Through Artillery from Thrust to Fire: How Prussian Military Thinking Anticipated Emergent Warfare in 1870

Abstract

Reassessing the reasons for the German military success over France in War of 1870 up to the Battle of Sedan, we rely on publications of contemporary artillery generals, such as Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen and put the topic into the broader context of warfare since the 1866 German War. We reject the idea of success, being simply based on armament or a special ‘soldierly spirit’, but argue that the main reason for military success was based on reorganization of the Prussian artillery, which paved the way to the future ‘battle of combined arms’ and the dominance of fire over thrust.

Introduction

The Franco–Prussian War is usually described either within the context of the military dimension of the German Empire's founding, or it serves as example for the ‘road to total war’, meaning the transition from contained form of inter-state warfare fluently moving into the new ‘era of people's wars’. In both cases, the war is used to typify various forms of warfare in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. ¹ From the perspective of an institutional and functional history of the military, ² however, the Franco–Prussian War is seen as an expression of a fundamental change in military thinking due to the development of an emergent form of combat, which is inadequately captured by the contemporary term ‘Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen’ (combat of combined arms). ³ This emergent form of fighting, however, is the main reason for the clear Prussian–German successes in the numerous engagements following the combat reconnaissance of the II. French Corps on 2 August 1870. ⁴

Although the latest detailed source-based studies have expanded our knowledge since the publication of the older English language and French accounts, a critical reappraisal in terms of military history remains a desideratum. ⁵ Most publications usually cite a bundle of arguments to explain the Prussian–German success, e.g., Roon's army reforms as the fundamental transformation of the Prussian military. ⁶ More recent German literature, however, provides explanations among the lines of a rather evolutionary military development in the middle of the nineteenth century. ⁷ According to this, the already introduced changes emanating from the Prussian reforms following 1806 in terms of planning, organization, education and analysis now merged with new developments in the field of technology, ⁸ bringing the military to ‘the dawn of modernity’. ⁹ This narrative advocates a stringently prepared mobilization, resulting in a rapid deployment of the Prussian–South German units ¹⁰ led by experienced general staff officers and equipped with superior weaponry, especially in the field of artillery, and juxtaposes it with a less efficient French military administration and leadership. ¹¹ According to this narrative, the superior-in-range French infantry rifle, which had been introduced as a reaction to the Prussian success in 1866, was opposed by a technically more modern and better-served Prussian artillery. This – as the narrative goes on – paved the way for the Prussian–German victories on a technical–tactical level. ¹² In turn, the dominance and efficiency of the Prussian artillery, interpreted by Michael Howard as ‘the greatest tactical surprise of the Franco-Prussian War’, ¹³ can be explained by the Krupp cast-steel breech-loading guns with rifled barrels introduced after 1859 and their tactical massing in battle. Injected into popular military history, this narrative promotes the view of military equipment as the decisive factor.

But how could there be such a superiority in artillery in 1870, if the Prussian artillery, according to the judgement of contemporaries, had failed so extensively in the Bohemian campaign ¹⁴ ‘that the artillery achieved almost nothing in the war of 1866’ ¹⁵ ? At that time, the Krupp company's breech-loading systems already accounted for almost two-thirds of the Prussian artillery stock, ¹⁶ and the equipment between 1866 and 1870 was almost technically identical. Indeed, contemporary judgements question the undifferentiated argument of superior Prussian–German artillery, which, it turns out, is entirely made up by historians. More recent literature generally omits a closer discussion of the background to the argument of a ‘superior’ artillery. But we also need to question the simplifying statement of a massive tactical deployment ¹⁷ or the unspecified claim of the rise of the artillery to ‘a main weapon in its own right’. ¹⁸ What happened between 1866 and 1870? How can we explain the failure of the Prussian artillery in the German War and its decisive role in the campaign of 1870, even though the equipment deployed was almost identical?

Reflections on the history of ideas such as those of the US historian Antulio Echevarria II and his remarks on nineteenth-century tactical adaptations draw our attention to the importance of military thinking. ¹⁹ It allows us to explain the performance of artillery not only from a purely technical perspective but also to understand and ultimately describe its tactical adaptation as an intellectual process.

