Abstract
Axis land forces overran most of the Crimea in October 1941, but were unable to capture Sevastopol. Realizing that sea power was now necessary, Hitler ordered that light boats be transferred to the Black Sea. However, the Germans did not have a sufficient number of small boats at their disposal and asked the Italians to supply them. Based on a critique of archival sources, this article analyses this little-known aspect of the Black Sea campaign and argues that the Italian Flotilla made a crucial, although overlooked, contribution to Sevastopol's conquest, concluding that its activity prevented essential Soviet supply missions.
On 22 July 1941, a month after the German invasion of the Soviet Union commenced, Hitler ordered the conquest of the Crimea. He attached special importance to the peninsula for three main reasons. The first was the need to seize the Caucasus oil fields, which accounted for 90% of all oil produced by the Soviet Union. However, before the offensive into the Caucasus could be launched, it was necessary to clear the Crimea and bring about the fall of Sevastopol, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet's main naval base and a permanent threat to Axis shipping. Moreover, Soviet forces on the peninsula were in a position to attack at any time towards the north, against the southern flank or rear of the German Army. The second reason was to protect the Ploesti oil fields in Romania from Crimea-based Soviet bombers. The third was Hitler's insistence on seizing the Caucasus and defending the Romanian oil industry because of Germany's critical oil shortage. 1
Despite intense efforts from the mid-1930s to improve the nation's heavy dependence on overseas imports of crude oil, by the time war broke out only about a third of the 7,500,000 tons of oil Germany consumed was produced domestically. The other five million tons mainly came from the United States, Iran and Venezuela. The cessation of overseas imports following the imposition of the Anglo-French naval blockade in September 1939 delivered a severe blow to Germany's oil situation. Imports dropped to two million tons in 1940 and further plunged after the invasion of the Soviet Union. By the summer of 1941, almost all German oil imports came from Romania. 2 In his supplement to War Directive No. 34, dated 12 August 1941, Hitler stated: ‘The most important aim to be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow but, rather, the occupation of the Crimea, of the industrial and coal-mining area of the Donets Basin, and the cutting of the Russian supply routes from the Caucasus oil fields. … The capture of the Crimea is of extreme importance for safeguarding our oil supplies from Romania.’ 3 The next day he further explained that it was ‘absolutely essential for Germany’ that Soviet air bases in the Crimea ‘be eliminated’. 4
Axis land forces reached the Crimea in October 1941 and overran most of it, but were unable to capture Sevastopol, one of the strongest fortifications in the world. Although the original plan had attached very little importance to naval operations in the Black Sea, within a few weeks of the start of the campaign, the German High Command realised that undisputed control of the Black Sea was enabling the Soviets to support ground units with heavy artillery fire, bring reinforcements to isolated garrisons and evacuate encircled units. 5 Realising that sea power was now critical to securing this objective, and unaware that his navy lacked asymmetric warfare capabilities, on 5 April 1942, Hitler ordered that light naval forces be transferred to the Black Sea and prepared for combat without delay. 6 However, at that time, the German Navy did not have many small boats or midget submarines at its disposal. Grand Admiral Erich Räder, Supreme Commander of the Kriegmarine, knew that, regardless of number, these assets could provide symmetrical, but not asymmetrical, capabilities. Yet the Italians’ specialist Decima Flottiglia MAS (often abbreviated Xª MAS) – which had very specific training, equipment and experience unique to the task at hand – was unusually capable of asymmetrical operations, with an outstanding record of success. Räder, therefore, asked the Italian Navy (Regia Marina) to supply that capability. 7 During the period of alliance between Germany and Italy, ‘this was the only occasion in which the Germans ever spontaneously requested the military support of the Italians.’ 8 They did so because they were aware that the Regia Marina's light surface and underwater boats were superior to their own, and because they were impressed by the many successes achieved by these vessels against the British at Gibraltar, Suda Bay, Malta and Alexandria. 9
