Abstract
This article explores the role of the battleship in naval strategy, challenging the contention that they were obsolete before the end of World War II, using the D-Day landings of June 1944 as its focus. It argues that battleships played two indispensable roles. First, they countered the threat from enemy capital ships, both to achieve command of the sea and to protect the invasion fleet. Second, they provided fire support both for the initial assault and also thereafter in defending the bridgehead and assisting the Allied advance, thereby contributing to the collapse of the German strategy for defence.
The battleship was dominant in navies and naval strategy at the beginning of the twentieth century and entirely absent from both by its end. At some point between, it lost any role that offered enough utility to justify its cost. The exact timing and process of its eclipse are debatable; the battleship was the subject of many premature obituaries that understated and misrepresented its continuing importance. Too often portrayed as hopelessly vulnerable, irrelevant, or superseded, it retained a vital albeit evolving role in naval and national strategy to the end of World War II and beyond. This article explores the role of the battleship by analysing its contribution to one of the pivotal operations of the war – Operation Neptune, the D-Day landings that began on 6 June 1944 as the first phase of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Western Europe.
The article begins by considering the significance of the traditional battleship function of countering the heavy surface units of the opposing fleet, arguing that this role was still essential both in establishing the preconditions for the Normandy landings and also in protecting the forces that conducted the operation. Its main focus is an assessment of another wartime role of battleships, bombardment of targets ashore. It contends that battleship gunfire was central to the Allied plan not only in ensuring that the initial assault succeeded but also in supporting the bridgehead against counter-attacks. It concludes that these two contributions were indispensable and could not have been adequately provided by other capabilities. The focus is on the Royal Navy, though the arguments also apply to the US Navy, allowing for differences between the different theatres of the war.
The subject of this article falls at the intersection of a number of existing literatures. First, many works analyse the war at sea in general, including some material on the contribution of battleships. 1 While these provide essential background for this article, it differs in its focus on battleships and their direct and indirect role in supporting the D-Day landings. Second, several works consider the evolving role of battleships, some quite technical, focussing on one specific vessel, or covering a longer period than that assessed here. 2 Again, while these provide useful background or greater detail on particular issues, none explores D-Day in depth. Third, there is a wealth of material about the Normandy landings, though surprisingly little on the specifically naval aspects, which in many works receive attention that is perfunctory at best. 3 Those works that devote sustained attention to naval power focus on amphibious warfare with only passing references to battleships, with these mentions heavily focussed on fire support during the assault rather than the full range of battleship roles during the campaign. 4
Some verdicts on the effectiveness of naval bombardment on D-Day are highly critical. Correlli Barnett, for example, uses an eye-catching historical parallel: the Allies’ hope that the warships and bombers would have crushed the defence before the attackers reached it was to prove vain, just like the comparable hope entertained by Sir Douglas Haig and his generals with regard to preliminary bombardment before the Battle of the Somme in 1916.
5
O’Connell offers a rather dismissive judgement of the importance of bombardment by battleships across the war as a whole: ‘All in all, it was a modest but positive performance, although other, far cheaper ships could have approximated most of these services, including shore fire mimicked by massed rocket barrages’. 6 This article contends that such opinions not only understate the importance of naval bombardment at D-Day, they also mischaracterise and consider it too narrowly. It further argues that while this role was vital, it was not the only important contribution that battleships made to the assault and indeed to the campaign – they also had a vital broader function that is not adequately covered in the existing historical literature in the form of ensuring command of the sea for the operation.
I. Countering enemy heavy warships
The classic core role of battleships was to counter enemy heavy warships and thereby establish the conditions necessary for the rest of the fleet to carry out its own tasks. Performing this role was the battleship’s principal contribution to the liberation of Europe yet it is rarely acknowledged. With the advent of submarines and aircraft, command of the sea defined in traditional terms of neutralizing the enemy surface fleet was no longer sufficient. However, it remained necessary before the liberation of Europe could begin. A full account of the defeat of the German fleet is beyond the scope of this article but the battleship was an indispensable element of the force that had, over several years, won this victory. It was a combination of the battleship and the aircraft carrier, with the former providing striking power in bad weather (making it particularly useful in northern European waters) and at night, whose actions or mere threat accounted for the pocket battleship Graf Spee and the battleships Bismarck and Scharnhorst, and tightly constrained the use of the rest of the German surface fleet for most of the war. In summer 1943, Allied planners estimated that between the North of Holland and the Spanish frontier, there were no German warships larger than a destroyer, and only four of those. 7 In April 1944, the Home Fleet took the next step in this process by knocking out Tirpitz, thereby ensuring that the single most powerful warship in European waters would be compelled to sit out the Normandy campaign. 8 According to Rommel’s naval advisor, ‘Therefore on the sea, not much could be expected from the navy’. 9
The threat from the German surface fleet was therefore limited. The Norwegian destroyer Svenner, sunk off Sword Beach by torpedo boats, was the only Allied vessel lost to German warships on D-Day. 10 Given the limited threat from enemy surface forces and the number of cruisers and destroyers present, as well as air support from shore bases, there was little call for battleships in this role. They would have become more central, however, had a greater threat emerged – the possibility of which was envisaged and anticipated.