One of the driving figures behind this intellectual process was Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, ²⁰ a member of the high nobility from southwestern Germany. As a professional artillery officer, he had been the commander in chief of the Guards Artillery Regiment in 1866. In 1870 he led the Guards Artillery Brigade and, thus, was the corps artillery commander of the Prussian Guards Corps. ²¹ After 1866 he was entrusted with the reorganization of the artillery by the Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, and the Inspector General of the Artillery, Gustav von Hindersin. ²² His publications attracted great attention among his contemporaries, especially his military letters and memoirs. ²³ Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that research on Hohenlohe flourished for a short time in the 1920s. ²⁴ Hohenlohe's published reflections on artillery can be considered as an outgrowth of his service studies. His writings to some extent compensate for the general lack of official sources on the Prussian army resulting from the destruction of the Potsdam Army Archives. ²⁵

The main argument of this article is that a breakthrough in military thinking took place within the Prussian army between 1866 and 1870, one which not only fundamentally changed the previous way of fencing, but also shaped it into the twentieth century. This new idea of warfare cannot be described merely as a further development of the already existing concept of the ‘Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen’. It entailed also the replacement of thrust tactics by the principle of ‘Feuer und Bewegung’ (fire and movement), and it directly leads to the later concept of manoeuvre warfare. This fundamental change in military thought will be illustrated by the development of the artillery during the nineteenth century until the war of 1866, the measures then taken by Prussia between 1866 and 1869, and its application in the battles of 1870 and thereafter.

Artillery Between Thrust and Fire

Traditionally the task of the artillery was to accompany the main weapons of infantry and cavalry. Therefore, its place was among the supporting weapons, divided into stationary fortress or siege artillery and mobile field artillery. ²⁶ The decades before the Franco–Prussian War had been a period of constant technical changes triggered by advances in the metal and toolmaking industries, thus leading to adaptations of the previous loading method (muzzle-loading systems) and bullet guidance (smoothbore barrels). Furthermore, due to the increased range of technically upgraded infantry weapons (first rifled barrels), the artillery suddenly found itself within the range of the enemy's infantry fire. ²⁷ In France, a modernized muzzle-loading system with rifled barrels and guide warts on the projectiles was established but still with clearance between the projectile and the barrel (the system La Hitte). First used in the war against Austria in 1859, it was a sensation and quickly considered ready and tested afterwards. ²⁸ In Prussia, based on the principle of the breech-loading ignition-needle rifle, thinking led to the construction of a breech-loading system with rifled barrels made of cast steel and appressed bullet guidance – without clearance – and a considerably higher gas tightness. ²⁹ Under the impression of the developments in France, Prussia also ordered its first 300 new Krupp barrels in 1859. In terms of equipment, this step started a transition to an entirely new system, but it remained uncompleted until 1870. In both of the following campaigns, l864 and 1866, the Prussian artillery stock consisted of batteries equipped with new breech-loading guns as well as batteries with previous muzzle-loaded smoothbore guns. The advantage of the heavier Prussian field gun was its superiority in range and effectiveness, whereas the lighter French guns had the advantage of higher mobility. ³⁰ The mobility argument in fact corresponded with the 1859 consolidated French perspective – which was adopted by the Austrians in 1866 – that it had to be the thrust or shock attack (frontal and offensive) by infantry columns with felled bayonet which ultimately leads to the decision in battle. ³¹ In order to serve the purpose of the decisive force, an accompanying and thus highly mobile and ultimately light artillery with limited range and accuracy seemed to be sufficient. If necessary, it could be assembled to massive artillery lines as well – as was seen at Solferino. ³² The development of the mitrailleuse in France is another example of supporting such tactical scheme. In 1870 these guns clearly must be understood not as an ancestor of the machine gun but as a variant of an accompanying light artillery.

