Abstract
This article re-examines the purpose of the army summer training camps introduced by James II that became an intrinsic part of London and army life between 1686 and 1688. Current historiography has associated these camps purely with James II’s attempt to subjugate both London and its predominantly Protestant population. This article will argue that although there is no doubt that those opposed to James II viewed the camp as intimidation, that was not James II’s primary focus as there were better locations for any large-scale camp if this was the intended purpose. Using contemporary newspapers, broadside ballads, and printed promotional material alongside more traditional archive sources, this article will show that the intention was primarily to increase the capabilities of the army. The camps were responsible for introducing new tactics and instrumental in the introduction of battalion guns into regiments of foot.
The genesis of this article derives from the discovery of a popular broadside ballad published in 1686. Titled, The Valiant Souldiers Gallantry: Or, The Glory of the Camp-Royal on Hounslow Heath, this ballad seemed to reference an altogether different camp than the ones described within Whig history. 1 The annual training conducted on Hounslow Heath between 1685 and 1688 was, in effect, the late-seventeenth-century equivalent of the medieval tourney or mêlée. It encompassed all the elements of procession, performance, entertainment, training, martial identity, and combat, resulting in a series of mock battles designed not just as realistic training but also as a public spectacle and would have been easily recognizable by a medieval spectator or participant. The summer camps were not just viewed as an opportunity for training, but as an opportunity to unify what was a disparate organization into a cohesive organization. James II’s intent on transforming the English army, despite his critics and the genuine fears concerning a standing ‘Catholic’ army, did professionalize the army in a way not previously seen within England during peacetime. They performed the function of staff college, officer training school, and social club, and allowed both personal and professional networks to flourish.
The political consequences of James II’s interactions with the military cannot be separated; Whig commentators and historians have emphasized the impact or perceived impact of the political motivations over the military advancements achieved by the implementation of the training camps. 2 There is no doubt that the Monmouth rebellion resulted in James II both enlarging and professionalizing the army, which would have been seen as intimidating for those opposed to James or had concerns, regarding his intentions. While the likes of Ogg correctly identify the impact of large numbers of troops stationed on Hounslow Heath on the population of London, it must be questioned whether this was greater than the impact of having on the order of 4,000 troops stationed within the city for the remaining months of the year. 3 The English Civil War had a lasting effect on the English population and their views concerning a standing army; the prospect of James II using a ‘Catholic’ army to subjugate the Protestant population added a new dimension to these fears. Under Charles II, the army consisted of 8,865 men; by December 1685, this number had risen to 19,778 men and by November 1688, the English army consisted of just under 30,000 men. While the increase in the size of the army has been used as an indication of James’s intention to use it to subjugate the English population, one must remember that the main increases in 1685 and 1688 were in direct response to invasions. Although this article’s intentions are to concentrate on the improvement to the army, the political implications of James II having access to a more professional and loyal army cannot be underestimated as an implement to force the sovereign’s will.
This article will rectify the current gaps in the historiography by highlighting the importance of James II’s changes to the training and development of the English army. It will examine how the annual training camps became the primary location for regiments to converge following dispersed duty and therefore allow regimental, brigade, and combined-arms training. It will detail the organizational and operational changes instigated by James II, during the summer camps held between 1685 and 1688. While there is undoubtedly an element of truth in Whig propaganda regarding the camps acting as an instrument of sovereign power and influence, this article will show that James’s primary intention was to use Hounslow Heath to train the army in the latest European methods of warfare, something that is currently overshadowed in the historiography. James II did not invent the idea of summer training camps; Louis XIV of France held training exercises including siege training involving the construction of earthwork fortifications in 1669 which he also used to create political pressure on the Dutch as well as to train his troops. 4
The training of the English army in the late-seventeenth century has been an under-researched area of military history with few notable studies. Roger Manning’s Apprenticeship in Arms and John Childs’ excellent canon of works on the armies of Charles II, James II, and William III are the exceptions, but even these fail to identity the importance of Hounslow Heath to the army. 5 Stephen Ede-Borrett’s revitalized work on the army of James II mentions the importance of the camp, but focuses on the development and structure of the army. 6 Correlli Barnett succinctly covers the impact of the summer camps, stating that James created a field army during peacetime which was ‘permanently encamped at Hounslow’. 7 That said, the current consensus is that James’s intention was to use the army and by default the summer camps as an instrument of oppression, rather than as an attempt to professionalize the army. The summer camps have been seen as a highly overt show of martial strength by James II and as a method to subjugate the English population and Londoners in particular. 8 James II had a proven record as a talented administrator, including as Lord High Admiral and following the Monmouth Rebellion (1685), James turned his attention to modernizing the army. 9 The current works on the training of the army during the reign of James II focus on the social aspects highlighted by later Whig historians and not on the achievements James made in military training and advances in tactics.
