‘The termination of the long immunity from air raids’ 1 : The bombing of Berlin under Operation Tannenberg,August 1942–March 1943

Abstract

Arthur Harris infamously pursued the Battle of Berlin in winter 1943/1944 in the face of an increasingly sceptical Air Staff and a disinterested prime minister. The irony was that originally the C-in-C Bomber Command was lukewarm about bombing Berlin. Instead, it was Churchill who continually pressed for attacking the German Capital under Operation Tannenberg, which went ahead in mid-January 1943, for wider political considerations, especially Anglo-Soviet relations. For the Air Staff and Harris, they endeavoured to use Churchill’s enthusiasm for bombing Berlin to further an agenda of increasing the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of Bomber Command.

. . . trust you will repeat [Tannenberg] several times so as to make a real impression

Churchill to Sinclair, 18 January 1943 ²

Many thanks for your message concerning the successful bombing of Berlin on the night of 17-18th January 1943. I wish the British Air Force further successes, more particularly in bombing of Berlin

Stalin to Churchill, 19 January 1943 ³

On 16 January 1943, the British dispatched 201 heavy-bombers to attack the governmental heart of the Nazi Empire – Berlin – for the first time in 14 months. Haze over the target hampered the Pathfinder crews from identifying specific ground features, and the city centre was not found. Of the 140 aircraft that got to Berlin, few dropped their bombloads on the central districts; instead, it was the city’s southern suburb around Tempelhof that received some scattered damage. ⁴ By any other standard, it was a disappointing outcome and an operation that was not successful according to Bomber Command’s standards. Yet in this instance, the location and level of destruction inflicted were not the primary purpose of the raid. Instead, the chief requirement was the mere symbolism of British heavy-bombers having dropped some bombs on Hitler’s capital. The raid that had taken place, with another the following night, was called Operation Tannenberg. After the war, Harris wrote that from autumn 1942 ‘I was being continually pressed to attack Berlin’. ⁵ ‘Pressed’ is the most important word here, for the evidence shows all too clearly the prime minister’s consistent badgering of the RAF to bomb Berlin. Although lukewarm about this enterprise and for months advocating its delay, the Air Staff and Harris saw Tannenberg as an opportunity for a quid pro quo, in which the bombing of Berlin would be exchanged for Churchill’s full support of Bomber Command’s expansion in readiness for the main bombing offensive against Germany in 1943.

In existing accounts, the Berlin attacks of early 1943 are mentioned solely within the general chronology of Bomber Command’s operations at this time, with little reference to Tannenberg’s particular origins, development, and objectives. What certainly emerges is that these operations were an example of bombing for politically symbolic reasons rather than for inflicting any significant devastation. Although airpower theorists had given considerable thought in the interwar period to the effects of strategic bombing in the 1920s and 1930s, such figures as Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Alexander de Seversky all conceived the blow from the air to be rapid and decisive, and thus the notion of using strategic bombing to assist an ally was scarcely considered. ⁶ Yet one scholar’s recent work pays considerable attention to the issue of political bombing. Overy notes that

what is now called a ‘political dividend’ is a dimension of the bombing war that has generally been relegated to second place behind the more strictly military analysis of what bombing did nor did not do to the military capability and war economy of the enemy state . . . [In this case] bombing was used to try to exact a political dividend or to fulfil a political pledge . . . [and was brought about by] the direct involvement of politicians in decision-making about bombing [policy]. ⁷

Thus, we are able to formulate a definition of what might be termed ‘political bombing’ or, perhaps more accurately, ‘Diplomatic Bombing’. The aim was not physical damage on the enemy per se, but instead the influencing of a third party. In the case of Tannenberg, Churchill aimed to secure diplomatic advantage with the Soviets by maintaining Moscow’s confidence in Britain’s military capabilities. For this reason, the actual target mattered. ‘Attacking Berlin were always mainly political’, the AHB stated, because of ‘its importance as capital and headquarters of the Nazi movement’. Furthermore ‘political’ targets were Munich and Nuremberg because these were ‘shrines and strongholds of the Nazi system’, with the latter staging the annual party rally. ⁸ Moreover, the aiming-point was equally important for emphasizing an attack’s political importance. The Directorate of Bomber Operations considered either the Alexanderplatz or Siemenstadt District; in other words, a choice between the city centre or a major industrial area. Yet Tannenberg’s fundamental political imperative meant only the Alexanderplatz, surrounded by famous streets and landmarks of the German capital, could serve to emphasize that Bomber Command had flown over central Berlin. ⁹

I. ‘Pay our way by bombing Germany’ ¹⁰

On commencing leadership of Bomber Command in February 1942, Harris inherited an Air Ministry Directive that stated ‘the primary object’ was ‘the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular, of the industrial workers’. This heralded the restarting of the bombing offensive against Germany after its drastic curtailment over the previous winter, and in connection to the Eastern Front, two specific reasons were given for doing so: first, ‘it would enhearten [sic] and support the Russians if we were to resume our offensive on a heavy scale’, and second, ‘the co-incidence of our [bomber] offensive with the Russian successes would further depress enemy morale, which is known already to have been affected by the German armies’ reverses on the Eastern Front’. ¹¹

