption of civil war. 121 Therefore, many officers capably took on the responsibility for command and initiative necessitated by the circumstances of Operation Manna, with more junior commanders acting adroitly to disarm and then protect collaborationist Greek Security Battalion personnel from ELAS reprisals. 122 However, the issue of dispersion, in a broader sense, was not specific to Manna as Greenacre suggests. Prior to this, the Brigade had already encountered the issue of dispersion, albeit on a smaller scale and over a reduced timeframe, during Operation Dragoon. The official command structure broke down during the early stages of the operation due to the inaccurate dropping of Pritchard's Brigade, creating many widely dispersed groups of paratroopers. Therefore, junior commanders took the initiative to organise these groups returning to Le Muy and transformed them into potent raiding units. 123 Junior officers had been prepared for the challenging situations they would face in operations during training by TEWTs and exercises, teaching them to have the confidence to take the initiative and use their ingenuity to overcome tactical challenges. 124 Therefore, as many junior officers had already been well prepared and had the brief experience of leading small groups of men independently of higher Brigade and Battalion command during earlier operations, they were better able to adapt to the dispersion experienced in Greece to take control of the issues faced during the policing and fighting actions in Manna. The Brigade's men applied their experience from earlier operations to succeed in their subsequent operations, again highlighting the unit's elite nature.
The issue of dispersion, however, was resolved by early December 1944 as the whole Brigade was concentrated in Athens to combat the ELAS insurgency which aimed to topple the British-backed Greek Government. 125 In order to defeat the insurgency, Pritchard's Brigade had to create an adept military response in an unknown environment. The element of the unknown in Athens was clearly an issue, with Greenacre highlighting the need for the Brigade to adapt to co-operate and fight alongside native Greek forces without any prior training together. 126 The challenge was increased during the insurgency, as the Brigade had to adapt to fighting urban warfare, which it had neither been trained for nor experienced before. The 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade also had to adapt to fight with new allied forces, most importantly the British 23rd Armoured Brigade which made up Arkforce alongside the paratroopers. 127 Pritchard's men quickly learned effective urban combined-arms warfare, working productively with equipment they had rarely fought or trained alongside before. ELAS snipers and machine gunners used multistoreyed urban houses in the area to ambush British troops advancing through streets and crossroads. Thus, the paratroopers learned to use Sherman tanks to provide cover for themselves when moving in the city streets, while symbiotically protecting the tanks from mines and close-quarters attacks. 128 Tanks and armoured cars were also employed by the paratroopers to fire their cannons and machine guns to either suppress or destroy ELAS positions, which would have been costly to clear using infantry alone. 129
Furthermore, paratroopers learned how to proficiently clear an urban area while minimising casualties without supporting armour. A whole street of houses would be cleared at a time on both sides, with men fighting to the top of one house, then either blasting through into the houses next door using explosives or using the roofs to spread laterally across the block, then working downwards to clear the set of houses, killing and capturing insurgents while doing so. 130 The lack of local knowledge the paratroopers had was negated by the fact that many insurgents were rural ELAS fighters who equally lacked local knowledge of the area or how to perform house-to-house fighting, which many rural fighters feared due to the lack of space to retreat into after ambushes. 131 These circumstances reduced the potential potency of ELAS ambushes and made the insurgents far easier to eliminate for the Brigade's men. Nonetheless, adapting on the job highlighted the paratroopers’ skill as Pritchard's men had not been specifically prepared for this style of warfare. Their advanced training gave them the tools to adapt to this new challenge, using their ingenuity to find productive solutions to fight the novel counterinsurgency mission in an urban environment. The unit's learning was proven successful on one of the final days of the insurgency when the Brigade killed and wounded 240 ELAS fighters and captured 520 prisoners. 132
Another important feature of this urban counterinsurgency was the Brigade's approach to local Athenian civilians. Their support was retained in the face of martial law as the Brigade used its stores to feed them. This approach meant that, when ELAS casualty rates were raised to unsustainable levels in late December, insurgents could not be replaced. 133 The lack of reserves and support drove ELAS to acknowledge defeat by accepting a political solution where they would disarm and evacuate Athens, thus ending the immediate insurgency and the Brigade's involvement in Athens. 134 Pritchard's men were able to master urban warfare to defeat an insurgency, adapting efficiently using their mental abilities to solve these novel challenges they faced, further proving the unit's elite nature.
Conclusion
From studying the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade between June 1944 and January 1945, one can conclude that adaptability is a defining factor of this elite unit. Pritchard's Brigade was clearly elite, being formed up by brilliant individual soldiers with high mental and physical quality. Their skills were honed by extensive training throughout the time they served, which ensured both veterans and new recruits were well-prepared to adapt and successfully execute a range of operations. This training allowed the Brigade to succeed during Operation Dragoon as it skilfully adapted from its original plans, irrespective of the Brigade's dispersion and consequent numerically weak force near its objectives. Paratroopers further drew heavily on their basic training and used their own initiative to fight interoperably alongside their American allies. Like Greenacre's thesis, this work has highlighted that elite units must also be able to adapt between their operations to ensure success, as they faced a variety of operations requiring a range of skills. 135 The Brigade productively responded to the issues that arose during Operation Hasty. This demonstrates that elite units, like Pritchard's Brigade, could quickly identify and learn from their failures and, consequently, implement solutions in order to succeed in their subsequent operations. Similar prior experiences aided these units in adapting and dealing with challenges such as dispersion in Operation Manna. However, in the absence of prior experience, individuals relied on their mental agility to innovate solutions to novel challenges faced in a new operational environment, such as the counterinsurgency in Athens. Thus, by being made up of well-trained, high-quality soldiers, the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade adapted to the challenges they encountered on the ground across a wide range of operations, proving itself to be a highly effective elite military unit.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Joseph Maiolo, Aleksandra Pomiećko, and General Sir Roger Wheeler, alongside two anonymous reviewers and the Journal Editors for their support and suggestions which elevated this work.
Data Availability
All primary sources used in this work were open access materials reposited at their respective archives.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