This little-known aspect of the Black Sea campaign is analysed here. Those scholars who have looked into it have focused their attention solely on the Axis land and air offensive. Joel Hayward is the exception. Although his book does analyse the naval campaign, he is limited by not being able to access and read Italian sources, providing only a simple sketch based on the German archival sources. Evidence that this aspect has been disregarded can be found in the fact that Richard Di Nardo's and Robert Citino's seminal works on Axis warfare on the Eastern Front make no mention of it. 10 This article argues that the Regia Marina made a crucial, although largely overlooked, contribution to the Axis offensive and the conquest of Sevastopol, concluding that the intense activity of its special assault units disrupted and finally prevented essential Soviet supply missions. This gradually starved the besieged defenders not only of food and medicine but, crucially, also of ammunition, severely reducing their ability to resist the German infantry attack. ‘With every day it became more difficult to bring troops, ammunition, armaments and foodstuffs into Sevastopol,’ acknowledged the official Soviet history. 11 Hayward reports that ‘they became so desperate for ammunitions that they sent down naval divers to retrieve shells and anything else of value from the wrecks of ships lying on the bottom of Sevastopol's harbour. Even the tons of shells they brought up were incapable of satisfying the demands of artillery and flak gunners.’ 12
The role played by the Regia Marina's Xª MAS (the initials standing for Motoscafi Armati Siluranti, a cover name to disguise its true character) in the fall of Sevastopol is revealed through an extensive examination of previously neglected primary Italian Navy records. The Xª MAS was a secret naval commando unit of the Regia Marina. Established in 1939, it had three units: a surface group operating explosive motorboats, an underwater group using slow-running human torpedoes (siluro a lenta corsa, SLC) and a Gamma assault frogman unit. 13 This archival research is further supplemented with official German and Italian published documents, private papers and diaries.
The Transfer of the Italian Flotilla
On 8 January 1942, Rear Admiral Giuseppe Bertoldi, Head of the Italian Navy Liaison Office at the Oberkommando des Kriegsmarine, informed Admiral Arturo Riccardi, Undersecretary of State of the Regia Marina, of the German request to send naval forces to support the Axis offensive in the Black Sea. 14 However, the formal German appeal for the supply of light surface and underwater boats was communicated on 14 January 1942 by Admiral Räder to Admiral Riccardi in Garmitsch-Partenkirchen, the Alpine ski town in Bavaria and the site of the 1936 Winter Olympic Games. These were the two leaders who met to discuss a joint plan of action for the ongoing conduct of naval warfare. The undertaking of the special assault underwater unit of the Xª MAS – which on 19 December 1941 had disabled the British battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth in Alexandria – offered the opportunity to lay a sound plan for coordinated coalition warfare between the Kriesgmarine and the Regia Marina. This success in fact reversed the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. For the first and last time during the war, the Axis achieved naval superiority and dominated that sea. 15 The two-day strategic conference included five personal talks between the two admirals, three plenary meetings and a number of expert sessions. During one of the personal talks between the two leaders, Admiral Räder informed Admiral Riccardi that the Kriegmarine was going to deploy six Schnellboote to the Black Sea and asked the Regia Marina to support the operation by sending some light surface and underwater boats. 16
Admiral Riccardi agreed to provide a mixed flotilla composed by four torpedo-armed boats of 20 tons (Motoscafi Armati Siluranti, MAS), six midget CB-class submarines of 35 tons, five torpedo-armed speedboats (Motoscafi da Turismo Siluranti Modificati, MTSM) and five explosive motorboats (Motoscafi da Turismo Modificati, MTM). 17 The MASs were torpedo-armed boats with displacements of 20 or 30 tons, a 10-man crew, a maximum speed of 45 knots, two 450-mm torpedoes, and one heavy machine gun. The midget CB-class submarines had a displacement of 30 tons, a four-man crew, a length of 15 m, a beam of 3 m and a draught of 2 m. They were armed with two externally mounted 450-mm torpedoes and powered by a single shaft of one 80-hp Isotta Fraschini diesel engine and one 50-hp electric motor, resulting in a surface top speed of 7.5 knots and a submerged top speed of 7 knots. The MTSMs had a length of 8 m, a two-man crew, and carried a 30-kg torpedo inside the hull. A six-cylinder, Alfa Romeo 2,500cc gasoline engine allowed them to reach 34 knots. Finally, the one-man MTMs had a length of approximately 7 m, fitted a 300-kg explosive charge in the bow and were specially equipped to make their way through navigation obstacles such as torpedo nets. They were propelled by a six-cylinder outboard motor and had 5 h of autonomy at a maximum speed of 34 knots. 18