Thus, a connection between bombing Germany, the Wehrmacht’s military misfortunes in the east, and bolstering Soviet morale was established in British bombing policy early on. Yet the pressure to do so greatly increased from August 1942 because relations between London and Moscow had worsened, notwithstanding the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance signed on 26 May. The British government had particularly objected to Molotov’s speech a month later, in which he had declared the failure to open a Second Front in Western Europe meant Britain was ‘failing to redeem definite promises’ and the treaty would henceforth ‘lose its value’, while Soviet propaganda soon adopted an anti-British tone. ¹² But there were other Soviet complaints too; in July, Stalin wrote to Churchill to protest against the Arctic Convoys being discontinued. The drain on the Home Fleet and the likelihood of further heavy losses on the PQ.17-scale were reasons, the Soviet premier stated, he found ‘wholly unconvincing’. ¹³ Thus, Anglo-Soviet relations were in a delicate state when Churchill went to Moscow in August 1942. It proved a difficult summit. The prime minister confirmed a Second Front would not be launched in Western Europe in 1942 as the Allies instead would focus on the North African/Mediterranean Theatre. Yet it was during a tough meeting on 13 August that Stalin showed increasing interest in the bomber offensive. Roger Beaumont describes how ‘Stalin’s [hostile] manner eased, [with] the Soviet premier and his advises eagerly suggesting targets and urging destruction of German labourers’ dwellings as well as factories’. This then was the atmosphere in which Churchill made ‘the commitment to step-up bombing’, which was ‘a policy born of diplomatic expediency’ as a sop to Soviet disappointment with the British. ‘There was no doubt in Moscow in 1942’, Beaumont concludes, ‘that a strategic bombing campaign was a Second Front’, ¹⁴ which caused Stalin to receive news about Operation Torch ‘in a better mood’. ¹⁵ Thus, one author’s assertion that late 1942 saw Churchill ‘in one of his moods of periodic reaction against the whole bombing offensive’ ¹⁶ seems an imprecise judgement given his commitment given in Moscow. In autumn 1942, Churchill needed the bomber offensive if for no other reason than for providing proof to Moscow that Britain could take the war directly to Germany. Indeed, he began regularly sending to Stalin the latest statistics and damage photographs of British attacks on German cities.

Yet bombing Berlin specifically became central to Churchill’s ‘use’ of the bombing offensive to placate Stalin during winter 1942/1943. While returning from Moscow via the Middle East, Churchill messaged the Secretary of State for Air (SSA), Sir Archibald Sinclair, and Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief-Marshal Sir Charles Portal, stating that ‘Stalin attaches great importance to bombing Berlin and is going to start himself soon. Should be glad if we also struck hard as soon as darkness permits’. ¹⁷ Stalin proposed an Anglo-Soviet bombing operation against Berlin, with the RAF assigned an aiming-point west of the city centre and the Soviet Air Force one in Berlin’s eastern-half. Discussed in the Air Ministry later that day, Sinclair informed Portal that Churchill had ‘achieved a wonderful success with Premier Stalin’, but the Soviets still demanded greater direct support by launching an invasion of Western Europe (Operation Sledgehammer), basing Allied air squadrons in the Caucasus and resuming regular Arctic Convoys, none of which were considered viable. Consequently, this left the only option being ‘a rendezvous with the Russian pilots over Berlin’, which Sinclair hoped the Air Staff would not ‘return a negative answer to’. ¹⁸ Yet as the SSA himself knew, the principal obstacle to undertaking this was Bomber Command’s size in August 1942. With the Wellington squadrons and OTU crews unable to reach Berlin during a moon period, reliance would solely be on the four-engine bombers, particularly on Bomber Command’s significant number of Halifaxes, but this meant only 250 aircraft was the maximum number available for the operation. ‘In view of the huge scale of defence which must be expected in Berlin’, Sinclair wrote, ‘this force seems to me too small’. For this reason, Stalin’s plan, the SSA continued, should be considered. ¹⁹ But in response, Portal scotched the idea with the shrewd observation that

. . . it would be extremely difficult to ensure coordination, and if we cancelled operations at, say, 6 pm the Russians might well have started & would say we let them down if they had heavy losses. My own view is that it does not matter one way or the other whether the plan is coordinated with the Russians until we can send a very large force. (Author’s emphasis) ²⁰

Portal’s message was clear: Bomber Command should only bomb Berlin as a unilateral undertaking, notwithstanding its limited resources that precluded doing so at that time. Consequently, Sinclair discussed with the ACAS(Ops.), Air Vice-Marshal Norman Bottomley, about what to tell Churchill. Emphasizing a need to avoid ‘an appearance of a negative attitude in our reply’, the SSA told Bottomley that convincing reasons needed to be given for not being able to bomb Berlin with a force larger than 250 aircraft. Sinclair did not want to ‘alarm’ Churchill over ‘the unsatisfactory Halifax position’ – in terms of its performance not number – but the difficulty of using OTU crews required explanation. ²¹ Based on work by Bottomley and the Air Ministry’s Directorate of Bomber Operations, Churchill received a reply from Sinclair and Portal later that day. It stated 250 bombers was the maximum number available because of ‘our inability to penetrate the distance into heavily-defended areas with lower performance aircraft and less experienced crews’, which thereby ruled out the Stirlings and OTU crews. Yet the implicit message being given to Churchill was just how limited, both in terms of quality and quantity, Bomber Command actually was. Though substantially short, they argued that 500 heavy-bombers was ‘the minimum number necessary’ to saturate Berlin’s defences and inflict a reasonable amount of damage for the high casualties expected, but such a figure remained almost impossible to assemble. The SSA and CAS ended with the carefully crafted statement that the Air Ministry ‘are anxious to meet the wishes of the Soviet Government in this project but unless reasons of major policy necessitates early attack regardless of cost, we would propose to wait until larger force can be used’. ²² Having promised Stalin a Berlin attack imminently, Churchill’s request was being rebuffed by his own Air Staff.

