Abstract
As the world reflected on two nuclear explosions that destroyed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, killing approximately 200,000 people, few if any thought that we would see over three-quarters of a century without further nuclear use in warfare. For sure, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been built, over 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted—many of them in the atmosphere, releasing significant amounts of radiation and causing damage to human, animal, and plant life—and over 13,000 nuclear weapons still exist today. But somehow, we have avoided the apocalyptic scenarios feared by many and achieved a certain ‘nuclear peace’. The reason for this, according to Michael Krepon, founder of the US-based Stimson Centre and a thoughtful and tireless campaigner for reducing nuclear risks, was nuclear arms control.
In this heavily detailed and researched work, the first to fully tell the story of nuclear arms control (and of the many key personalities that played a part in the story), Krepon explains why finding a middle way between deterrence and disarmament was fundamental to preventing nuclear use and nuclear war after 1945. While some have championed deterrence and ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD) as vital to nuclear stability, Krepon argues that this was only possible because of the often-ground-breaking and innovative achievements of arms controllers who sought to minimise the inherent risks of nuclear deterrence. Likewise, only at a very few brief moments in the atomic age were genuine moves towards disarmament even remotely feasible, and so pragmatism in the form of arms control had to fill the gap.
Nuclear arms control had to be painstakingly ‘invented’ and applied to a very different political and military context than what had gone before. Krepon describes this battle for arms control, and how it led to the agreement of numerous treaties and agreements that together minimised the risks of nuclear use through the second half of the twentieth century. According to Krepon, arms control peaked and enjoyed a ‘golden era’ between 1986 and 1996 as massive reductions were made in Cold War-era nuclear stockpiles, entire classes of destabilising weapons were banned, and the international community agreed to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty and work towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
The world began to fall away from this apogee in the mid-1990s as the consensus that underpinned a number of arms control agreements were challenged and supplanted by a desire for more flexibility and the perceived requirements of national interest. This culminated in the late 2010s with the end of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the unravelling of the nuclear deal with Iran, but also included the weakening of numerous other measures that had been designed to help achieve what became characterised as ‘strategic stability’.
This second half of the arms control story—characterised by ‘demise’—is naturally of great concern to Krepon, who warns against the potential pitfalls of a global nuclear order driven by increased bilateral and multilateral nuclear competition without guardrails. In this current world of ‘disruptive technologies’, deepening nuclear rivalries, and increased nuclear posturing, Krepon passionately argues that ‘arms control must be revived’. However, while Krepon argues for new, inventive, and outside-of-the-box forms of arms control to manage this worrying nuclear environment, ultimately, he argues that it is the norms rather than specific agreements that are key. Arms control can be impermanent, but powerful norms can endure.
Sadly, Michael Krepon passed away in July 2022, but this book will provide a lasting testimony to his insightful and passionate thinking and activism when it comes to managing the risks posed by the ultimate weapon. Policymakers, practitioners, and the general public more broadly would do well to engage with the story he has written and to take on board the seminal importance of arms control as an essential toolkit to mitigate the new generation of nuclear challenges that we face. Krepon's story reminds us that arms controllers achieved this in the past, against the odds, and he challenges us to do so again. Above all, the norms of no battlefield nuclear use, no nuclear testing, and no nuclear proliferation must remain at the heart of our efforts to achieve the nuclear peace. Whether we can make it to 100 years without nuclear use in 2045, as Krepon hoped, will surely depend on engaging with his incomparable understanding of the past and beliefs for the future.