At best, in June 1944, the German Navy might have put to sea a squadron comprising two pocket battleships (Lützow and Admiral Scheer) and two heavy cruisers (Prinz Eugen and Admiral Hipper), supported by four light cruisers and numerous destroyers. 11 Had such a force, coordinated with action by torpedo boats, U-boats, and land-based aircraft, targeted Allied operations in the Channel, it would have posed a significant threat – perhaps the only threat other than the weather capable of defeating the landings. Not all of these warships were serviceable but this was not known at the time, and it was only sensible for Allied planners to err on the side of caution. 12 The initial plan for Neptune therefore made a prudent assumption: ‘When it becomes clear to the enemy that a full-scale invasion is developing, it is probable that all his available Naval forces will be used against our operations to the full extent of their capabilities’. 13
Admiral Bertram Ramsay, Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force and the lead planner of Neptune, carefully considered how to defeat any German naval operation against the landings. Although Barnett suggests that the German surface fleet was the, ‘least of Ramsay’s concerns’, 14 the precautions Ramsay took suggest that he deemed it to be worth anticipating. In May 1944, he devised ‘Operation Hermetic’, by which he would order the commander of the British Eastern Task Force to take command of all seven battleships off Normandy and in reserve in Portsmouth, together with 20 cruisers and supporting destroyers, with fighter cover. This force would then, ‘proceed as necessary to bring the enemy to action’. 15 Ramsay never made the signal he was aching to – he confided to his diary, ‘It would be a glorious thing to wipe out the German fleet with my Amphibious Operational Warships’ 16 – because his quarry never challenged Operation Neptune. Had it done so, battleships would once again have performed their classic role. 17
The other option for the German fleet was to head north, aiming to break into the Atlantic and threaten shipping from North America carrying the reinforcements and supplies on which Overlord depended, as well as diverting Allied warships from supporting the invasion. Land-based air power had less utility against a move towards the Atlantic than it did for operations in the southern North Sea or the Channel, 18 so countering such a sortie was left to the Home Fleet. Based at Scapa Flow, this force comprised three of the four most modern British battleships (the only ones commissioned during the war), Duke of York, Anson and Howe, alongside the fleet carriers Formidable and Victorious. 19 It provided cover, support at a distance, both for forces conducting Operation Neptune in the Channel and ships in the Atlantic supplying Overlord, while protecting convoys to Russia, attacking German shipping and contributing to the ‘Fortitude North’ strand of the deception campaign by striking targets ashore and feigning interest in likely landing beaches. 20
Battleships therefore retained their core role during the Normandy landings. This particular contribution tends to be overlooked, for two reasons. First, due to the wide area over which naval forces operate, it is common for the cover force to be some distance from the forces that it is protecting. In the case of D-Day, this separation was even greater, given where the threat was likely to manifest. Second, the successful exercise of cover is often achieved without an engagement, by deterring an enemy force from intervening – or alternatively, the enemy might have no intention of attacking in which case, the cover force is an unused albeit essential insurance policy. The principal explanation for the absence of enemy heavy warships, both in their availability and the willingness of the German high command to hazard them even to contest the Allied invasion of Europe, is that this campaign had by June 1944 already been fought and won by Royal Navy battleships and carriers.
II. Naval bombardment: the plan
The most prominent contribution of battleships to the Normandy landings was bombardment. Many previous amphibious landings had relied on the mobile, heavy firepower provided by battleships and cruisers to counter enemy artillery and to support the assault forces in establishing themselves ashore.