Given the wider considerations involved, this cool response must have been very disappointing to the prime minister. But Churchill proved not so easily deflected and, clearly irked, sent a comment back to Portal, which queried that

250 Heavies far exceeds weight and accuracy of any previous attack on Berlin. What date with 500 be possible? Certainly no attack should be made ‘regardless of cost’ but Harris mentioned to me before I left [for Moscow the] possibility of an attack in the August moon. Can you do it in September? I had always understood weather was the limiting factor, not numbers. ²³

Before replying, the CAS asked Bottomley to consult with Harris over the quantity of Bomber Command and to ascertain precisely how, notwithstanding a frontline strength of 438 heavy- and medium-bombers, the number decreased when required for a Berlin operation. Harris replied by stating that even raising 250 suitable aircraft bombers was a challenge and proceeded to account for the ‘deductions’. Twenty-four Hampdens and 48 Wellington IVs were dismissed as ‘unfit’ for the task, which brought the figure down to 366 bombers, and then the mediocre and unreliable Stirling had to be factored in. Two hundred and fifty aircraft could only be made ready through ‘special preparation’, where 50 more could ‘be squeezed’ from Conversion Units, but Harris stated flippantly about having little idea when a force of 500 would ‘be possible’. ²⁴ These views were thus incorporated into the reply to Churchill, with the CAS elaborating that

Uncertainty of casualties, production and extraneous calls on the Command make it impossible to give date by which we can attack with five hundred aircraft. Number of aircraft and not hours of darkness is the limiting factor. In September we think we shall have available three hundred aircraft suitable for the task. With this number we should doubtless have heavy casualties in proportion to the damage done to the target . . . [that] would necessitate virtually ceasing bombing for at least a month if we were to avoid crippling Bomber Command and prejudicing future expansion . . . We therefore recommend waiting until by re-equipment and expansion we have a larger force of suitable aircraft. ²⁵

The two key words here were ‘production’ and ‘expansion’. Such issues, of course, went to the inter-service battles for resources, which needed to be secured by providing the prime minister with convincing arguments to secure his favour. Churchill’s pressing over bombing Berlin was clearly an opportunity for the airmen to do just that. For Portal’s reply was, in effect, stating that a Berlin operation could not be done immediately because it would jeopardize Bomber Command’s expansion, but if Harris received more heavy-bombers it could then be undertaken. Yet Churchill continued to remain unconvinced, and this time wanted an urgent meeting with the CAS to discuss it. In preparation, Portal told Harris that he expected to meet with Churchill on Monday afternoon and anticipated the prime minister would press for an attack on Berlin to be made in ‘the near future’. ²⁶ The CAS wanted Harris’ view, which he submitted the following day.

Though mentioning the undesirability of undertaking a Berlin operation at this juncture, in reality the letter was a strong complaint about the inadequate size and patchy quality of Bomber Command’s frontline. Perhaps a veiled reference to Peirse’s fate following a poorly executed operation to the German capital in November 1941, Harris opened with the disclaimer that ‘I am as keen as anybody to bomb Berlin, but I am certain that when we do this we must make a good job of it’. Stressing the city’s many flak units and searchlights, he emphasized the target’s sheer size relative to the resources available. The bombing had to be ‘sustained’ – an early reference to a concentrated ‘battle’ against Berlin at some point – requiring at least 500 bombers every time. Yet the small force then available could only inflict ‘trifling damage’ at the risk of high casualties, with the previous night’s operation to Nuremberg being shown by its 14.5 per cent losses. In such circumstances, the ‘only value’, Harris wrote, was ‘being able to say that we had bombed Berlin’. This was, of course, precisely the point behind Churchill’s request, but Harris was dismissive and stated that ‘the time is long past when we could afford to lose valuable aircraft and crews for dubious political advantages of this kind’. With the Hampden and Wellington IV withdrawn, the poor Stirling unlikely to operate, and 60 of his heavy-bombers being the ‘not really fit for the task’, Halifax, the prospect of incurring heavy losses to the component of Bomber Command that represented real quality, namely the Lancaster squadrons, was most unwelcome. In no position to execute operations against Berlin and ‘too small for the tasks it is expected to carry out’, Harris ended by giving Portal a clear message to communicate to Churchill: ‘[if] we are not to fail completely we must increase the first line strength of Bomber Command without delay’. Thus, the dispatch of bombers to other Commands (such as Coastal and the Middle East) had to end, while increasing bomber production, especially of Lancasters, had to begin in order for an average daily strength of 500 heavy-bombers to be achieved ‘as a first step’. ²⁷ From the outset, the issues of bombing Berlin and increasing bomber aircraft production were being promoted as inseparable.