The Germans were worried about the quality and suitability of the vessels themselves and sent Naval Captain Kratzenberg to La Spezia to inspect them and discuss their transportation. 19 He found the vessels to be ideal and remained with them until they arrived in the Black Sea. 20 The three squadrons, each with its own commander, were regrouped as the IVª Flotilla MAS and placed under the leadership of Frigate Captain Francesco Mimbelli. He had distinguished himself in the Battle of Crete defending a collection of 21 small vessels loaded with 2,331 German soldiers against superior British forces. He was escorting the vessels as captain of the torpedo boat Lupo when, on 22 May 1941, it was intercepted by a British convoy of three cruisers and four destroyers. To cover for the escape of the vessels, Mimbelli attacked the British ships. Lupo came under heavy fire and was hit by 18 large calibre shells, but still managed to pass through the British convoy and escape. Although the odds were heavily stacked against them (one torpedo boat vs. seven ships), more than two-thirds of the vessels survived due to Mimbelli's manoeuvres, an action for which he was awarded the Gold Medal of Military Valour. 21
It was further agreed that the IVª Flotilla would be under the direct command of the Admiral of the Black Sea (Admiral Schwarzes Meer), which would also cover all administrative matters. It was decided that the Regia Marina would only pay for the salaries of its own personnel, while the Germans would take care of everything else. 22 After the composition of the flotilla had been agreed, work was carried out to prepare the vessels, train the crew and centralise all armament and maintenance materials. Considering that the IVª Flotilla was destined to operate in distant waters, without the immediate support of national bases and with little possibility of training, it was decided to select only men of ‘already proved war efficiency.’ 23 Supermarina, the Supreme Command of the Regia Marina, placed particular importance on the need to include personnel with some knowledge of German in order to avoid the language difficulties experienced by the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia. 24 As noted by Di Nardo, the language barrier had proved to be one of the main reasons for the poor record of Axis coalition warfare on the Eastern Front. ‘While some Italian and Romanian officers … were probably conversant in German or French, they generally lacked this kind of education. Italy's level of education was rather low.’ 25 This expedient also contributed to the success of the German-Italian collaboration in the Black Sea. ‘Relations with the German Navy,’ wrote Mimbelli in his final report to Supermarina, ‘were marked by the most sincere and loyal camaraderie.’ 26
In the weeks that followed, Mimbelli made a reconnaissance trip in the Crimea to select the most suitable bases for the units of the three squadrons. Although none of the ports on the peninsula was sufficiently protected from air attacks, it was imperative, given the limited range of the IVª Flotilla vessels, to operate from bases closer to Soviet supply routes than Constanta, the Romanian port serving as the main base for the German Black Sea Fleet. Having received assurances that anti-aircraft defences would be greatly improved in anticipation of the IVª Flotilla's arrival, Mimbelli decided to station the squadron of MASs and midget submarines in Yalta. It was an ideal position for cutting off the enemy's lines of communication at short notice. For the special assault vessels, he settled on Foros, on the southern tip of Crimea, not only for its proximity to Sevastopol but also because its dense thicket and huge cellar under the command post made it possible to hide both the boats and the vehicles very effectively. Accordingly, accommodation, workshops, ammunition and torpedo depots were quickly equipped. Then Mimbelli decided to split the Flotilla's command: when the personnel and material for setting up the operating bases departed for the Crimea, his second-in-command, administrative staff and depots remained in Constanta. 27