During the late-seventeenth century, Hounslow Heath and to a lesser extent Blackwell Heath, both just outside London, became the closest thing to a permanent summer home to the English army. Each summer, almost the entire English army descended on Hounslow Heath and turned it into a medium-sized temporary town while it conducted its summer camp. In the summer of 1686, the camp contained 18,000 soldiers consisting of 9 regiments of horse, 3 of dragoons, and 15 battalions of foot. Permanent training areas and scheduled military exercises have become synonymous with the training of the British army, but are in fact, a relatively new concept. The Catterick training area is one of the oldest permanent sites still in use in Britain and dates to 1798, with Salisbury Plain only being purchased by the military in 1897. The summer camp was the only occasion that the army had the ability to operate as a complete entity and not just as a company or regiment. 10 The summer camp operated between late May and late August each year, depending on the state of the roads and of the heath. On particularly wet summers, the camp would break up early enabling the army to make its way to its allocated winter quarters. 11 The musters lasted on average for two months with the 1686 muster lasting officially for 61 days. 12 With the English (and Scottish) army dramatically fluctuating in size and without a constant command or centralized training structure, these summer camps became an intrinsic and important part of army life. 13 Without centralized barracks, a regiment’s quarters could be spread over a substantial area consisting of numerous towns. 14 Even regiments quartered within London would be housed over several boroughs. Thus, it was all but impossible for anything above company-level training. They allowed for large-scale multi-regimental and multi-brigade training with the ability to re-create battles and conduct training in siege warfare along with combined-arms training with horse and artillery. Logistical operations were able to be practised and skills honed, although lessons were not always remembered and seldom put into practice.
Hounslow Heath was the obvious choice for an annual camp, located approximately 12 miles to the West of St James’s Palace and Westminster Palace. Its geographical location and topography made it the perfect location on open ground within a day’s ride of the capital and allowing officers to split their time between the camp and socializing within London society. The location also allowed for the civil population of London to observe the camp and training. The heath had been used as a royal hunting ground since at least the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, with William III continuing the tradition of using the manor house in Hounslow as his hunting lodge. 15 The land was leased to the crown by John Lord Belasyse (1614-1689), although areas beyond the river Crane would appear to have been owned by Sir Thomas Chambers and Lord Berkeley. Both Berkeley and Chambers submitted claims for damage to their land following the disbanding of camps. 16 Hounslow Heath had been used by the military prior to the introduction of the annual training camps by James II. Following the cessation of hostilities of the Third Anglo-Dutch War in 1674, 12,000 soldiers were camped on the Heath, which accounted for the bulk of the expanded English army and again in 1678 as the mustering location for troops being sent across to Flanders. 17 During the Monmouth Rebellion, Hounslow Heath was utilized as the muster location for the returning Anglo-Dutch brigade. The three Scotch regiments of foot arrived on 1 July 1685 and consisted of about 1,500 troops, with the three English regiments expected the following day. 18
Hounslow Heath had been utilized as both a training ground and as a muster location for the English army since the reign of Charles II; while Blackheath and Putney Heath had also been used in a similar fashion by the army, this article’s focus is on Hounslow Heath. 19 Without the existence of permanent army barracks, the effect of the army being dispatched to its winter quarters cannot be over-estimated, soldiers were billeted in alehouses and private houses (supposedly with the consent of the homeowners). 20 Due to the lack of available accommodation, regiments of foot were housed over a substantial area; cavalry and dragoon regiments were dispersed over an even wider area, due to the need for forage for their horses and the danger of exhausting local supplies. During the winter of 1686, cavalry regiments were quartered over whole counties due to the availability of quarters for the men and supply of hay and oats for horses. His Majesty’s Royal Regiment of Horse was quartered in Henley, Marlow, Newbury, Reading, Wallingford, and Wickham, while the Royal Regiment of Dragoons were quartered in Bridgnorth, Ludlow, Nantwich, Oswestry, Shrewsbury, Whitchurch, and Wrexham. While most regiments of foot were quartered in and around large county towns that year, some were far more dispersed, resulting in very little inter-regimental communication and co-operation. The Earl of Lichfield’s regiment billets were split between Gravesend and Tilbury, and then garrison duty in Guernsey and Jersey, which precluded any inter-company training. 21