Not surprisingly, these points shaped many discussions on Bomber Command during the final months of 1942, but at this moment the ever-mercurial Churchill simply closed the issue. On Portal’s copy of Harris’ letter from 29 August, the CAS wrote about offering to see the prime minister on 1 September but was told that ‘he [Churchill] would not ‘press it’!’. ²⁸ The prime minister’s motive for suddenly ‘easing off’ is open to debate, but was possibly connected to the imminent talks between Eden and Maisky on 4 September, and whether the issue would be raised again. But if Churchill thought the question of bombing Berlin might be forgotten by the Soviet ambassador, he would be mistaken. Maisky opened by stating that, notwithstanding the good personal relationship between Stalin and Churchill, an increasing problem was the Red Army and Soviet population’s belief that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and Communiqué had promised a Second Front in Western Europe in 1942. Eden replied no such commitment had been made, but Maisky remained doubtful. After requesting a resumption of the Arctic Convoys, which met with an equally disappointing response, the Soviet ambassador then raised the bomber offensive and described it as having an ‘excellent psychological effect’ in the Soviet Union. Consequently, ‘we should bear this in mind in selecting our targets’ because ‘some names in Germany meant much . . . others meant little or nothing’. ²⁹ No doubt a veiled reference to bombing Berlin, Bomber Command’s difficulties in doing so were stressed by Eden. This only reinforced Moscow’s understandable view of the British being difficulty allies, who remained obsessed with the snags and obstacles to many military operations. Maisky suggested the best alternatives to Berlin were Nuremberg, Frankfurt-on-Main, and Munich, ‘the importance of which [the] last city as a political target he underlined several times’. These cities were known to the Soviet public, and photographs of ruins in these places published in Soviet newspapers had far greater impact than ones of such towns as Saarbrücken and Karlsruhe. ³⁰ Such images, accompanied by updates on British bombing efforts, were sent frequently by Churchill to Stalin over the forthcoming months but conspicuous by their absence were photographs of a damaged Berlin. Moreover, the pressure to bomb Hitler’s capital increased after 8 October when Churchill told Stalin that regular Arctic Convoys would not restart until after January 1943 because the naval escort forces were all needed for Operation Torch. As Horst Boog notes, Roosevelt advised Churchill ‘to soften the impact of this piece of information by bracketing it with other proposals and promises’. Furthermore, on 6 November Stalin stated publicly that Red Army failures were due to the Western Allies’ inability to force Germany to fight on two fronts and belittled British advances across North Africa, which in no way compared with the Soviets’ titanic struggle in southern Russia. ³¹ Thus, it now seemed imperative that the British do something to help the Soviets, particularly as Western statesmen were concerned that high casualties could force Stalin into signing a separate peace with Hitler. With the idea of basing Western Air Forces in the Caucasus soon regarded as impracticable, few military options remained left, except the bombing of Berlin, of course, which Churchill wanted reconsidered.

By implication, this meant reopening the issue of Bomber Command’s capabilities. To help improve its numbers immediately available, Churchill and Cherwell decreed that no more bombers could be taken from Bomber Command. Coastal Command instead had to rely on their own resources for undertaking more sorties. Yet recognizing that Harris’ force needed to be increased, Churchill scrawled on this minute: ‘S. of S [Sinclair]. We must have more Bomber Squadrons. You must arm me to get them’. ³² Churchill had clearly come round to viewing Bomber Command’s expansion as essential for undertaking the task that he himself wanted it to do. But the case for increased resources, he told the Chiefs of Staff, was not helped by ‘the impression’ the bombing offensive had ‘petered out’, which came after being ‘led to believe’ that longer autumn nights would see an increase in operational intensity. Once again, he asked about Berlin. ³³

For those long committed to achieving Germany’s capitulation by airpower alone, the prime minister’s chastising about bombing Berlin was an opportunity too good to miss. Only months into his tenure as C-in-C, Harris sent Churchill a long note, later revised in August 1942 probably on account of the promises given in Moscow by the prime minister, which laid out the case for achieving victory through strategic bombing. ‘Victory, speedy and complete, awaits the side which first employs air power as it should be employed’, he declared. Stating ‘there will be no other way’, such a claim was being made because the ‘Bomber Barons’ had watched on as vast resources had been allocated to campaigns waged by soldiers and sailors, such as Operation Torch. Stating that ‘only some 10% of our squadrons are employed offensively against Germany’, even that ‘ridiculous proportion’ had caused considerable damage to Germany’s cities, especially Lübeck, Rostock, and Cologne. It was therefore better to commit resources to Bomber Command’s expansion rather than a Continental invasion, which would only succeed ‘if Russia maintains an Eastern front’. Only the destructiveness wrought on Germany by an expanded Bomber Command, Harris promised, offered ‘a quick or certain victory’, and in a nod to Churchill’s promise to Stalin, the C-in-C stated strategic bombing was ‘the only course’ that could assist ‘Russia in time’. ³⁴ Waiting for Churchill’s arrival back from Moscow, Harris submitted another long note that recommended defeating Germany by deploying a vast bomber force against 30–40 of its major cities. ‘The effect’, he wrote, ‘upon German morale and German production of so doing would be fatal to them’. Cleverly, Harris invoked the Soviet angle once again by stating that bombing would be ‘decisive as encouragement and direct assistance to Russia’, contributing ‘far more to the successful relief of pressure on the Eastern front than can any land or sea operation’. ³⁵ Thus, by late summer Churchill’s commitment to bomb Berlin had given rise to arguments that Bomber Command should be expanded into the ‘war-winning’ weapon. For good measure, Lord Trenchard also weighed into the debate and submitted a note on Britain’s ‘war policy’, circulated to the War Cabinet on 5 September, which contained the usual arguments about focusing purely on bombing Germany and ending Bomber Command’s exploitation ‘as a pool . . . for side shows, minor raids and experiments’. ³⁶ Instead, it was time to have a bomber force ready to commence some serious bombing of Germany during the forthcoming year.