However, the biggest challenge was the transfer of the vessels to the Black Sea because the closure of the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the 1936 Montreux Convention meant they could not travel by sea. 28 A number of historians have reported that the IVª Flotilla reached the Black Sea travelling by road as far as the Danube and then sailing the river to the Romanian port of Constanta, but, in fact, Supermarina established specific routes for each of the three squadrons following careful study. 29 On 16 March, the Germans created a liaison staff, based initially in Vienna but also sent briefly to Rome, to support the transportation of the IVª Flotilla to the Black Sea. This placed responsibility on Captain Hoering, who became the official ‘Naval Liaison Officer’ to the Italian Black Sea Fleet. Initially, the transports were planned for the end of March. Yet analysis of how to solve the logistical difficulties caused a month's delay. 30
The four MASs of the 19th Squadron (MAS 570-571-572-573), under the command of Lieutenant Captain Curzio Castagnacci, were gathered in Venice and taken by road across the Brenner Pass to Vienna, where they arrived having overcome great obstacles. Ironically, the Germans had not foreseen any difficulties moving the vessels over the Brenner Pass, with their own road/rail analysts saying that there would be ‘no restrictions’ on the route. 31 Although the boats had been loaded on wagons that ran on tracks, the soldiers of the Army Corps of Engineers still had to widen some narrow passages by knocking down walls along the way – and this without their superstructures, engines and weapons – to ease the transit of the large convoy. Where the tunnels were too low, the MASs had to be unloaded from the wagons onto the road and pushed onto rollers. Once they reached Vienna, the boats were slipped into the Danube and towed to the Romanian port of Galati. From there, they continued their journey to Constanta, where they arrived on 8 May. 32 On the afternoon of 20 May, the four boats left this port for their operating base in Yalta. Around 9 pm, the sea became rough and Mimbelli ordered the MASs to redirect to Sulina on the Romanian coast. But the inaccurate representation of the seabed in the nautical charts made entry into the harbour particularly difficult, and several incidents occurred. The first boat grounded on the shallow bed and came to an abrupt halt. The second MAS in the formation suffered two gashes to its hull after hitting the squadron leader's unit and being hit in turn by the third boat. Repairs, which in a fully equipped base would have taken no more than a few hours, were instead prolonged for over a week, given the limited availability of equipment and personnel. However, in order not to delay the arrival in Yalta too much, Mimbelli decided to continue with just MAS 571 and 573, leaving the other two in Romania. He arrived in Yalta with the able-bodied boats on 27 May, while MAS 570 and 572 did not get there until 9 June. 33 Soon after the arrival of the first two MASs, Soviet planes began to bomb Yalta systematically day and night. On 29 May, as a result of one of these attacks, several pieces of shrapnel hit MAS 573, seriously injuring two crew members. 34 The following day, even though Mimbelli had only one MAS available, he ordered the raids to commence. 35
Under the command of Lieutenant Enrico Lesen D’Aston, the six midget submarines of the 11th Squadron (CB 1-2-3-4-5-6), departed from La Spezia on 25 April, reaching Constanta entirely by rail on 19 May. According to the highly detailed German records, the Italians sent the munitions for the submarines in a separate convoy. 36 On 1 June, after the set-up was completed and the necessary fuel had arrived, Mimbelli dispatched the 11th Squadron to Yalta. CB 1, 2 and 3 reached the operating base on 5 June, with CB 4, 5 and 6 arriving on the 11th. 37