In an age of political and civil uncertainty and on occasions of down-right hostility to the premise of a standing army, the physical distance from London allowed some degree of separation between the army and the civilian population. 22 Instances of the civilian population being abused by soldiers were not uncommon. The Duke of Sunderland wrote to the mayor and aldermen of Yarmouth regarding reports of soldiers abusing and robbing town citizens and instructing the corporation to punish those responsible. 23 Hostilities against the army ranged from towns refusing to allow troops to be billeted within them, for fear of not being paid lodgings and putting their inhabitants into poverty to political campaigns against the principle. 24 The presence of the camp has been described as an attempt by James II to ‘overawe the city’ [of London] and as an act of military oppression against the Protestant population. 25 The local proximity to London did allow the monarch to ‘show off’ his army to visiting dignitaries as James II did to Louis XIV’s ambassador Maréchal d’Humières which must have helped fuel Whig speculation and fears. 26 If, as the current historiography suggests, the primary focus of the camps was as an instrument of oppression then a more central location would have been both more desirable and more effective. 27 Blackheath or Greenwich Park due to their more central location would have better served James II’s supposed clandestine aims. A better definition would be that the location was the best location for training the army, being close enough for James II to travel to review the army while reminding London of the power and size of the army under the sovereign’s command.
Animosity and undisciplined behaviour were not only a problem between the civilian population and the military, but within the military camp as well, something that the wider civil population would have been aware of, therefore shown the disunity and internal conflict within the army. During the 1686 camp, there were reports of riots between Catholic and Protestant soldiers. 28 The burial register for Twickenham in 1686 shows several deaths within the camp that year, including a record for a soldier by the name of Joseph Ashe, who was buried on 1 August 1686. 29 The register also includes the burial of an unknown soldier having been ‘shot by a felon unknown’. The descriptive language suggests that this death was not due to a training accident, but due to a lethal altercation. Other instances including a ‘gentleman in the Lifeguards being killed by Colonel John Culpepper with a blunderbuss’ during the 1686 camp and Captain Richard Cooke killing Lieutenant Ash. 30 While there is no intrinsic reason to suggest that the primary motivation for these deaths was religious, a number of recorded cases suggest religion as the motivation. Lieutenant Robert Moxam, a Catholic, was killed on 2 February 1686 in a duel by Captain Henry Wharton who was Protestant; both officers held commissions in the Duke of Norfolk’s regiment of foot. 31
The establishment of the Hounslow camp in 1686 coincided with the implementation of the Articles of War (1686) which initiated martial law for soldiers during peacetime, taking them out of the civil justice system. A weekly court-martial was established within the camp, whose authority extended to the boundaries of the camp and to all the soldiers within. 32 This included the death penalty for instances of desertion. 33 The previous version of the articles, which had been added to the statute books by Henry VIII, stated that a deserter could only be sentenced to death in times of war, or when the army was overseas. 34 This revision of the Articles of War has been viewed as confirmation of James’s lack of faith and trust within the army. It has been referred to as an illegal act, with the resignations of Sir Edward Herbert, Lord Chief Justice, and Sir John Holt, Recorder of London, being used to support this view. 35 A more nuanced explanation could be that this is further evidence that James’s primary intent was to professionalize the army and bring the legislation concerning the army up to date. The views of Ogg and Schwoerer that the implementation of martial law was an unwelcome illegal act would seem to be at odds with acceptance by the army of the Mutiny Act of 1689, which was implemented by William III and became enshrined in law and is the basis of all subsequent mutiny acts. 36