Such arguments soon began to bear fruit, at least partly. On 22 October, Churchill circulated a note that emphasized the bombing offensive ‘must be regarded as our prime effort in the Air’. Concerned about it falling during the forthcoming winter ‘when the strain of the Russian front will be heavy on the German people’, the prime minister asked that the plan for increasing Bomber Command to 50 Squadrons by the end of 1942 should be ‘accepted in principle’. The airmen were no doubt pleased by the prime minister’s commitment to Bomber Command’s expansion, but less acceptable was his stipulation that ‘the Wellingtons must not be prematurely discarded unless it can be shown that concentration upon the Lancaster . . . causes no falling off in bomb-deliveries on Germany’. ³⁷ For, as will be seen, Harris also wanted a decision made to switch production from all other types over to Lancasters, even if this meant a short-term reduction in aircraft numbers, and would achieve this by highlighting that only the Lancaster was suitable for Berlin operations.

Meanwhile, the 22 October Eden met Maisky again, this time against a backdrop of Soviet propaganda claiming the British air offensive against Germany had not developed as ‘hoped’. The accusation particularly related to Berlin, Maisky stated, because Churchill had given ‘the impression’ in Moscow that an attack would happen in September; this had not materialized, nor had a raid taken place during October. Feebly, Eden responded by stating greater damage could be achieved against those German cities lying closer to the British bomber bases, but Maisky remained insistent over bombing Berlin and also demanded additional Spitfires on top of the ones the Soviets had already received. ³⁸ This other demand represented an added complication, and ultimately an additional source of Soviet disappointment. On 1 November, Sinclair informed Portal that the Spitfires already given to Russia had been ‘an exceptional gift’, which could not be repeated because the RAF needed these fighters for the Mediterranean and Indian Theatres. ‘Hence’, the SSA stated, ‘my anxiety about mentioning Spitfires to Stalin at this stage merely to keep him quiet’. Sinclair’s view on bombing Berlin was no less dismissive. Like Harris and Portal, he was against sending a small Lancaster force, preferring to wait for Bomber Command to be larger before attacking Berlin. Yet he counselled about ‘feel[ing] happier’ if Churchill was informed that Berlin would be bombed on ‘the first night’ when the weather was suitable and some 500–600 aircraft were available. ³⁹ Based on this advice, Portal updated Churchill the following day; it would be unwise to sanction the Soviet requests. Preferring ‘to wait’ until a larger force could be dispatched to Berlin, it remained ‘more profitable’ to attack Germany’s submarine-building ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Kiel. Yet Portal still gave Churchill the option to decide whether these ‘narrower military considerations’ were outweighed by bombing Berlin, and if so, Harris was prepared to send a small Lancaster force to bomb from a great height. ‘Such an attack’, the CAS concluded, ‘would probably sustain fairly heavy losses among our best crews and would be unlikely to make any real impression on a city as big as Berlin’. ⁴⁰ This was a carefully crafted statement, clearly designed to not refuse the prime minister’s wishes but simultaneously highlighting Bomber Command’s numerical limitation. It represented the application of gentle pressure on Churchill for increasing Lancaster production so that the promise made in Moscow about bombing Berlin could be properly fulfilled. The prime minister had little option but to agree. The reservations of his senior air advisers were on record, and for these to have then been overruled and a Berlin operation ordered, which if becoming a costly disaster, meant the responsibility would have been all Churchill’s, with all the possible domestic political consequences that may have followed. Consequently, the prime minister was left with little to offer Stalin, apart from soothing words of support of ‘you know how anxious we are to take off you some of the undue weight which you have steadfastly borne in these last hard months’. ⁴¹

Berlin was, of course, 580 miles (in a straight line) from RAF Mildenhall, and this distance was critical for the type of aircraft used, and thereby the size of the bomber force sent. Possessing a better range and ability to fly higher, Harris championed the notion that only the Lancaster was suitable for bombing Berlin. But on 29 October, he told Portal that Tannenberg could not go ahead because the Lancaster force, comprising 80–90 aircraft, was simply too small. It threw into sharp focus the low number of Lancasters within Bomber Command at this time, which was critical not just for Tannenberg but for the heavier bombing effort envisaged against Germany in 1943. ⁴² Accepting this argument, Portal told Churchill that

the Lancaster and to a less degree the Stirling and Halifax, have enabled us to maintain our bomb delivery throughout twelve months of most distressing dispersal of squadrons, and I hope we can now look forward to a steep and steady rise in potential bomb delivery, ⁴³

which meant, of course, increasing Lancaster production. But Portal’s use of the phrase ‘distressing dispersal of squadrons’ was also striking, for it represented a euphemism for another of Harris’ grievances, namely the frequent transfer of bombers over to Coastal Command and the Mediterranean Theatre, which had done little for Bomber Command’s expansion during 1942. In one lengthy missive, he was incandescent at the Admiralty for stipulating that should the Halifaxes sent to Coastal Command prove unsatisfactory, then they could be replaced by the Lancasters of 61 Squadron. Instead, Harris offered the Pathfinder’s Halifax unit (35 Squadron) because every Lancaster was required for Operation Tannenberg, in addition to such naval targets as Gdynia and the Tirpitz battleship. As he told Portal,

I could spare that Squadron [35] better than any in existing conditions, especially as the P.M. is pressing Berlin again. I do not want to send anything but Lancasters there, if I can avoid it, and I must have them all to achieve anything approximating adequate concentration. ⁴⁴

Having ‘them all’ also meant remedying the Lancaster’s fuel-system problem, which had prevented it flying at higher altitudes. A lack of spares, causing the ‘cannabilisation’ of existing Lancasters, and a generally low level of serviceability hardly helped the number available, either. ⁴⁵ In late December, the C-in-C took to task Air-Vice Marshal W.A. Coryton, the AOC 5 Group, over having 144 Lancasters on charge but only 85 available for operations. ⁴⁶