Under the command of Lieutenant Captain Aldo Lenzi, the transport of the 10 special assault MTSMs (MTSM 204-206-208-210-216) and MTMs required a special study for which a mobile, truck-mounted base, equipped to maintain the boats’ efficiency, was specifically created. Supermarina organised a convoy of 28 vehicles, three tractors, nine trucks, tankers and trailers, which travelled by rail to the station closest to the operating base, and from there by road. This convoy renamed Autocolonna Moccagatta in honour of the Frigate Captain Vittorio Moccagatta, Commander of the X Flotilla MAS who fell in the assault on Malta, left La Spezia on 6 May with six officers, 18 petty officers and 33 petty chiefs. It reached Simferopol in Crimea on 19 May, where the unloading began ‘with makeshift means and acrobatic manoeuvres’. Although this was being completed, Lenzi went to the Naval Command, where he had learned that, although the Autocolonna Moccagatta had been expected in Simferopol, the Germans had no idea it was so large. Admiral Hans-Hermann Graf von Schwenitz made available five Elcavet heavy trucks to transport the boats. Despite the fact that the unloading took place without the aid of cranes, everything was completed in ‘record time to the admiration of the Germans and more importantly without incidents.’ 38 On 21 May, after a 10-h journey to cover a distance of 150 km, the Autocolonna Moccagatta reached Yalta. At 5 am the next morning, the convoy continued on to its operating base. The first 47 km of the road from Yalta to Foros was good, but the last seven km had very tight bends that were particularly problematic for the vehicles with trailers. However, ‘our vehicles and drivers did wonderfully,’ reported Lenzi. ‘The only ones that gave us any trouble were the Elcavets, which did not have sufficient steering and very long chassis.’ 39 The site chosen to accommodate the squadron consisted of a small villa on an estate. As the boats were unloaded, they were hidden under trees and covered with vegetation. Access to the sea was provided by a small road that led about 2 km to a pebble beach. The German Army Pioneer Battalion had already made it passable, but Lenzi further demanded that a trench be dug at the end, at the bottom of which a mobile unit for the boats to go in would be placed. 40
The Siege of Sevastopol
After the failure of their first assault on Sevastopol in the autumn of 1941, Axis forces launched Operation Sturgeon Catch on 2 June 1942. For five consecutive days and nights, German artillery and aircraft relentlessly pounded Soviet combat installations in and around Sevastopol. More than 3,000 air missions were conducted, showering down almost 1,800 tons of high-explosive bombs, while about 2,000 guns and mortars kept firing at Soviet positions without a moment's interval. 41 The day after the launch of this operation, Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein, Commander of the German 11th Army, made a reconnaissance trip along with the coast on MAS 571. Although a naval–air command had been established to improve the cooperation between naval and air forces, misunderstandings still happened. On the way back, just a few miles from Yalta, the torpedo-armed boat was suddenly pumped with machine bullets from the sky. ‘The behaviour of the young Italian captain was beyond praise,’ recalled Manstein. ‘He showed immense presence of mind in the steps he took to save us and his ship.’ 42 Historians familiar with the English translation of Manstein's famous memoir know that this attack was attributed to Soviet fighters. The original German version, however, is more ambiguous and less explicit on this point, merely reporting that ‘two fighters’ (Zwei Jäger) had conducted the raid. Unpublished Italian Navy records shed new light on this episode and conclusively show that it was actually a case of friendly fire. Two German fighters, unaware of the prohibition against making any attacks whatsoever on any light forces in the Black Sea, had raked the deck, leaving three people dead and seven wounded. 43
The IVª Flotilla began its operations on 30 May and was, from that moment until the conquest of Sevastopol, constantly engaged in missions. The object was to cut off Soviet naval supply lines. Surface units (MASs, MTSMs and MTMs) were deployed in front of Sevastopol but, because they were vulnerable during daylight hours to attack by Soviet aircraft and vessels based along the Black Sea's Caucasus coast, they operated only at night. 44
A typical day involved the special assault vessels moving at nightfall from their base to ambush Soviet convoys at a distance of two to three miles from the coast. The MASs were positioned further out, at six to seven miles, forming a double barrage that Soviet convoys had to pass through to enter Sevastopol. The only downside was that the surface units would generally depart on intelligence from German air reconnaissance that ships had been spotted. The midget submarines were deployed near the coast, south and south-west of Cape Sarych, in missions that lasted two nights. 45