One glaring exception was the disastrous August 1942 raid on Dieppe. The target for this operation was chosen largely because it was within range of air cover from England, and it relied heavily on bombing for fire support. No heavy warships were allocated for naval gunfire; the naval commander felt that his force of four destroyers was too weak and requested a battleship but his superiors declined, perceiving too much risk of a valuable heavy ship being lost to a mine in confined waters. 21 He later concluded, ‘I am satisfied that a capital ship could have been operated in the Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation without undue risk’. 22 The bombardment force was increased to eight destroyers yet with no guns larger than four inch, they were less powerful than the known coastal batteries. The result was that the destroyers’ guns, ‘were too light to have much effect on the strong and well-concealed enemy positions’. 23 The Royal Navy’s official historian identified the lack of naval fire support as one of the key weaknesses of the plan, resulting in failure to suppress German batteries, which inflicted heavy losses among the ships conducting the assault: ‘Off Dieppe the heavy guns of long-range bombarding ships . . . were shown to be as essential as adequate air cover’. 24 Heavy naval bombardment, including by large-calibre guns, was needed to tackle coastal batteries and fortifications which posed a mortal threat to amphibious landings. The lesson was learned and in subsequent operations, the Allies applied progressively more naval firepower – in Operation Torch against North Africa in November 1942 and Operation Husky against Sicily in 1943. 25
Naval fire proved particularly important during Operation Avalanche, the landings at Salerno, Italy, in September 1943. The first lesson cited in the Admiralty Battle Summary was that ‘Heavy preliminary air and naval bombardment are essential before undertaking a landing on defended beaches’. 26 Naval gunfire was important in allowing Allied forces to establish themselves ashore; it proved even more important in helping to defeat German counter-attacks. While the initial landings had been supported by smaller warships, as the troops defending the bridgehead found themselves in an increasingly desperate situation, the battleships Warspite and Valiant were rushed to the area (with Nelson and Howe held in reserve). Both fired, effectively, in support of the beleaguered US troops ashore. 27 The Royal Navy officer commanding the escort carrier force concluded that naval gunfire, ‘had been of crucial importance in saving the situation’ and quoted Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German theatre commander, as stating, ‘in order to evade the effective shelling from warships, I authorised a disengagement on the coastal front’. 28 The US Admiral commanding Avalanche declared: ‘The margin of success in the Salerno landing was carried by the naval gun’. 29 The utility of naval gunfire in defending a bridgehead against the famously inevitable German counter-attacks was well understood – by both sides.
For Neptune, naval gunfire was particularly important given the strength of the defences. German strategy emphasized fixed fortifications built along the length of the coast where the Allies might land, the vaunted ‘Atlantic Wall’. These were intended to slow and inflict losses on attacking forces, while also identifying the main assault for a decisive armoured counter-attack. The resulting defensive system was not as daunting as its proponents envisaged, being incomplete and much of it inevitably in the wrong place, yet it was still a hugely challenging barrier. 30
Within this defensive system, gun batteries played a key role, ‘with 343 built along the French coast, housing 1,348 guns of 150 mm calibre or greater’. 31 They came in four categories. First, there were heavy anti-ship batteries, with a field of fire to seaward. These positions, of which in Normandy there were six in the British sector alone, typically included four guns between 122 and 155 mm calibre in heavily protected positions with seven-foot thick concrete. Second, protected field gun and howitzer batteries (two in the British sector) were able to fire to seaward or on the beaches, usually with four guns of 105-122 mm, again in reinforced concrete casements. Third, open-field, unfortified gun and howitzer batteries, usually four guns of 105-155 mm, were designed to ‘harass the beaches’ with indirect fire; there were 12 to 14 of these in the British sector. Finally, multiple beach-defence strong points mounted 75 mm or 88 mm guns and 55 mm anti-tank guns, in strong concrete emplacements, in enfilade position to fire along the beaches. According to the Admiralty Gunnery Review, this coastal artillery amounted to, ‘the most formidable yet tackled in a seaborne assault’. 32
The Allied strategy to counter these defences was multifaceted. It included landing in Normandy rather than the Pas de Calais to avoid the densest fortifications and to achieve surprise; a deception plan to reinforce the contrary expectation; and a thoroughly joint and combined-arms plan for Operation Neptune itself, which encompassed an increasing pace of air attacks in the run up to D-Day and then during the night before the assault. In contrast to operations in the Pacific, there was no prolonged preliminary naval bombardment. In that theatre, amphibious assaults typically faced defences that were concentrated near the beaches, because Japanese forces were defending small islands rather than a continental coastline. These islands were isolated from external resupply or reinforcement, whereas the target for Neptune was the continent on which the main enemy forces and war production were located. For the Normandy landings, a preparatory bombardment extending over several days was undesirable because it would clash with the need for the highest possible degree of surprise, minimizing German warning time and hence delaying their response. Nevertheless, naval bombardment was from early morning on D-Day at the heart of what Ramsay described as the key naval task, ‘the breaking of the strong initial crust of the coast defences by assault’. 33 One reason for this assault beginning in daylight rather than at night (the latter being generally preferred by the army) was precisely to facilitate the supporting air and naval bombardment without which the assault forces would not make it ashore. 34 Indeed, the German naval officer who commanded coastal defence forces in France and Belgium from 1941 to 1943 and then became naval advisor to Rommel even noted, albeit with hindsight, that the Allies’ decision to land in Normandy rather than the Pas de Calais should have been obvious because the former was so much more suitable for bombardment by heavy warships, to which, ‘the British attached great importance’. 35
Naval gunfire offered advantages over aerial bombardment in accuracy (with bombing constrained by low cloud and poor weather), rapidity of response and volume of fire, and destructive potential against heavy, concrete fortifications. 36 However, there were known limitations to its effect; naval gunfire had on previous occasions struggled to defeat shore-based batteries not least because of the lengthy bombardment required to guarantee destruction. As discussed below, any expectation that the prior bombardment could entirely destroy the defences was unrealistic. What it could do was reduce the threat that they posed and the losses they inflicted to levels that did not jeopardize the success of the assault.