Desertions, or the lack thereof, have been used as a measure of the army’s morale and discipline. 37 While tracking the numbers of desertions from the army is extremely problematic, there is some contemporary evidence of troops deserting from Hounslow Heath. Descriptions of army deserters were often published in the bi-weekly The London Gazette. Ogg uses descriptions of deserting soldiers published in The London Gazette as justification for his argument that the camps were disordered and had an un-martial bearing, as justification for his argument that James was not professionalizing the army. 38 This analysis is spurious at best. The evidence presented is for four soldiers that deserted between May 1688 and September 1688; he also falsely included a servant of the Countess of Orrery, four soldiers out of approximately 18,000 cannot have left any opinion on the population of London. 39 The London Gazette for Monday 6 June 1687 gives details of one John Burges who had deserted from Sir Henry Cornwall’s regiment of foot. He is described as a ‘well-proportioned man, with long black greasy hair and a pock-broken face’. A reward of five pounds is offered for his capture and return. 40 The following month, The London Gazette reported another two soldiers deserting, this time from Sir Edward Hales’s regiment of foot. The deserters were 23-year-old John Glover, a ‘middle-sized’ man with lank brown hair, and Joshuah Bamforth, a tall ‘black-man’. 41 The numbers of deserters reported do not increase during the periods of the camps at Hounslow Heath, suggesting that the hardships of the camps were not a significant factor in the daily lives of ordinary soldiers. The two most prevalent months for desertion according to advertisements placed within The London Gazette were April and December, suggesting that factors other than the camp were the primary reason for desertion. 42
The camps allowed regiments not only to train together but also to train with new equipment and tactics. The 1686 camp saw the introduction of battalion guns to seven regiments of foot. Battalion guns were typically lighter artillery pieces than the standard field guns firing a cannonball between one lb and three lb in weight. The guns were supplied with Board of Ordnance staff, although it is highly likely that soldiers from the battalions would be involved in their operation.
43
King James ordered that the Board of Ordnance on 12 May 1686 supply a train of 26 brass guns for that year’s summer camp, as well as the necessary stores, munitions, and equipment as required in addition to the officers and men required to service the guns.
44
Brass or bronze artillery pieces were not only lighter but were also more robust and were less likely to burst than the cheaper iron equivalents, and therefore were the preferred option.
45
On 5 June, the Board of Ordnance was instructed to supply a second train of 12 artillery pieces plus all the necessary equipment to equip the following regiments.
46
This confirms one of the main benefits of the summer camps, they allowed individual regiments to train in a realistic way with artillery, in a way that was previously deprived to them. The regiments and equipment involved were Queens Regiment 2-3 Pounder’s new
47
Princess’s Regiment 2-3 Pounder’s new Colonel Cornwall’s Regiment 2-3 Pounders drakes Sir Edward Hales Regiment 2 Falconetts Colonel Tufton’s Regiment 2 Falconetts Colonel Bochan’s Regiment 2-3 Pounders
The camp that year started to break up on 8 August 1686. The King ordered 14 small brass cannons to be made ready to travel with seven regiments of foot to their respective winter quarters. 48 This evidently suggests that the allocation of battalion guns had been a success and that this was not just a theoretical training opportunity but designed as a more permanent arrangement. These regiments were the Battalion of Scotch guards, Dunbarton’s [Royal] regiment, Queen Dowager’s [Kirks] regiment, Prince George’s regiment, the Holland regiment, Earl of Bath’s regiment, and the Marquis of Worcester’s regiment. The rest of the artillery train was returned to the Tower of London; orders were issued to the royal regiment of fusiliers to break camp and to march to the Tower of London on the evening of Monday 9 August. The grenadier companies of the seven regiments were to escort the artillery pieces to their respective regimental camps, with all departing on Tuesday 10 August. 49 This further confirms that while the bulk of the artillery remained under the auspices of the Board of Ordnance, the lighter three pounders were becoming integrated within the structure of regiments of foot.