In essence, then, in the decades before 1870, two fundamental ideas regarding the use of weaponry and achieving victory in close combat wrestled each other: Will victory arise from bayonet thrust or from the power of firearms? ³³ Starting with Napoleon, the thrust or shock attack by massive infantry columns had become the guiding principle of warfare as a means to achieving superiority in close combat. The drill regulations of the Prussian infantry from 1843 were based on this idea as well. ³⁴ Under this paradigm, the artillery retained its role from the early modern period as an ancillary weapon to cover the deployment and open the battle, ³⁵ just as the infantry and cavalry retained their roles as the decisive force. For the artillery this understanding culminated in the principle of ‘maximized mobility combined with only necessary effect’. ³⁶ In this context, neither Napoleon's nor Frederick II's increased use of artillery nor the latter's emphasis on the infantry's firepower is in any way inconsistent with thrust or shock tactics. The limitation in range of the artillery guns already prompted Napoleon not to use these during battle, but to save them for the moment he intended to seek the decision by a final infantry attack. ³⁷

The technical innovations of the nineteenth century, however, challenged these traditional ideas in a process that lasted decades and resulted in partly contradictory developments. The advance of the now rifled weapons in cadence, range and accuracy increased the repulsive effect of fire and questioned the approach of the spatially massed column thrust. Initially, however, this did not lead to a change of the paradigm of thrust, but to attempts at its tactical adaptation by drawing swarms of riflemen in front of the columns or breaking down the battalion-size column of the past into new company-size columns, ³⁸ as well as a discussion about a dispersed use of infantry in combat. ³⁹ Parallel to these efforts, the first contours of a new idea of primacy of fire over thrust emerged. In other words, in 1870, the French army had an accompanying artillery in accordance with its tactical paradigm of thrust, whereas the Prussian army already had an artillery for a future way of combat, even though the final contours of this future still remained unknown to the protagonists.

The Artillery in 1866: From Critics to the Dawn of Modern Warfare Ideas

The German–Danish War of 1864 had proven the technical superiority of Prussian and Austrian rifled artillery over Denmark's smoothbore guns. On the other hand, in view of the predominantly static use of these guns, there was no room for operational or tactical conclusions. ⁴⁰ Expectations concerning the new rifled guns were high, and yet the verdict of contemporaries on the use of artillery in the German War of 1866 was sobering. This judgement did not refer to the factual inferiority of the old smoothbore Prussian guns, ⁴¹ but to the fact ‘that the victories were won without the hitherto much-vaunted breech-loading artillery.’ ⁴²

Apparently, despite its predominantly modern armament, Prussian artillery had not come into its own in the Bohemian theatre of war. In the various battles before 3 July 1866, such as that of the Second Army at Trautenau (27 June) or the battle of the First Army at Gitschin, it was the infantry – not the artillery – which secured the victories in thrust or shock attacks. This finding also applies to the battle of Königgrätz itself. ⁴³ Significantly, the technically inferior Austrian artillery had brought the attack of the columns of the Prussian First Army to a standstill for hours through consistent tactical massing. The reasons for the final Prussian success in these battles were primarily the fatally flawed Austrian infantry shock tactics and – at Königgrätz – the superior operational use of forces in space and time by the Prussian leadership. This was aided by the decisive exposure of the Austrian right flank at Maslowed. The Prussian infantry did perform excellently, but it had received virtually no support from the artillery. ⁴⁴ Helmuth von Moltke assessed the victory of 1866 as ‘accompanied by luck in an unprecedented manner’. ⁴⁵

The Krupp guns were technically superior to the Austrian Lenk system, ⁴⁶ but could not perform in a decisive way. Firstly, due to inadequate regulations, there was a lack of wartime gunnery training. ⁴⁷ As a result of this training deficit, gunners were unable to effectively estimate the correct combat range. ⁴⁸ Secondly, the officers in charge lacked the tactical training to reconnoiter and move into appropriate gun positions in the field. Consequently, they were not in the right place and could not have any effect. ⁴⁹ For Colonel Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, who served as regimental commander of the guards artillery in 1866, the main problem was the inadequate understanding of the use of artillery by the higher Prussian commanders themselves, which was why ‘they were not available at the decisive points in time, or not in sufficient numbers.’ ⁵⁰

This contemporary finding, however, should be understood as a symptom of the paradigm shift described above, from thrust to fire, and as an expression of the failure as yet to develop an idea to solve the problem of the increased repulsive effect of fire. For Hohenlohe, who should play a decisive role in the reorganization of the artillery after 1866, it was not a question of the mere material and only secondarily a question of the craftsmanship of his technique. The core dilemma, rather, was that the tactical commander using the artillery had no idea, no concept, how this new weaponry had to be integrated into the complex tactical interplay.