The initial plan for Neptune, which envisaged a landing limited to three beaches, included three battleships or monitors, 37 one in the US sector and two in the British, ‘to deal with particularly obstinate targets’. 38 The number of beaches was later increased to five in order to widen the bridgehead, increase force levels in the early stages of the operation, and hasten the capture of a major port at Cherbourg. This decision together with Allied awareness of the further fortification of the defensive batteries drove an increase in the supporting bombardment forces. 39 The fleet conducting Neptune therefore included four British and three US battleships along with two monitors and many cruisers and destroyers. Force S, assaulting Sword Beach, included the battleships HMS Warspite and Ramillies, and the monitor HMS Roberts; in the US area, Force O (Omaha Beach) was supported by the battleships USS Texas and Arkansas, and Force U (Utah Beach) by the battleship USS Nevada and the monitor HMS Erebus. The battleships HMS Rodney and Nelson were held in reserve for any beach. The D-Day landings were supported by 84 bombarding warships, as well as dozens of landing craft armed with guns, rockets, and self-propelled artillery. 40 The First Sea Lord initially baulked at the number of warships that Ramsay requested for bombardment; the latter described it as, ‘a huge force but not great in respect of the issues at stake’. 41
III. ‘A bombardment without parallel’ 42
The scale of fire support provided from the sea was remarkable: the assault, ‘was covered by 800 naval guns from 16-inch to 4-inch’. 43 The heaviest German batteries included four guns of up to 155 mm; the light cruiser HMS Belfast, part of Bombarding Force E supporting Juno Beach, carried twelve guns of 6-inch calibre (slightly smaller than 155 mm) and twelve 4-inch guns (about 105 mm). The destroyers supporting the assault typically mounted four guns of 4-inch (e.g. HMS Talybont, supporting Omaha) or 4.7-inch calibre (e.g. HMS Grenville off Gold), equivalent to 105 mm and 120 mm, respectively. 44 Most German batteries were therefore outgunned by a single destroyer, the larger ones by a light cruiser; yet they also faced battleships, such as Warspite, with a main armament of eight 15-inch (380 mm) guns and a secondary armament which at fourteen 6-inch guns outgunned most individual German batteries in Normandy.
In assessing the effect achieved by naval bombardment, two categories of targets must be distinguished; first, the coastal defence batteries that could engage warships at sea or amphibious transports and landing craft approaching the shore, and second, the fortifications defending the beaches. The former were the principal targets for monitors, cruisers, and, particularly, battleships, with their advantage over smaller warships in the range and penetrating power of their main armament. While these targets were to be extensively bombed, the operation plan concluded that this was unlikely to knock them out, so naval bombardment was required as, ‘the best means of neutralising coast defence batteries’. The Admiralty advised that counter-battery fire was generally best performed by a cruiser but ‘A heavily protected battery however will not be effectively neutralised unless it receives a direct hit from a 15″ shell’; there was therefore a need for a battleship or monitor to be dedicated to each of four or five such heavily protected batteries. 45 Destroyers (with their more rapid fire and ability to approach the shore more closely, enhancing the accuracy of their direct fire) engaged beach fortifications during the preliminary bombardment and then, with armed landing craft, provided the ‘drenching fire’ designed to keep the defenders’ heads down as the assault went in. 46 The objectives were to prevent the coastal batteries from inflicting losses on warships and amphibious shipping sufficient to significantly disrupt the operation, and to assist the assault forces by preventing beach fortifications from inflicting sufficient casualties to defeat the landings. Destruction was the ideal, but temporary suppression, which was more realistic, would also achieve the aim.
Against the first category of targets, a high degree of success was achieved. The threat to warships and amphibious shipping, particularly from the larger batteries, was eliminated: Perhaps one of the most noticeable features of the assault phase was the inability of the enemy to disturb the tranquillity of our shipping lying in the anchorages either by coastal batteries or by air bombardment . . . This was mainly due to the effectiveness of our counter-battery fire and the pre-H-hour bombardment.