In addition to the implementation of battalion guns, infantry weapons and equipment underwent a multitude of changes within the latter half of the 1680s. The arms and equipment of the English army underwent a step change. Matchlock muskets were increasingly being replaced with flintlocks, and plug bayonets were being issued to more regiments, both as a replacement to the pike and also to be used in conjunction with the pike. 50 While the flintlock musket and plug bayonet were not uniformly adopted until the 1690s, the wargames and battalion exercises allowed senior officers to identify the issues and advantages. During this period, we also see the change from bandoliers to ready-made ammunition stored within cartouche boxes, although like muskets they were introduced alongside the older bandoliers and units could be issued with both. 51 The camp allowed for large-scale drills including regiments moving from line to extended line and into defensive hollow squares. 52 The summer camps allowed for regiments to be inspected and ensured that soldiers were issued with new clothing every two years. 53
As previously stated, the ability and importance of both individual regiments and the army to be able to conduct ‘joint and combined-arms’ training cannot be over-estimated. The ability to be able to train such a large group in a single line of battle did not happen again, until after the Crimean War. With the artillery belonging to the Board of Ordnance and not the army, there were very few occasions where the two could interact. The gunners, gunners’ assistants, and mattrosses (labourers) were all civilian and employed by the Board and not by the army. Trains of artillery due to the logistical challenges and the expense would only normally be raised in time of war or conflict. This resulted in the average soldier not having the experience of being in close proximity to artillery as they were emplaced or fired. The summer training enabled soldiers to gain firsthand experience of working with artillery at the ‘unit-level’ and become aware of how their interaction with artillery changed their ability to move and their requirements for space. Battalion guns have not been previously associated with the English army until much later in the eighteenth century. When the army was reviewed by King James II on Monday 18 June 1686, the encounter was recorded in a broadsheet printed and sold by George Croon
54
: The whole army was drawn up in battalia, with two regiments of [dismounted] dragoons on the right and one on the left, facing one another, and the Lord Dartmouth’s fusiliers in the front of all the army behind the field pieces: Whereupon, order was given to the fusiliers to fire, then the great guns fired in number 27; then the dragoons on the right wing fired, and so through the whole army: then the fusiliers fired a second time, then the great guns, so they fired for three rounds together in that manner.
The process was repeated on the Wednesday (the 20th) with the army firing three times, followed by the army marching past the King with the two regiments of dragoons leading, followed by the regiment of guards. The Broadsheet published by Croon in 1686 also gives details of the drill performed by the regiments of horse, foot, and Dragoons. The regiments of horse are recorded as ‘giving fire’ while mounted with both their pistols and carbines as are the dragoons, who are also recorded as exercising drill on foot befitting their joint role. The drill also specifies that the ‘six outside men of both right and left’ flank of each rank remain mounted to act as horse holders for those dragoons who have dismounted. The regiments of foot were recorded conducting drills with both musket and pike. It is of note that the musketeers do not ‘give fire’ during these drills. Regiments were armed with both matchlocks and flintlocks during this period and the sequence for ‘giving fire’ for matchlock and flintlock muskets is sufficiently different that it requires two separate drills. 55 The army seems to have forgotten about or decided to drop some of the systems and equipment developed during the camps. There is no evidence in any of the Board of Ordnance records of battalion guns being deployed with English regiments being sent to either Ireland or Flanders in 1689.
Getting the troops to Hounslow Heath was only the first step in obtaining a well-trained army; in addition to the location and time, trained instructors were also required. This had previously been fulfilled by English officers serving in foreign campaigns to gain experience, including John Churchill and the Duke of Monmouth who both served at the siege of Maastricht in 1673, when they served in the army of King Louis XIV. James II ordered Jacob Richards in October 1685 and Edward Clarke in March 1687 to travel to Hungary and join Emperor Leopold I of the Habsburg Empire in his next campaign.
56
They were instructed to take note of their Methods of marching, encamping, embattling, exercising, ordering of their trains of artillery, their manner of approaching, besieging or attacking a town, their mines, batteries, lines of circumvallation and contravallation, their way of fortification, their foundry’s, instruments of war and engines, or what else may occur observable in his journey.