Until the arrival of the IVª Flotilla, there had been a scant possibility of Axis forces carrying out military operations, mainly because the Romanian Navy, which comprised four destroyers, one submarine, three torpedo boats, three gunboats and some minelayers, patrol boats, tugs and auxiliaries, could not be relied upon either for material or personnel. Up to that moment, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, estimated at one battleship, four heavy cruisers, 10 destroyers, 29 submarines and a multitude of torpedo boats, gunboats and patrol ships, had been able to supply Sevastopol with food, medicine, ammunition and reinforcements. They did so via convoys consisting of a steamer protected by five or six destroyers and patrol boats, bringing about 15,000 tons of freight and over 24,000 reinforcements. Once near Cape Khersones (10 km from Sevastopol), small torpedo boats would come out of Sevastopol and replace the destroyers and patrol boats which had accompanied the steamer for the crossing, and which would immediately return to their ports in the Caucasus. 46 The presence of the IVª Flotilla greatly disturbed these arrangements, because the sea lanes leading into Sevastopol, hitherto relatively safe, suddenly became very dangerous. 47 In fact, as soon as Vice Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrskii, Commander of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, learned about their presence, he cut back the number of supply missions undertaken by surface vessels. He ordered instead that ‘half of his forty-strong submarine fleet to carry out the vast bulk of the supply mission. … As it happened, submarines were almost as vulnerable as surface ships.’ 48
After several unsuccessful torpedo attacks on convoys between 3 and 9 June, the IVª Flotilla's first success came during the night of 10 June, when MAS 573 sank the 5,000-ton steamer Abkhazia. This achievement was followed on successive nights. On 13 June, MTSM 210 disabled the 10,000-ton transport Fabritius, which was subsequently destroyed by Stuka dive-bombers. On 18 June, two MTMs attacked two fully loaded Soviet troop transports escorted by six gunboats. Although they only had one machine gun each, the two MTMs engaged in fierce combat against the troop transports, inflicting considerable losses among the Soviet soldiers. It was only when they had run out of ammunition that the MTMs returned to base, alerting Mimbelli to the position of the enemy convoy. The Flotilla Commander immediately set off with MAS 570 and 571. He sighted the two transports at 5.45 am and went on the attack. At 7.25 am, after 90 min of fighting, during which MAS 571 was hit several times and its commander Sub-Lieutenant Ettore Bisagno killed, he had to desist and return to base, leaving the two Soviet transports in a desperate condition: one half-submerged, the other badly damaged. 49
However, these successes were not achieved without cost. Inadequate protection of the bases by air force fighters or anti-aircraft guns allowed the Soviets to attack the vessels of the IVª Flotilla with great frequency: MAS 573 was damaged and submarine CB 5 was lost in this manner. 50 On 13 June, a lone Soviet motor-torpedo boat slipped into the port and fired several torpedoes at the docked vessels before speeding off. Mimbelli was stunned by the audacity of the raid. ‘The attack … was conducted with daring and cunning, cleverly taking advantage of the misunderstanding that could arise if the enemy's MAS showed up at the entrance of the harbour, a few minutes before the usual time of return of our vessels. The ruse succeeded perfectly: the enemy MAS was able to come within 150/200 m of the harbour's entrance and launch the torpedo that sank CB 5.’ 51 However, despite coming under constant attack from Soviet bombers and torpedo boats, all the Flotilla's surface vessels remained ‘in perfect working order. This was due,’ noted Mimbelli, ‘to the goodness of our equipment and, above all, to the tireless work of our mechanics and workers.’ 52
After the sinking of the Abkhazia and Fabritius, the IVª Flotilla scored its first submarine kill on 14 June. These achievements helped the Regia Marina establish a favourable reputation with the Germans, which was further enhanced by later actions. On 16 and 19 June, CB 2 and MAS 71 sank two Soviet submarines sailing on surface. 53