47
According to the Gunnery Review, It is clear that naval counter-battery fire against the enemy’s fixed coast defences achieved its object, since these batteries in no way interfered with the approach of assault phases or with the landings. They were either silenced or reduced to short periods of spasmodic and ineffectual fire . . . This could not have been achieved without the fire of capital ships or monitors.
48
The most dangerous German batteries, located to defend the port of Le Havre, were within range of Sword Beach: Fire from Warspite, Ramillies, Roberts and, later in the day, [the cruiser] Arethusa, succeeded in neutralising the three main coast defence batteries east of the Orne to the extent that enemy return fire was desultory and inaccurate and did not interfere with Force ‘S’ landings.
The effect achieved is underlined by the fact that planned commando raids to capture two of these batteries overnight between D-Day and D + 1 were called off because of the batteries’ inactivity. 49 Some German heavy guns were destroyed by direct hits, while near misses damaged others or knocked them out by their shock effect on the crews. Roskill concluded that while counter-battery fire achieved its purpose, the results confirmed, ‘the well-known fact that strongly protected and cleverly cited shore batteries are extremely difficult targets for warships to hit’. He also cited a 1945 report by the Joint Technical Warfare Committee: ‘Summing up, it seems probable that bombing reduced the potential rate of fire of the coastal batteries . . . while naval gunfire was the only means available for producing a further appreciable but temporary reduction in enemy fire’. 50 Some smaller and mobile batteries lying inland proved difficult to neutralize, with prior intelligence on them being less comprehensive and their invisibility from seaward making them more difficult to target – although the lack of a line of sight applied both ways and reduced their effectiveness against shipping and against the beaches. 51
The results achieved against the second category of target, the beach fortifications, are more controversial. Some contemporary and later accounts express disappointment or even criticism that these defences were not destroyed.
52
Such judgements reflect expectations that were unrealistically high – though understandably so, because the soldiers conducting the assault had been encouraged in these beliefs by their superiors.
53
Bombing, preliminary bombardment, drenching and supporting fire, together with combined-arms tactics from the assault forces overcame the beach defences. Some fortified positions remained a threat either because they were not suppressed at the outset or because early damage was repaired and they were brought back into service. The Chief of Combined Operations noted that, ‘many beach defences were active until overcome by the infantry. The problem of destroying or neutralising these defences must still be solved’.
54
Yet while the results achieved against beach fortifications were less comprehensive than those against the coastal batteries, they were what could reasonably be expected. According to the Gunnery Review, though the enemy was not neutralised to the extent of being unable to oppose the landings from the moment of touch-down, at least the quality of his resistance was impaired by the fire preparation . . . [it] succeeded in rendering the enemy temporarily incapable of strong resistance.
55
The bombardment and the broader plan of which it was a central part were remarkably successful. ‘Losses of ships and landing craft of all types were much lower than had been expected’. 56 Allied casualties were also less than anticipated; although they were heavily concentrated in the first waves to land, the Gunnery Review gives a casualty figure (killed and wounded) for these forces of six per cent. 57 The naval bombardment did not destroy the German defences but it suppressed them – the coastal batteries highly effectively, the more challenging beach defences sufficiently for the landings to succeed with lower losses than feared. As Ramsay concluded, ‘the outstanding fact was that despite the unfavourable weather, in every main essential that plan was carried out as written’. 58
Correlli Barnett’s verdict on the bombardment, quoted above, was critical. He set the bar too high in terms of what could realistically be achieved, although some junior commanders had been led to share these expectations. Nonetheless the results were vastly better than those of his World War I comparison. There was no alternative capability that could have matched the success of the naval bombardment, let alone improved on it. This bombardment could have achieved more had it been significantly prolonged but this was not possible for wider strategic reasons. The battleships (alongside monitors and cruisers) achieved their objective against the coastal batteries and, in doing so, cleared the way for the destroyers and landing craft to add their contribution against the beach defences. The German equivalent of the official history is clear in attributing Allied success in the landings in large part to air power and to naval gunfire: ‘They managed not only to destroy many obstacles and minefields but also to put German positions and, in particular, coastal batteries out of action’. 59
IV. Naval fire support after the initial assault
The contribution of naval bombardment, including by battleships, to the success of the initial landings was immense. Equally significant, although less frequently noted and meriting separate consideration, was its role after 6 June. 60 It was always intended that naval gunfire would continue to support the forces fighting ashore over the following days and weeks, just as it had in previous landings. First, it could help to defeat the immediate counter-attacks that were central to German doctrine in general and their strategy to defend Western Europe in particular. It offered most value in the period before army artillery could be established ashore in significant strength and before airfields could be built on the French side of the Channel to stretch the legs of short-range fighters. Second, once the initial counter-attacks were beaten off and the bridgehead was secured, naval gunfire could help with the subsequent advance and breakout. Dogged German resistance in Normandy, especially around Caen, slowed the Allied advance and delayed airfield construction, yet in doing so kept the battle within range of heavy-calibre naval guns for an extended period.