57
James also sent his illegitimate son, James Fitz-James, Duke of Berwick, to gain experience of European warfare. 58 Officers who had spent time abroad, returned to impart their knowledge. During the camp of 1687, the army conducted practice multiple siege operations on a purpose-built earth fort, with what was described as a recreation of the 1686 siege of Buda using the expertise of officers who had been witness to these events. 59 As previously stated, we know that Jacob Richards travelled to observe the Habsburg army in 1685; he could have supplied the information required to reconstruct the siege. James’s illegitimate son, James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick, also attended the siege, returning to England during the winter of 1686. 60
Mock battles were a regular part of the training performed at the summer camps. One of many wargames conducted over the summer occurred on the evening of 6 July 1686. The army was split into two, about three and a half miles apart, one side forming up over the river by the hospital and the other half on the other side of the heath by the powder mill. Both forces marched towards each other having to ford the river, until one of the forces came across ‘enemy’ dragoons defending a hedge line. After forcing the dragoons to retreat and carrying the position, both sides engaged in a firefight that lasted for two hours. Exercises are recorded all through July of 1686, with the last one on 29 July involving opposing forces complete with two great guns deployed between each infantry battalion. 61 As well as combined operations, the camps enabled some regiments to train as a whole unit and practice complicated manoeuvres, where previously this was often limited to training by company. By 1686, printed drill manuals were becoming more popular and were displaying the latest thinking in tactics and weapons. 62 By 1688, there were at least 13 drill books in wide circulation within England. There is no doubt that a large percentage of drill manuals reprinted text from earlier volumes. A drill manual printed in 1689 used the same phrases as earlier drill manuals printed in 1684. 63 Both the availability of experienced officers and regiments would have resulted in a far more conducive training environment. Reprints of ‘Military Observations, or the Tacticks Put into Practice’ along with newer titles explained how a regiment could be manoeuvred on the battlefield. 64 Manoeuvres such as forming battalion or regimental squares took both constant practice and also space. Most training would have been conducted on the company level throughout the year, so the ability to practice with all the regiment’s companies was of critical importance. Given the average strength of a regiment of foot being 600 private soldiers, the regiment when in line would be between 450 ft long in close order to just over 2,025 ft at double order. 65 The camps allowed the space for this to happen along with the development of regimental cavalry tactics, which coincided with James II issuing Royal Warrants stating the trumpeters should only ride grey horses. 66
The sheer logistical challenge of assembling the army and all the stores and equipment necessary was a huge challenge for the army and the Board of Ordnance. One advantage of the location of the camp was the ability for supplies and soldiers to be transported by barge down the river Thames. 67 The 1686 and 1687 camps are depicted in a number of contemporary engravings; these show the camp being over three miles in length with its own bake house, hospital, and powder mill. 68 The camp was set out with lines of tents, running down the length of the grounds, soldiers at the front, then separate lines behind for officers by rank, with the regimental colonels’ tents at the rear. Sutlers’ booths are located behind the camp alongside the artillery park. The camp was surrounded by small camps for the picquets or ‘out-guards’. The parade ground was overlooked by a raised wooden viewing platform for the King and his guests. While the prints all show a stylized version of the camp, these are aligned with contemporary accounts of armies in the field. The army is depicted drawn up in a traditional battle line with the infantry flanked on both sides by the cavalry, the artillery camp in the centre front and Lord Dartmouth’s regiment of fusiliers to the rear. The figure of 18,000 soldiers quoted by Davis is considerably higher than the records returned by the official records. 69 These show 8 regiments of horse, 3 of dragoons, and 15 of foot, with a total of 12,884 soldiers and officers present. Between 31 May and 14 June 1687, 165 teams of horses were required just to move the required number of tents from the Tower of London to the Heath. The teams were ordered to be at the Tower between 2 am and 4 am, giving them enough time to make the 15-mile journey in one day. 70 The camp’s military hospital was constructed each year under the control of an apothecary general, with Thomas Maxwell being appointed for the 1686 Camp. 71 While troops were under the direct medical care of their individual regimental chirurgions and Chirurgion-General, who in 1685 and 1686 was James Pearce, the hospital was under the administrative control of the apothecary general. 