On 29 June, the IVª Flotilla also participated in a diversion intended as a decoy for the Soviets while the final assault was underway from the north. 54 The operation was to be carried out by 12 Sturmboote escorted by MTMs, which were to approach the coast by Cape Fiolent to simulate a landing. To make the diversion more believable, it was also decided to explode an MTM against the coast. 55 ‘The Soviets fell for the ruse, believing the deceptive manoeuvre to be a genuine operation and diverting forces from other stretches of coastline to protect that particular stretch.’ 56 The offensive was so successful that Admiral Oktyabrskii and other senior officials received the order to evacuate Sevastopol that very night. After 249 days of siege, Sevastopol fell on 1 July. As a crowning achievement, a number of MTMs entered Balaclava the following day ‘with flags unfurled and before any other Axis units’ to affirm the Regia Marina's contribution to the conquest of the fortress. 57
After the fall of Sevastopol, Mimbelli craved the opportunity to wreak havoc and enhance the reputation of the IVª Flotilla, but the Soviets did not attempt to evacuate their troops by surface ships, sending just a few submarines to evacuate some key staff officers and commanders. The Soviet Black Fleet was too devastated by the numerous losses incurred in the recent weeks to risk further attacks during the evacuation attempt. Some soldiers attempted to escape in motor or rowing boats, but few actually managed to reach the Caucasus because they were either swept by the German Air Force or sunk by the vessels of the IVª Flotilla. On 1 July, for instance, an MTM sank a boat with 15 people on board. 58
Conclusions
With the capture of Sevastopol, offensive naval operations were suspended. Between 30 May and 2 July 1942, the IVª Flotilla had completed 145 war missions: 65 with the MASs, 24 with the midget submarines and 56 with the special assault vessels, sinking three submarines, a 5,000-ton steamer, a 10,000-ton freighter, two troop transports, and participating in the final attack on Sevastopol with a diversion from the sea. Although the total tonnage sunk in the 30 days of fighting was limited, mainly due to the Soviet refusal to resupply the fortress and evacuate military personnel, the contribution of the IVª Flotilla ‘far outweighed the material damage it inflicted on enemy vessels. It compelled Admiral Oktyabrskii to curtail his fleet's fire support mission and to reduce, and finally stop, its vital supply convoys to the besieged city.’ 59 The capitulation of Sevastopol in fact took place while the fortress still had its full armaments, but was reduced to almost zero with ammunition. ‘It can be assumed,’ wrote Mimbelli, ‘that the intense activity of our vessels, not foreseen by the enemy … had a significant impact on the Soviet decision to reduce its supply traffic.’ 60
Admiral Karlgeorg Schuster, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy Southern Group, praised the excellent performance of the IVª Flotilla in a note to Admiral Riccardi: ‘Despite difficult supply conditions and continuous air attacks by the enemy, the Italian Naval force in the Black Sea energetically and successfully supported the Battle of Sevastopol under the unstable and valiant leadership of Captain Mimbelli.’ Schuster added that ‘the conduct and fighting spirit of the crews were exemplary. … All types of vessels deployed, proved perfectly suited.’ 61 In marked contrast to the poor collaboration among the Axis powers on the Eastern Front, the performance of the IVª Flotilla under the command of the Admiral of the Black Sea was an instance of successful cooperation. 62 The Germans were so pleased with the Italian Flotilla that they began planning their transportation by rail to the Caspian Sea. However, the German defeat at Stalingrad forever destroyed those plans. 63
The fall of Sevastopol drastically altered the strategic situation in the Black Sea. A massive consolidation in the position of the Axis forces was mirrored by a corresponding weakening in that of the enemy. The Axis had damaged or destroyed numerous submarines, destroyers, motor-torpedo boats, patrol boats and transports and had deprived the Soviet Black Sea Fleet of its main naval base. Debilitated and now operating out of less advantageous bases on the coast of the Caucasus, it had ceased to pose a threat to Axis shipping. With the expulsion of Soviet forces from the Crimea, the danger of enemy air attacks on the Ploesti oilfield was also removed. Moreover, Axis control of the Black Sea compelled Turkey to think carefully before entering the war on the side of the Allies. Finally, the 11th Army was now in a perfect position to join the offensive against the Caucasus by crossing the straits of Kerch to the Kuban. In the event that did not happen, the 11th Army was instead sent north to an endangered sector around Leningrad. But had Manstein been allowed to stay in the southern theatre, who can say what the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad might have been? 64