This role for bombarding warships was envisaged during the early stages of planning. Ramsay’s initial estimate of the naval forces required for bombardment, in December 1943, noted that, ‘there may well be a requirement for bombardment of targets far inland, such as road junctions through which the enemy will attempt to pass up to the front reserve formations such as Panzer divisions’. Accordingly, he advised that the force should include modern battleships in order to reach targets as far inland as possible. 61 In February 1944, a brief for Prime Minister Winston Churchill considered various fire support tasks and the comparative advantages of bombing and gunfire by different types of warship. ‘Engagement of back areas during and after the assault’ was one requirement that the article concluded was probably best met by naval fire: ‘The rapid engagement of snap targets is certainly more easily carried out by a ship than from the air. Only cruisers and above have the necessary equipment to carry out this task’. 62
The planners were right to anticipate this requirement. On D-Day alone, while short-notice fire support for ground forces was largely a role for cruisers or destroyers, on eight occasions, it was provided by battleships. 63 The most immediately dangerous German reserve unit was 21st Panzer Division, stationed around Caen with 90-100 serviceable tanks. It was the only armoured division to counter-attack on D-Day but was foiled by a truly combined-arms effort. As it assembled, it was delayed and suffered losses to air attack and naval gunfire. Its main effort, directed towards Sword Beach with the aim of splitting the British and Canadian forces, was halted by tanks and anti-tank guns. About a third of its strength advanced on the British airborne troops, ill-equipped to defend against tanks, defending the bridges across the Orne; it was driven back by naval fire. Holland quotes a Major in this counter-attacking force: ‘Then all hell broke loose. The heaviest naval guns, up to 38 cm in calibre, artillery and fighter-bombers plastered us without pause’. The counter-attack ‘was stopped dead in its tracks’. 64 The following day, a counter-attack by 12th SS Panzer Division against Canadian forces was fought off by with assistance from naval gunfire. 65 On 8 June, a German counter-attack towards Bayeux, ‘was broken up by massive artillery and naval gunfire’. 66 Rommel’s report of 10 June makes clear the impact of naval gunfire in the early days of the operation. He emphasized, first, the ‘immensely powerful, at times overwhelming superiority of the enemy air force’, second, the ‘effect of the heavy naval guns . . . The effect is so immense that no operation of any kind is possible in the area commanded by this rapid-fire artillery, either by infantry or tanks’. 67 A few days later, he wrote to his wife that, ‘The battle is not going at all well for us, mainly because of the enemy’s air superiority and heavy naval guns’. 68
A few later examples fill out the picture. On 11 June, D + 5, Warspite and Nelson supported the advance from Gold Beach, which had pushed beyond the range of cruiser fire. They destroyed German tanks and infantry preparing to counter-attack, ‘with results reported by the Divisional Commander to be most effective’; one of Nelson’s shoots was at 33,000 yards range (nearly 19 miles or over 30 km). 69 Her 16-inch guns could easily engage targets well to the south of Caen. On 16 June, a German counter-attack enjoyed some success but according to Rommel’s naval liaison officer, ‘In the afternoon, however, part of the recaptured ground had to be given up as a result of the devastating effect of the concentrated enemy ships’ artillery. Our losses were high’. 70
During the second half of June, the importance of fire support by battleships declined as the army’s artillery was fully deployed. 71 Yet not until D + 46, 23 July, did the front in Normandy finally move beyond the range of naval gunfire. Thereafter, battleships continued to support the Allied advance along the coast, proving particularly valuable against heavily fortified objectives, notably the ports of Cherbourg, Brest, and Le Havre, and the approaches to Antwerp. 72
Naval gunfire and air power were complementary; the former benefitted from Allied air supremacy which minimized the aerial threat to bombarding warships off the coast of Normandy, permitting them to anchor and fire from a stationary position, enhancing their accuracy. It also ensured the free operation of spotter aircraft which both further sharpened the accuracy of naval fire and also increased its responsiveness to the rapidly developing needs of the land forces. Just as the planners had anticipated, naval fire demonstrated advantages over bombing (especially before fighter-bombers were available in strength) in accuracy, weight of fire, destructive effect, and swiftness of response to developing needs. The Admiralty Gunnery Review quoted a German military journal describing naval fire as, ‘one of the best trump cards’ of the Allies because it was more accurate, could be used for prolonged periods rather than only in short ‘bursts of fire’ and, particularly in the case of battleships, offered heavy and concentrated fire: ‘time and again he put an umbrella of fire over the defenders at the focal points of the fighting compared with which incessant heavy air attacks have only a modest effect’. 73 German accounts make clear that overall, Allied air power was the principal impediment to their activities, in the immediate vicinity of the battle and with the transportation plan that delayed and disrupted the German reserves. However, they also reveal that naval gunfire was in the lead during and immediately after D-Day, and came a close second for several weeks after that – yet it receives far less attention than air power in accounts of the campaign.