The urgency in improving the Lancaster’s serviceability so that a larger bomber force could be sent to Berlin served to underline both the limited numbers and failings of Bomber Command’s other heavy-bombers. With regard to the former, overall production figures showed a considerable decline for all types during October and November (see Supplemental Appendix I), which meant the achievement of 50 operational squadrons by early 1943 fell short by five squadrons. ⁴⁷ What expansion that had taken place was in the ‘wrong’ place, namely in 4 Group’s Wellington squadrons, which were hardly the bomber needed for bombing Berlin or, indeed, for the heavy bombing offensive against Germany envisaged for 1943. As things stood, Bomber Command, far from expanded, remained well short of its intended strength of 50 Squadrons by 1 January 1943. ⁴⁸ Portal stated such failure ‘was primarily due to M.A.P.’s [Ministry of Aircraft Production] shortcomings’. ⁴⁹ The need for urgent attention to heavy-bomber production had thus been fully exposed and, owing to the prime minister’s continual pressure over bombing Berlin, meant prime ministerial backing could be brought against the MAP, headed by Churchill’s crony Lord Beaverbrook, into improving its efforts.

But quantity was only half the issue; the other was aircraft quality. The Short Stirling had well-known weaknesses – undercarriage problems, unreliable engines, and time-consuming maintenance – but particularly serious was the type’s low-ceiling, especially over heavily defended targets like the Ruhr or Berlin. Moreover, December 1942 witnessed a real crisis for 3 Group, the type’s operators, as they received 36 poorly made examples (‘rogues’ as Harris termed them), which could not climb above 12,000 ft. With its production sluggish, 3 Group was down by 82 Stirlings, and from the 46 it did possess only 26 were serviceable. ‘The Stirling Group’, Harris stated, no longer made ‘a reasonable contribution to the war effort’ and it remained ‘wasteful’ to continue operating it against any German target, let alone Berlin. ⁵⁰ The C-in-C pressed for it to be discontinued, with the Stirling factories switched to Lancaster production. ⁵¹ The capability of Bomber Command’s other heavy-bomber, namely the Handley-Page Halifax, was hardly promising either. Produced by a company he branded as run by ‘crooks and incompetents’, ⁵² Harris described Handley-Page’s product as ‘useless’. Certainly the type suffered from a mediocre ceiling, a tendency to stall or fall back on itself during evasive manoeuvring, and a bombload capacity and range that was little better than the Wellington III (6,000 lbs over 1,130 miles compared with the latter’s 4,500 lbs over the same distance). ‘Unacceptable for operations’ it had to ‘be replaced by something better as soon as possible’, ⁵³ although they could be released to Conversion Units to allow all Lancasters to be sent back to the front-line, ⁵⁴ a change that Portal approved. ⁵⁵ Therefore, in late 1942, sole reliance on the Lancaster for bombing Berlin was akin to making a very modest operation indeed.

Churchill was only too aware of this. Having been instrumental in having Italy bombed during autumn 1942, the prime minister had also queried what tonnage would be left for German targets. Informed it was between 500 and 1,000 tons per month, unless the winter weather proved exceptionally favourable, ⁵⁶ an underwhelmed prime minister told Sinclair that ‘I thought you were aiming at bigger figures than that. The heat should be turned on Italy . . . but Germany should not be entirely neglected. I am looking forward to a big raid on Berlin this month if conditions are favourable’. ⁵⁷ Clearly, attacking the German capital remained uppermost in Churchill’s thinking, and Sinclair dutifully asked Portal about doing so before the year’s end. But the age-old problem of aircraft numbers remained the chief limitation. On 14 December Bomber Command, the CAS noted, had 264 heavy-bombers available, which was substantially short of the stipulated figure of 300 aircraft being required for bombing Berlin. Consequently, Portal made the astute observation that were Tannenberg attempted now it could not be repeated for some time until the number of bombers had been built up, and this could prove ‘embarrassing’ were the Press to demand ‘frequent repetitions’ (as they had done after the Thousand-Bomber raid on Cologne). ⁵⁸ Sinclair agreed and advised a postponement until January, ‘weather permitting’. ⁵⁹ The following day, he told Churchill the bad news that Tannenberg would not be undertaken during December 1942 by emphasizing the now standard line of Harris and Portal that getting the requisite 300 heavy-bombers was almost impossible especially in the face of continued ‘diversions’ and demands made by others; moreover, using a smaller number was likely to incur casualties that would decimate Harris’ bomber force and ‘cripple’ its expansion for a considerable period. ⁶⁰

II. ‘Action This Day’ ⁶¹

Perplexed by all the verbiage, the prime minister sought clarification and, on 6 January, requested a meeting with his senior air force advisers. It was needed, he informed Portal, because

when I asked about bombing Berlin in September [1942] I was told that it was necessary to have three or four hundred planes in order to saturate the defences. And that this could not be achieved until December or January. Now however that we are near the action I am told that only 150 Lancasters are to be used. I do not understand this process at all. ⁶²

Yet perhaps not fully realizing it, he had highlighted a major grievance of the airmen, namely that the total number of aircraft was quite different to the total number of Lancasters, which they considered (somewhat erroneously) the only bomber capable of Berlin operations. Akin to being a ‘summons’ to Downing Street, the meeting was arranged for 8 January – the prime minister wanting the matter settled before leaving for Casablanca – and was a small, behind-the-scenes gathering of just Churchill, Sinclair, Portal, and Harris. The CAS had wanted the Minister of Aircraft Production’s attendance in order ‘to explain the difficulties which there have been on the production side’, but a question mark (probably written by Sinclair) was placed next to this request, and for unclear reasons Beaverbrook did not attend. It seemed indicative nonetheless of Sinclair, Portal and Harris having the agenda of using Tannenberg to secure the prime minister’s full support of Bomber Command receiving a greater number of better aircraft. ⁶³