One reason for the described lack of understanding can be found in the structural concentration of the artillery in the Artillery Inspectorate. Historically, a technically evolved branch that liked to wear the ‘mask of erudition’, ⁵¹ the artillery was separated from infantry and cavalry in peacetime – entirely in accordance with the paradigm of the thrust. The latter two were already permanently and organically subordinate to the general commands, while the former only joined them during manoeuvres or war in the ordre de bataille. As a result, the officers hardly knew each other and had only a limited understanding of the capabilities, needs and possible supporting effects of each other's weapons. For the commanding generals, who had emerged from the infantry and cavalry, this meant that they could only develop a limited understanding for the use of artillery. ⁵² This deficiency was exacerbated by the fact that the artillery in manoeuver and war was subordinate to the commanding general according to its role in combat, but not regarding technical issues. This divided subordination ⁵³ regularly led to competence disputes, which strengthened the reluctance of tactical commanders to deal with artillery-related questions. ⁵⁴ The effect of this situation meant that while technical development proceeded, tactical advancement stagnated.

In 1866, 60 per cent of the artillery stock consisted of the most modern material. However, the Artillery Inspectorate had not yet developed any further regulations, the gun crews were not able to operate them well enough, their untrained officers did not know how to use them appropriately, and the generals did not feel obliged to integrate this new artillery into new combat doctrines. The total number of Krupp guns available was imposing, but they ‘were shunted back and forth in the reserves and found nowhere to develop.’ ⁵⁵ Symptomatic of this disuse was the place assigned to the artillery in the marching columns. Often the batteries were placed at the end of kilometre-long marching columns, and the ‘infantry had then decided the battle already before the artillery even did arrive.’ ⁵⁶ This was particularly true of the batteries grouped together as army artillery reserve, which, for example, in the First Army, always marched behind with a day's gap during the 1866 campaign. ⁵⁷ Since the French acted the same way, we can understand this behaviour as corresponding to the prevailing thrust tactics. ⁵⁸ And since the Prussian army had not yet understood the technical changes’ effects on tactics, in 1866, artillery's impact on the battlefield remained limited.

This is proven by contemporary statistics: the 550 Prussian guns used at Königgrätz fired 15,300 rounds, while the 688 Austrian guns fired 46,500 rounds. ⁵⁹ Each Prussian gun fired an average of twenty-eight times, while each Austrian gun fired sixty-eight times. During the entire campaign, eight of the forty-nine batteries of the First Army did not even fire a single shot, and the twenty-four batteries of the Elbe Army fired only 2,949 rounds, each of their guns thus firing an average of twenty rounds. ⁶⁰

In 1866, the Austrian artillery concentrated its fire primarily to silence the isolated Prussian artillery, but it did little against the enemy's infantry. Therefore, the Prussian infantry was able to take advantage of the higher cadence of their ignition-needle rifles against the Austrian infantry. There was only one exception: the Austrian artillery massively engaged the infantry attack of the Prussian First Army at Königgrätz and showed the limits even of a superior infantry. In a war with an opponent equipped with equal infantry armament and modern artillery, any ineffective use of artillery could have fatal consequences.

Under this impression, the Inspector General of the Artillery, Gustav von Hindersin, commissioned Hohenlohe to develop new artillery regulations. ⁶¹ In the spring of 1868, Hohenlohe was also tasked by Moltke to prepare a memorandum on organizational changes, use and equipment of the artillery (analogous to the infantry and cavalry). ⁶² Moltke presented the results together with the writings about infantry and cavalry in a separate memorandum to the king, who devoted himself to it intensively. ⁶³ Hohenlohe, in turn, reviewed his memorandum for Moltke into a version handed over to Prince Württemberg, the Commanding General of the Guards Corps, who, however, initially refrained from turning it into a regulation for the Guards Corps – probably because of concerns about conflicts with the Artillery Inspectorate. ⁶⁴ The prince did ask Hohenlohe to present his thoughts in a lecture at the Military Society of Berlin. ⁶⁵ Here, on 18 March 1869, Hohenlohe presented his ‘Ideas on the use of field artillery in conjunction with other weapons, following the introduction of rifled guns and cannons’, ⁶⁶ which turned out to be fundamental to the further development of the artillery. His considerations laid the foundation for the paradigm shift towards fire and movement in 1870.