72 The hospital is described as 120-feet long and 20-feet wide and consisted of 90 beds within six wards. In addition to the hospital, the 1686 map also shows a bakehouse and a gunpowder mill situated besides the River Crane. The presence of a gunpowder mill within the camp confirms the use of ‘live-firing’ drills and not just musket and artillery drill. The bake house in 1686 is recorded as employing 14 bakers operating five ovens, each baking six batches of bread a day, with each oven producing 300 loaves within a batch, giving a total of 9,000 loaves as day. Strict rules were enforced regarding the camp’s layout, with set distances between tents. The company kitchen tents were to be 5 paces behind the soldiers, and 15 from the lieutenants, the captains a further 20 paces away with the majors 30 paces from them. Sutlers’ tents were to be placed 40 paces to the rear of the soldiers. 73 The lessons learnt from the summer camps seem to have been lost on the English army following the succession of William III. The army had obviously forgotten the lessons regarding camp hygiene and good practice; these and the lack of an adequate hospital and medicines at the 1689 camp at Dundalk, Ireland, had disastrous results when the camp was ravaged by disease which incapacitated almost one-third of the army. 74
Daily life within the camp reflected civilian life as much as possible with officers being able to entertain and promenade, as well as catering for both ecclesiastical and commercial aspects of daily life. In 1686 and 1687, temporary Catholic chapels were erected within the camps, to serve the ecclesiastical needs of the Catholic soldiers within the army. Daily mass was conducted by Nicholas Trapps who was the regimental priest for Sir Edward Hales’s Regiment of Foot. 75 The ease of access from London also encouraged high society to attend camp, with the King and Queen often dining with senior officers and a large part of the Royal Court being transported to the Heath during the summer months of 1686. 76 The 1688 camp was however noted for its ‘not so splendid entertainment nor consequently, the concourse so great’. 77 Officers would expend considerable sums of money every year at the annual camp, both on the fitting out of their tents and on entertainment during the summer months. Senior officers complained that the annual summer camps were a considerable drain on their finances, and the Earl of Dumbarton stated that ‘this camp will cost me a good deal of money’ and tried to recoup money owed to him by colleagues prior to the camp. 78 While there is no mention of the actual cost, it was enough for several officers including a Captain Freeman to lay down their commission as they were ‘weary of the cost’. 79 A number of other officers resigned their commissions as they would not ‘endure the fatigue and inconvenience’ that the summer camp at Hounslow offered. 80 Prior to the 1686 camp, the Commissary-General of the army, John Shales, was granted the right through a Royal Charter by James II to hold a market on the Heath. Not only did this enable a close proximity to normal life, but it also shows that there were opportunities for some officers to make money during the camp. The charter stipulated that John Shales could hold a market daily while the camp was being held, and on every Thursday throughout the rest of the year. 81 The following year, Shales was granted a second charter for holding a spring fair on Hounslow Heath on the first 12 days of May. The charter stipulated that the first two days were solely for selling horses, the third and fourth day for cattle and oxen, with the last eight days for general goods. 82 This arrangement must have been profitable for John Shales, as in 1692, he is recorded as the owner of the ‘Market House’ in Hounslow.
Broadside ballads are an exciting way to view historical events through their interaction with the general population through print and media culture. The Valiant Souldiers Gallantry: Or, The Glory of the Camp-Royal, Hounslow Heath, a broadside ballad published in London during 1686 gives a detailed account of camp life and structure. 83 The publication of this ballad goes to show the level of both public acceptance and entertainment the annual training camps of the English army attained during the late 1680s. The ballad was set to the tune of Hark the Thundering Cannons Roar which was later used as the tune to England’s Triumph, Or, The Kingdom’s Joy for the Proclaiming of King William and His Royal Consort, Queen Mary, in the Throne of England, on the 13th of this instant February 1688, which was written in celebration of the coronation of William and Mary. The use of a pre-existing and popular tune was a common practice and enabled people to recite the ballad with ease, thus increasing sales. The Valiant Souldiers along with the two engravings of the summer camp of 1686 and 1687 allow us to both visualize the camp and to see the impact that the camp had on the civilian population. There can be no doubt that these three items were intended to sell a particular version of events. The ballad of the Valiant Souldiers sides with the contemporary Tory narrative of supporting the monarchy by referring in the first verse to ‘our Gracious King and Queen’. The second and third verses promote civic pride within the army and were intended to counter the fear of a standing army by Whig politicians and the ‘no standing army’ rhetoric. By emphasizing desirable characteristics such as ‘brave and gay the soldiers are’ and ‘loyal hearts and active hand’, the ballad was attempting to change the civilian population’s perception of the army and, by association, the King. Verses four to seven describe the professionalism of the army, detailing specific elements of the camp and the activities within, from ‘tents and trenches are complete’ to ‘artill’ry, an noble train . . . that has often spoke in flame’. Similarly, verses eight and nine tried to emphasize the popularity of the event indicating that ‘some thousands flock to view’ both the army on manoeuvres but also by doing so, support the King. 84