While much of the fire support was provided by monitors, cruisers, destroyers, and specially equipped landing craft, the heavy guns of the battleships offered unique capabilities that other warships could not replicate. These came into their own both during the landings, when their heavy-calibre shells were able to target the better protected coastal batteries (freeing the smaller warships to fire on their own allotted targets) and during the subsequent campaign, when their range allowed them to reach far inland. O’Connell’s rather dismissive judgement quoted above, that, ‘other, far cheaper ships could have approximated most of these services, including shore fire mimicked by massed rocket barrages’, 74 is unconvincing. As with much of his diatribe against battleships, this comment fails to acknowledge their unique capabilities. Naval firepower was one part of a broad, combined-arms and joint service plan – but it was an indispensable one.
The potential impact of naval gunfire, as one of the key advantages of the Allies, imposed restrictions on the German defensive strategy and thereby helped to defeat it. There had been a heated debate within the German command over whether it was preferable to locate the armoured reserves (the best trained and best equipped part of their order of battle, and the element on which their defensive strategy hinged) near the beaches, or to hold them further back. 75 The most notable proponent of the forward policy was General Erwin Rommel, as a result of the devastating impact on his North Africa campaign of Allied air superiority – which he felt was under-estimated by colleagues whose experience had been on the Eastern front. The Rommel school of thought was convinced that reserves held far from the front would be badly exposed to air attack as they advanced, suffering delays and attrition. Rommel judged that the forces immediately defending the coast would, ‘suffer severely from the enemy bombing and artillery bombardment’, after which the Allied forces would be able to consolidate ‘with excellent support from his superior air arm and naval guns’. This would allow them to penetrate the initial defences: ‘Once this has happened it will only be by the rapid intervention of our operational reserves that he will be thrown back into the sea. This requires that these forces should be held very close behind the coast defences’. He therefore recommended strengthening beach defences and coastal fortifications, alongside bringing reserves far enough forward to be able to counter-attack an Allied landing within the first day or two. 76 Rommel was strongly supported by Ruge, his naval adviser, and also by Grand-Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander-in-chief of the German Navy. 77
In contrast, those who advocated holding the reserves further back were concerned about the effect on forces stationed near the coast of Allied firepower, including bombing but also naval gunfire. General Geyr Von Schweppenburg, commander of Panzer Group West, believed that, in view of the formidable enemy air superiority and the number, calibre and effectiveness of the naval guns of the combined Anglo-American battle fleets, a landing some place on 1,300 kilometers of coastline could not be prevented and would succeed in any case.
He therefore believed that German reserves should be used to defeat the Allies inland. 78 Others on his side of the debate, such as Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (Commander-in-Chief in the West), were strongly influenced by the scarring experience of the vulnerability of their armoured forces to naval gunfire in Sicily and Salerno. 79 The latter experience, in particular, had impressed the Germans, with their Salerno War Diary noting that fire from battleships, cruisers, and destroyers had, ‘brought our own attacking divisions to a halt before the goal could be reached of driving the enemy into the sea’. It added that, ‘our attack had to stop for reforming because of the great effect of the enemy sea bombardment and continuous air attacks’. 80 The German history of the Normandy campaign criticizes those who argue that holding the reserves too far away was a fatal flaw in the plan as, ‘underestimating the effect of the enemy’s powerful naval artillery and air power. Panzer units stationed on the coast would have been decimated [sic] before they could even begin to be moved’. 81 Stationing the reserves further from the beaches would keep them safe from naval gunfire.
The German high command did not opt decisively for either of these positions, instead rather falling between the two stools. The fundamental problem for the German defensive strategy was that both sides in this debate were correct with respect to the dangers that the reserves would face but incorrect that their preferred solution could resolve the problem; the Allied advantage both in the air and from the sea impaled the defenders on the horns of an insoluble strategic dilemma. Rommel was quite right to fear the effect of Allied air power on German reserves as they moved forward. Yet his opponents in the debate were right to fear the impact of naval gunfire (and bombing) if the reserves were held closer to the coast. In the event, air power proved every bit as destructive as Rommel had anticipated, while even its past experience did not prepare the German Army for the impact of Allied naval gunfire support, which even for von Rundstedt, ‘was a big surprise, both in its range and effect’. 82 His report made the impact clear: ‘Because of the high rapid-fire capacity of naval guns they play an important part in the battle within their range. The movement of tanks by day, in open country, within the range of these naval guns is hardly possible’. 83 Battleships therefore helped to defeat the German defence of occupied Europe not only tactically but also strategically.