Both this lecture and Moltke's Memoire to the King pointed out the requirements for the use and development of artillery in the future. Finally, they culminated in Moltke's ‘Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer’ (Guidelines for Higher Commanders) of 1869. ⁶⁷ Hohenlohe's ideas were based on the insight that in a coming war, the inferior range of the ignition-needle rifle could no longer guarantee success, as it did in 1866. Therefore, the infantry would lose its value. ⁶⁸ The artillery, which had been equipped with modern technology, had to be used more effectively; indeed, it had to be the artillery that had to ensure the success of the infantry battle. First and foremost, artillery ought to be used to suppress the enemy's artillery support and disrupt its infantry lines before one's own infantry would be able to advance under the cover of artillery-fire; later in the fight, artillery would have to support one's own infantry's advance. ⁶⁹ That this did not happen in 1866 ‘was precisely because the higher commanders had not used the artillery properly’. ⁷⁰

This basic idea was reflected in improved, practical gunnery training, ⁷¹ i.e., in the training of the gunnery unit, as well as in the practical terrain training for battery and divisional officers, in order to provide them with the necessary knowledge to deploy the gunnery units expediently in the field. ⁷² Finally, it was a question of the structural integration of a special technical branch into the existing infantry and cavalry formations, i.e., nothing less than the ‘use of field artillery in conjunction with other weapons’. ⁷³ The tactical combat tasks now decidedly assigned to artillery ⁷⁴ demanded ‘that it always be at hand where it is to be used and that it be directed in the most intimate connection with other weapons’. ⁷⁵

On the tactical level, the attempt to increase efficiency through an effective use of artillery marked the transition to the new paradigm, which for the first time in the nineteenth century gave priority to fire over thrust – and with it to movement. The shortcomings and the great extent of luck within the Bohemian campaign of 1866 thus did have a catalysing effect – in spite of the Prussian victory!

With regard to the operational level, the Guidelines for Higher Commanders of 1869 clearly stated that only the mixture of the three weapons would guarantee real combat readiness ⁷⁶ and that therefore the artillery must form ‘an integral part’ ⁷⁷ of the fighting force to which it has been assigned. The purpose of any artillery deployment was explained as follows:

With regard to artillery in general, the command of the troops must bear in mind that this weapon, by virtue of the range of the guns, is destined to open the battle. […] For this reason, it is important to have a superior number of guns in order to dispose the enemy right from the first stage of the battle, and following this the artillery's place should be assigned in the marching column. In order to prepare for the final decision, the entire artillery may be brought as close as possible to the enemy and it is not advisable to keep part of it in reserve. […] In general, the appearance of individual batteries must be the exception, mass deployment the rule. ⁷⁸

Only then, when we ourselves proceed to the attack, does the artillery direct its fire again at the enemy batteries, and that against those which make that attack most difficult. ⁷⁹

Thus, in order to allow the artillery to become effective early, Moltke also demanded adjustments to the marching order:

The artillery must march as close as possible to the tête, both in the vanguard and in the main body, in order to enter the fray as early as possible. In the main body, therefore, the artillery follows the first regiment or, under certain circumstances, the first battalion. ⁸⁰

As a rule, the corps artillery takes its place behind the second brigade of the main body, or, under certain circumstances, already behind the first brigade. To have them follow at the cue of the whole corps can only be expedient under very special circumstances. For the corps artillery has a different purpose than that of a reserve; it belongs rather to the main body, has to follow its movements and prepare the main attack. For this purpose, it needs time and will in any case have to become effective earlier than the reserve infantry enters the fray. ⁸¹

The effect of these changes also altered the tactical deployment. In the future, the artillery should not be distributed individually among the brigades, but rather in sections among the divisions in order to achieve a closed ‘mass deployment’ and avoid ‘dispersal’. ⁸²