While the social aspect of the camps was actively reported, for the officers at least, there was also a hidden side to the gathering of so many soldiers. James’s intent was to increase his popularity within the army, and therefore its loyalty. 85 The camps also allowed the opportunity for the promotion and propagation of dissent among both the officer class and among the common soldiers. In 1686, several officers came together to complain following James II’s declaration that martial law would supersede civil law when the army was ‘in camp’ and that the sentence for desertion during peacetime would be the same as during time of war, death. 86 The summer camps also acted as an incubation ground for the Treason Club. The Treason Club was a loose organization of army and navy officers along with a small number of politicians who met during 1688 at the Rose tavern on Russell street in Covent Garden with the aim of replacing the Catholic James II with the Protestant William of Orange, who was married to James’s Protestant daughter Mary. 87 Those involved included Lieutenant-General Percy Kirke, Lieutenant-General John Churchill, Lieutenant-Colonel Savage, Viscount Colchester, and Major-General Charles Trelawney. Each of these officers was in command of a regiment and therefore could exert substantial influence on the other officers within the regiment. The relationships that were constructed between officers of individual regiments during these yearly camps were an important factor when it came to the behaviour and operational effectiveness of the army during the campaign in November and December 1688 against William’s army. In July 1687, James II used the opportunity to question his officers on their support for repealing the Test Acts, which in retrospect pushed loyal officers towards the conspirators within the Treason Club. 88 Officers felt that their loyalty was being questioned and resented the threats to officers who would not support his policy. A large number of English senior officers including members of the Treason club including Churchill, Kirke, and Trelawney defected to William during late November and early December 1688.
The camps acted as a potential breeding ground of dissent among the enlisted soldiers as well as officers; during the 1686 camp, an estimated 20,000 anti-Catholic pamphlets titled An Humble and Hearty Address to All the English Protestants in This Present Army were handed out to the whole army by the Whig minister Samuel Johnson. 89 This exalted the loyalty and duty of the Protestant soldiers and claimed that they should separate themselves from ‘Papists’ who burnt the Bible, and owed their loyalties to French and Irish ‘Papists’. Although as previously shown, these attempts to incite mutiny and desertion among the enlisted soldiers did not manifest in an increase in desertions during the camps, they may have influenced the actions of the army in 1688.
In conclusion, the summer camps introduced by James II that occupied Hounslow Heath each summer between 1685 and 1688 increased the capabilities and professionalism of the English army. They enabled the army to conduct combined operations with the integration of horse, foot, and dragoon regiments alongside artillery and full-scale battle and siege training could be conducted on a regular basis. The camps also allowed for officers as well as enlisted soldiers to gain from the latest European tactics through the lived experiences of officers returning from the continent. New and inexperienced officers gained experience from seasoned officers, both from the campaigns in Tangiers and those officers who had been seconded to foreign armies on the continent. James introduced standardized drill, through published drill manuals and training at the regimental level instead of only at company level so large-scale operations including siege tactics were able to be taught alongside combined operations training with cavalry and artillery. Unfortunately, due to the effectiveness of the collective actions of the ‘Treason Club’, we cannot judge if the actions of James II did have an impact on the martial ability of the army. The army’s disintegration, desertions, and then its formal disbandment left William’s forces an almost open path to London and the country.
Following the Glorious Revolution and the accession of William III, the camp was dismantled, although review and musters continued to be held on the Heath throughout the eighteenth century for both the regular army and the militia. 90 Permanent cavalry barracks were built on the Heath in 1793, north of the current Staines Road, which are still in use by the military and home to the Welsh Guards when they are on ceremonial duties with London. 91 Unfortunately, James’s intentions and achievements in professionalizing the army have been overshadowed by the political and religious controversies surrounding his reign, and the subsequent events of the Glorious Revolution. A more professional and capable army had the potential to be a far more intimidating and powerful force in the hands of James II, even if this was only in the eyes and fears of those opposed to his ambitions and religion. That said, the poor showing of the English army following the invasion of William of Orange in November and December 1688 did not, and should not, reflect the actual abilities of the army or the training system instigated by James II. The format of training instigated by James II would be instantly recognizable to soldiers of all nations to this day.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