In preparation, Harris produced a long minute that enshrined ‘the views I propose to express at the meeting with the P.M. tomorrow’, which he sent to Portal and Sinclair in advance. ⁶⁴ Tackling Churchill’s query head-on, Operation Tannenberg had originally incorporated the Stirlings and Halifaxes because only 70–80 Lancasters were available, and for this reason a heavier attack had to comprise a mixed force of 500 aircraft at minimum. ‘When the demand for this attack grew more persistent’, Harris continued, the figure had lowered to 300 aircraft because it comprised a number of Lancasters released from the Conversion Units, and the weight of attack was equivalent to one mounted by the much larger mixed force. By early January 1943, the Lancaster position had improved, further owing to the small losses on Italian operations (the predominant focus of bomber operations during the last 3 months of 1942) and resolution of its fuel-system troubles, which meant a total of 171 examples. Thus, a reasonably sized all-Lancaster force could now be sent to Berlin, which could carry a far greater bombload (500 tons) than a mixed force of 500 aircraft and able to fly at 21,000 ft for better protection against Berlin’s flak defences. That Harris was championing the Lancaster was seen in his statement that using the Halifax and Stirling would see ‘these very poor aircraft’ operating at ‘the most lethal heights [of] between 14,000 and 18,000 feet’, and thereby likely to incur ‘severe’ losses. Moreover, these other types could only carry half the Lancaster’s bombload over a long distance, and their more limited range meant the circuitous routeing tactic was not possible (the bomber force would have to adopt a ‘straight in, straight out’ route to Berlin, which only increased the risk). Consequently, the plan for Operation Tannenberg had been modified, with the Wellingtons, Stirlings, and Halifaxes assigned their own targets along Germany’s Baltic Coast, splitting the bomber stream at a certain point following its route across northern Denmark to outflank the Kammhuber Line air defences (see Supplemental Appendices II and III). Doing so presented the German defenders with a constantly changing situation that hopefully caused confusion as the Lancasters continued to Berlin. With its clear tactical characteristics, Harris stated, this new plan would be ‘more effective’ than ‘any attempt to throw the entire mixed force against the main Tannenberg objective’. ⁶⁵ Certainly Tannenberg’s new ‘design’ only served to highlight the limitations of Bomber Command’s other aircraft types in terms of range, ceiling, and bomb-carrying capacity, which governed the targets they had been assigned.

The Downing Street meeting thus went ahead on 8 January 1943. In a curiously brief transcript, the only statements recorded were that of the following:

SIR ARTHUR HARRIS explained his plan for bombing Berlin and the limitations on the numbers of aircraft which could usefully be used for this purpose.

The PRIME MINISTER expressed his entire agreement with the plan as outlined by the A.O.C.-in-C., Bomber Command. ⁶⁶

Seemingly, Churchill had accepted uncritically what he had been told; after all, he needed this operation to be undertaken quickly. For Harris, Churchill’s ‘entire agreement with the plan’ meant HQ Bomber Command dispatched Operation Order No.167 to the Bomber Groups the following day. It stated that ‘The greatest importance is attached to this operation and it is essential that every effort should be made to make the force as large as possible’. ‘Weather permitting this operation will be repeated on the ensuing night’, the Command instruction continued, ‘and similar operations will be undertaken at short intervals thereafter’. Clearly, the intention was for Tannenberg to have become a regular commitment for Bomber Command’s Lancasters. With the stipulation that a force of 200 was to be ‘aimed at’, with 150 Lancasters ‘the absolute minimum’, the Group Commanders were told to withdraw every Lancaster from their Conversion Units. This was to be done immediately, for Order No.167 stated Tannenberg was likely to be ordered for any night following 10/11 January. ⁶⁷ This eagerness was due to the Germans’ deteriorating situation in southern Russia. Yet the imminent conference in Casablanca (codename: Symbol) may also have caused this urgency, which Churchill set out for on 12 January. The day before, he instructed his Private Office to draft a message to Stalin providing details of the raid. ⁶⁸ With the figures for the size of the bomber force and tonnage dropped added, the telegram was to be approved by Eden and dispatched immediately to Moscow. But it may also be wondered whether Tannenberg was useful for dealing with the Americans at Casablanca as well. For it cannot be overlooked that, three-nights into the conference, the British had bombed Berlin twice.

The Casablanca Conference had certainly started awkwardly. On 13 January, Churchill reported to Attlee that although ‘conditions [i.e. accommodation] most agreeable I wish I could say the same of the problems . . . I think at least a fortnight will be required [to solve these]’. ⁶⁹ In this atmosphere, a formal instruction for the Combined Bombing Offensive (CBO) needed to be agreed but the two sides were poles apart when it came to America’s daylight bombing policy. Indeed, Churchill had gone to Casablanca with every intention of cajoling the Americans towards the British viewpoint. Thus, by 17 January the prime minister could begin these discussions with both sides fully aware that Britain’s strategic bomber force had penetrated Germany’s air-defences all the way of Berlin and surely was useful evidence for convincing the Americans to switch to night-time bombing.