The demands for an integrated tactical deployment of the artillery ultimately required changes to the previous command and staff process. Hohenlohe recommended that the (artillery) division commander assigned to the division should always stay with the division commander in order to be able to ‘translate his ideas and intentions directly into orders for his batteries’. ⁸³ Moltke also made the following demand to his higher commanders, which became known in the twentieth century as the artillery leader principle:

It is urgently recommended that higher commanders communicate to the artillery commander on their staff the purpose of the battle and the way in which they intend to achieve it, have their orders passed on to the batteries through him, and instruct him in detail to carry them out. In order to make this possible, a general rule should be established: The artillery commanders will remain at the side of the commander of the troops during the planning of the battle; in the course of the same, the division commander will belong to those areas where more than one of his batteries is engaged, the regimental commander to those areas where the corps artillery is engaged, the artillery brigade commander to those areas where division and corps artillery are engaged, and the artillery general to those areas where batteries of different corps are engaged. The guiding principle is that the artillery fight should never be without a common command, then the often-occurring dispersal or disintegration of individual batteries will be prevented, the mass use of artillery will become the rule, and the appearance of a single battery the exception. ⁸⁴

Thus, the considerations initiated by Hohenlohe turned out to be not a simple adaptation, but a paradigm shift in European military history. This is how Echevarria II's proposal for ‘a greater firepower to support infantry attack’ ⁸⁵ and a ‘greater cooperation between infantry and artillery units’ ⁸⁶ can be developed further. Infantry combat was no longer to be decided by the thrust of the bayonets, but by the effect of fire – as mirrored in the infantry regulations of 1876 ⁸⁷ and 1888. ⁸⁸ Hohenlohe had emphasized this scheme in his ‘Letters on the Infantry’ already as ‘sprungweises Vorgehen’ ⁸⁹ (sequential advance) or ‘zerstreute Fechtart’ ⁹⁰ (dispersed order) of the infantry, using the battle of Le Bourget on 30 October 1870 ⁹¹ as an example. Howard called it ‘a small landmark in military history’. ⁹² The core of ‘fire and movement’, however, was not the massive infantry thrust, but the emergent interaction of all parts, a ‘gegenseitiges Sichverstehen’ ⁹³ (mutual understanding). The difference to the previously used term ‘Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen’ is that the artillery was no longer a secondary weapon to prepare the battle and support the striking force during the decisive attack; ⁹⁴ instead now it became an integral part of this striking force. ⁹⁵

In purely mathematical terms, we can see in 1870 that two-thirds of the artillery were already in the fray at the beginning of a battle, compared to only a quarter or a third of the infantry. ⁹⁶ The increased range of rifled barrels enabled the artillery to engage enemy positions directly without facing the danger of infantry fire in return. Thus, the artillery was able to move on the battlefield together with, or even before, the infantry. However, the guns had to be made horse-mobile to a greater extent than before, which points to the dynamic moment of movement. The interaction of infantry and artillery was no longer consecutive and following a clear distribution of roles, but flowed inseparably one into another, becoming emergent. This interlinkage also became a structural feature in organization, training and command of – at least – German armed forces in the twentieth century. Previous research certainly has recognized this struggle, but did not associate it with the tactical principle of ‘fire and movement’ and the ‘combat of combined arms’, which have both always been discussed on a more operational level. ⁹⁷

The Artillery 1870: Practical Application on the Way to Sedan

The examination of the course of the campaign up to Sedan shows to which extent the changes in battle management, training and tactics, based on Hohenlohe's ideas and described in the Guidelines for Higher Commanders of 1869 and the infantry regulations of 1876 and 1888, were actually applied in wartime practice. Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look on the adaptation of the following aforementioned principles: (1) the integration of the artillery within the marching order in a way that facilitates an immediate deployment, (2) the section-wise assignment of the artillery to the division level to support massed deployment, (3) the role of artillery units at the corps level (former reserve formations) and finally (4) the assignment of the artillery commanders to the next senior command level (artillery leader principle) in order to translate the intentions and ideas of the higher command into orders for the fighting batteries.