V. Conclusion
On 6 June 1944, the Royal Navy had 10 operational battleships and one battlecruiser. Four (Warspite, Ramillies, Nelson, Rodney) were in the Channel directly supporting Operation Neptune and three (Anson, Howe, Duke of York) were providing cover and indirect support with the Home Fleet based at Scapa Flow. The others were either deployed with the Eastern Fleet (Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, and the battlecruiser Renown) or refitting prior to doing so (King George V, the fourth of the modern capital ships). 84 This distribution with its significant presence in the Channel differed from that of the fleet carriers, of which two were with the Home Fleet and the other three committed to the Eastern Fleet. 85 Within a few months, the British Pacific Fleet would comprise four battleships, six fleet carriers, and four light fleet carriers, backed by nine escort and two maintenance carriers. 86 The composition of this force reflected not only the different requirements of the Pacific theatre but also the changing balance between carrier and battleship.
The long-standing principal role of the battleship, containing or destroying its enemy counterparts, still loomed large at the time of D-Day; that it could achieve this without firing a shot or while conducting secondary roles does not detract from this requirement. Alongside carriers, which were increasingly important but not yet able to perform the task alone, it was the main role of the battleships with the Home Fleet as it provided cover, and one to which those off Normandy were ready to turn if needed. Battleships committed to the Far East were doing the same, although in that theatre, and especially in the US Navy, the carrier was further down the road of taking the lead in the partnership. Battleships had also performed this role over the preceding years, thereby helping to establish the essential preconditions for the invasion of Europe. The continuing centrality of their core role is indicated by the age of the battleships committed off the Calvados coast – all five had first commissioned during or even before World War I (Arkansas in 1912, Texas in 1914, Warspite in 1915, Nevada in 1916, and Ramillies in 1917). The two held in reserve, Nelson and Rodney, were newer, both commissioned in 1927, but still not the most modern ships in the fleet. This deployment was in part due to the threat from mines, described by Ramsay as, ‘our greatest obstacle to success’, 87 but it was also because the more modern battleships were retained by both navies for the most demanding role of their class, fighting the enemy’s capital ships.
Bombardment of targets ashore was by summer 1944 an increasingly prominent role for battleships and was crucial to the Allied invasion of Europe. It was required to defeat the coastal batteries, greatly reducing the threat to amphibious shipping and freeing the smaller warships to suppress the beach defences. It was equally important in helping the land forces to defeat counter-attacks and to expand the bridgehead, before this role could be fully passed over to artillery and air power. In doing so, it formed an integral part of the broad Allied plan to defeat the Germany defensive strategy, for which there was no other capability that could have provided an effective substitute.
Without the involvement of battleships, the risk would have been much greater, from coastal batteries as well as the German fleet (perhaps emboldened by the absence of the enemy capability that had done so much to keep it in port). Losses to warships, amphibious shipping, and the landing forces would inevitably have been higher. Given the limitations of bombing and the lesser capability of other naval assets, the threat from German counter-attacks against the developing bridgehead and the losses inflicted would also have been greater. At the very least, the prospects of the operation would have been considerably more precarious, and Normandy was the last place where the Allied high command was prepared to take a gamble. More fundamentally, the command of the sea and neutralization of the German surface fleet that was a precondition for Neptune either could not have been achieved without battleships (save for the unlikely counter-factual of vastly more investment in the Fleet Air Arm) or would have taken far longer.
The role of the battleship must be set in context. In the fight to secure sea communications, battleships had to play their part – alongside carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines – in defeating or containing the enemy heavy ships in order to limit the threat facing convoys to U-boats and sporadic air attack, which smaller and more numerous escort vessels and long-range, land-based aircraft could handle. 88 Similarly, during Neptune, battleships took on the major coastal batteries to free smaller bombardment vessels to engage their respective targets. The activities of capital ships and other naval vessels were conducted separately, often at considerable distance in time and location, but they were nonetheless inextricably linked and mutually dependent. The war at sea and the naval strategy have to be seen as a whole; it makes no sense to focus on convoy escorts or landing craft alone and ignore the interconnection between their activities and those of capital ships.
Supporting D-Day, battleships had two essential roles: first, protecting against the limited but conceivable threat of attack by heavy surface ships and second, providing fire support. Both were necessary for the operation, that is, without them it could not have been countenanced, and there were no alternative capabilities that could have replaced the battleship in either role. By 1944, battleships in both the Royal Navy and the US Navy were well into the process of handing on the baton as the centrepiece of the fleet to the aircraft carrier; yet as their contribution to the D-Day landings demonstrated, their race was not yet quite run.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