Hohenlohe himself describes how his ideas were adapted by the three Prussian–German armies. A look at the ordres de batailles shows that the artillery within the corps was assigned to the divisions by division as proposed, ⁹⁸ while the ordre de bataille of 1866 still shows a battery-by-battery assignment at the brigade level. ⁹⁹ However, during the border battles, the picture is indifferent. Whereas the artillery of the II Bavarian Corps at Langensulzbach (near Wörth) was deployed battery by battery, leaving the infantry without artillery support, ¹⁰⁰ the Prussian units at Wörth had their artillery deployed in sections, initially fighting the enemy's artillery and its new mitrailleuses, ¹⁰¹ but subsequently taking up the fight against the French infantry, thus preparing the attack of the own infantry, which advanced in a dispersed manner or in columns. ¹⁰² The decisive taking of Fröschwiller near Wörth was also prepared by the artillery. After repeated infantry attacks without success, the batteries advanced beyond their own lines and enabled the following infantry to break into the enemy's positions. ¹⁰³ The characteristic gun lines of a later stage, i.e., the spatial expression of the required ‘massing’ of the guns, were already developed in this battle. ¹⁰⁴

The battles around Metz, meanwhile, were characterized by intensive and coordinated interaction between the three branches of the German armed forces. ¹⁰⁵ In the final battle for Metz, Gravelotte-St. Privat, a legendary line of artillery was formed, which – after a previous attack of the Guards resulting in heavy losses – finally paved the way for the infantry at St. Privat in an artillery-prepared column thrust in cooperation with the Saxon units attacking from the north. It was also St. Privat that offered an example of the artillery leader principle as well as the reimagined use of the corps artillery. ¹⁰⁶ The artillery was not only deployed on a massive scale, but its firing skill must also be understood as the result of the adapted ‘elementary tactics’. ¹⁰⁷ Later at Sedan, it became clear that the tactical use of artillery had become a standing procedure. The fully integrated way of fighting also manifested itself in the increased consumption of ammunition and higher casualties. ¹⁰⁸ The success of the Prussian artillery was also facilitated by the French artillery. Being smaller in number and less effective in terms of marksmanship and impact, the French artillerymen were hardly in a position to fight the Prussian–German batteries on an equal level. ¹⁰⁹ The reduction of French gun batteries prior to 1870 in favour of the setup of new mitrailleuse batteries only increased this imbalance. The latter refers to the French understanding of light artillery to accompany the infantry, which continued to be the primary fighting force. The Prussian army overcame this approach after 1866 and – in light of the paradigm shift – developed its artillery within a remarkably short period of time from a troublesome follower to a fully integrated part of its fighting force on all levels.

After the Franco–Prussian War

Apart from the tactical adjustments, the consistency and the willingness of the Prussian army to develop and learn in reaction to the poor performance of its artillery in 1866 is rather surprising. ¹¹⁰ As quickly and consistently the innovations on the tactical level had been tackled during the war and continued afterwards, ¹¹¹ as long-lasting the adaptation process of the traditional peacetime structure and the subordination of the artillery to the general commands turned out surprising. The dissolution of the General Inspectorate of Field Artillery was the final step of a step-by-step approach of the General of Cavalry Theophil von Podbielski, following the new artillery regulations of 1876, not implemented before 1 April 1889. ¹¹² The 20-year delay can be attributed to perseverance and departmental egotism within the military. The reform of the Prussian artillery, initiated in 1866, shows on the one hand an enormous flexibility and willingness to learn in times of war and, on the other hand, strong perseverance in times of peace. The final step was taken under Moltke's successor, Alfred Graf von Waldersee, and the Prussian War Minister Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf, who both had fought in the wars of 1866 and 1870/71. Since it was primarily Waldersee who sought to expand the powers of the general staff and increase the size of the army during his term of office, the reform of the peacetime structure in 1889 cannot be interpreted solely as a belated organizational measure; rather, it fits seamlessly into the transition from Bismarck's policy of balance to an imperial policy of becoming a great power. ¹¹³

The subordination of the artillery to the general commands entailed a further, long-term consequence, due to the fact that its organization ¹¹⁴ was now on an equal footing even in peacetime. It concerned the personnel system and the promotion of artillery officers to the general ranks. Hitherto, artillery officers had been assessed as specialists by their superiors in arms in the inspectorates and, as a rule, were not considered either for training as general staff officers or for promotion to the highest ranks. Of course, there were artillery officers with the rank of major general or lieutenant general, but they had not been higher commanders leading to formations of all arms such as divisions or corps. They served as specialists: artillery commanders, commanders of artillery brigades or artillery commanders at the corps or army level. But with their equation in 1889, this changed. As an organic part of the combat of combined arms, now subordinate to the commanding general even in peacetime, the future military elites, namely, the higher commanders, were now also regularly recruited from the ranks of artillerymen. ¹¹⁵ This advancement, initially only perceptible within the sector, became publicly visible in 1889 with the introduction of the rank of ‘General der Artillerie’ (General of the Artillery) and the thus widely visible opening of the circle of the highest commanding officers to officers who had emerged from artillery service. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, who has to be considered the spiritual father of this change, became the first General der Artillerie in 1889. He also was the first artillery officer of that era who became both division commander and commanding general. As an exceptional phenomenon due to the war, Hohenlohe remained the first and last artilleryman to achieve this for decades. It took until 1 October 1912 that General der Artillerie Friedrich Scholtz, the second full general and commanding general with artillery background since 1889, was promoted to this rank. ¹¹⁶ Due to the advancement time from graduate of the General Staff Academy to the first general rank, it took until the First World War before a larger number of artillerymen became visible as higher commanders. The high number of artillerymen among the senior leadership since 1920, as identified by researchers, was therefore not only due to the discontinuation of a supposed social protectionism to the disadvantage of apparently predominantly bourgeois artillery officers. ¹¹⁷ It seems to be rather a retarded sign of structural change, which transformed the artillery into an equal and integral element within the combat of combined arms. These changes had been first introduced in 1866, tested in 1870, and finally implemented in 1889.

Conclusion

Between 1866 and 1870, an intellectual breakthrough in military thinking took place within the Prussian army, one which fundamentally changed the previous way of fencing and would shape the practice of war into the twentieth century. The breakthrough produced not only a further development of the existing concept of the ‘Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen’ but the replacement of thrust tactics by the principle of fire and movement. This method of fighting, which was initially described for the infantry as ‘sprungweises Vorgehen’ or ‘zerstreute Fechtart’, found its way into the combat of combined arms and thus dissolved the previous distinction between main and secondary weapons in the sense of an emergent method of fighting.

This article has argued that a fundamental change in thinking took place in the Prussian army as early as 1866. The challenge posed by the increased firepower of the rifled barrels of all weapons questioned the commonly practised thrust or shock tactics. France and Austria, as a consequence of the conclusions drawn from Magenta and Solferino in 1859, clung to the paradigm of thrust tactics, whereas the Prussians learned in 1866 – despite their victory – that it was necessary to rethink the paradigms and that adherence to established tactics could have fatal consequences in a future war. The failure of the higher commanders to successfully integrate modern artillery was recognized as a major shortcoming and remedied by 1870 in an intensive as well as ambivalent process of learning and adaptation. The Prussian military countered the challenge of the repulsive power of the long-range infantry armament by developing a fully integrated artillery. This structural and doctrinal upgrade was of such a quality that it marked the change from thrust into fire and movement and ultimately to manoeuvre warfare in the twentieth century. Even if this process was not completed in 1914, as it suggests the search for the right mix of fire and movement in the ossified fronts of the First World War and the subsequent motorization of war through aircraft and tanks, the decisive effect of fire of the dispersed order in (infantry) battle was consequently declared already in the infantry regulations of 1888. This change can be described as a constant learning process. The historical moment lies in this intellectual achievement, not in the existence or use of technology and weaponry.

This, in turn, led to the development of a mobile tactical warfare aimed at emergence, which enabled the Prussian army as the first force of the major European powers to apply the possibilities inherent in industrialization. For future research on warfare, there is a desideratum on to what extent industrialized wars have been related to emergent combat leadership and to what extent the successful integration of technology into an intellectual leadership process led European neighbours to try to copy it and thus to further increase industrialized firepower. Or to put it another way, when did the mitrailleuse actually become a machine gun?