For Operation Tannenberg had finally gone ahead that night though in a modified form as the attacks on Lübeck, Rostock, Stralsund, and Pölitz had all been shelved. Although weather may have played a part, ⁷⁰ the cancellation of Tannenberg’s other components certainly helped to showcase, for both American and Soviet consumption, British ability to bomb Hitler’s capital. Indeed, with only one aircraft (0.5 per cent) failing to return, which showed how the Luftwaffe’s nightfighters and flak defences had been caught unprepared, the operation was repeated the following night. This was understandable but risky, especially as the same route was followed, and Bomber Command lost 22 aircraft (11.7 per cent). On both occasions, the Pathfinders had considerable difficulty in identifying the aiming-point over snow-covered Berlin and only scattered damage was inflicted in the Tempelhof district (first raid) or the Tiergarten and Marienfelde area (second raid), although the Daimler-Benz aero-engine works and Deutschland Halle had been hit. ⁷¹ Results were ‘disappointing’, Sinclair wrote, but it remained important ‘we ought not to be unduly depressed by them’. ⁷² For inflicting concentrated destruction had not been the primary objective; instead, what mattered was the symbolism of a sizable British heavy-bomber force appearing over Hitler’s capital. This was clear from the information sent to Churchill, at his request, of the bombers dispatched, the losses incurred, and the bomb tonnage dropped – the latter being probably the most important detail of all. ⁷³ Indeed, on 18 January he instructed Sinclair and Eden that ‘if second night’s attack on Berlin was on an appreciable scale you should send another telegram to Stalin from me with the new total of bombs dropped’. ⁷⁴ Informed this had been done, Churchill replied ‘good’, no doubt pleased this was dispatched promptly, but emphasized Tannenberg was to be repeated ‘several times’. ⁷⁵ Sinclair responded that ‘Berlin ranks first on our target-list’, although poor weather had cancelled that night’s attack. ⁷⁶

Meanwhile, in Casablanca a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCoS) on 18 January saw Portal explain the details of the Berlin operations. ‘The effect of the raids would be largely on morale’, the CAS emphasized, and gave ‘great encouragement to the Russians’. ⁷⁷ For his American listeners, not only had these ‘aerial demonstrations’ over Hitler’s Capital happened just days into the conference but had occurred right when Eaker’s bombers remained confined to attacking targets in France. In British eyes, Tannenberg had showed the greater effectiveness of night-time bombing that stood in sharp contrast to the Americans’ daylight efforts. Two days later, Churchill told Eaker ‘so far they had never thrown a single bomb on Germany by their daylight methods’. The case for night-bombing, and the Americans switching to it, was compelling. ⁷⁸ In response, Eaker explained how the training and equipment of the USAAF were geared to pre-existing doctrine and could not be altered quickly; he therefore pleaded for more time to perfect daylight-bombing. Yet notwithstanding Churchill’s underlying intention, he recognized there was a limit as to how far he could push, and soon withdrew his opposition. ⁷⁹ He agreed with the senior Air Staff who believed American daylight-bombing should be given its chance. After all, there seemed a danger the Americans, far from converting to night-bombing, would divert their heavy-bombers to the Mediterranean or send them solely to the Pacific.

Approved by the CCoS on 21 January, the Casablanca Directive reflected American wishes by its incorporation of ‘target sets’ – submarine construction yards, aircraft factories, transportation hubs, and oil plants – suitable for daytime precision bombing. British objectives were more enshrined in the Directive’s ‘general concept’, namely ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people’. Yet also stipulated was that ‘other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked’, particularly ‘when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavourable to the morale of the enemy or favourable to that of Russia’. ⁸⁰ Within days, Churchill demanded this instruction should be put into effect. In characteristic style, on 27 January he told Sinclair that ‘it seems to me most important to keep on at the big city [Berlin] whenever the weather allows lest it be thought their feeble but vaunted reprisals [on London] have damped our ardour’. ⁸¹ The SSA wrote back immediately: ‘Am absolutely of same opinion. Nothing but weather will restrain us’. ⁸² Four nights later, a predominantly all-Lancaster was set to bomb Berlin to coincide with the 10th ‘anniversary’ of Nazi rule, but weather forced a switch to Hamburg. ⁸³ Within weeks, the lack of Berlin operations became an increasing embarrassment for Churchill. In mid-February, he congratulated Stalin about ‘the series of prodigious victories which to-night brings us the news of the liberation of Rostov-on-the-Don’ but added ‘my most earnest wish is to do more to aid you’. ⁸⁴ That wish ‘to do more’ saw the Air Ministry send the specific instruction to Bomber Command that

Recent events on the Russian front have made it most desirable in the opinion of the Cabinet that we should rub in the Russian victory by further attacks on Berlin as soon as conditions are favourable. ⁸⁵

Although poor weather would ‘scrub’ most of the bomber force, Harris wanted to send a small Lancaster force to Berlin just after Goebbels’ ‘Total War’ speech on 18 February. The AOC 8 Group, Air-Vice Marshal D.C.T. Bennett, later recalled the telephone conversation with the C-in-C who stated he wanted 24 Lancasters to ‘sneak through’ to attack the German capital. Asked for an opinion, Bennett replied that ‘you’ll lose 24 aircraft . . . and you’ll certainly won’t get away with it’. Told this was also Coryton’s view but that Cochrane, in contrast, believed it could be done, Harris concluded by stating that ‘I’m sending them’ and promptly hung-up. Later that day, Bennett found out that Coryton’s refusal had seen him sacked, while the ever-willing Cochrane was moved over to 5 Group. ⁸⁶ Harris was clearly in no mood to receive pessimistic outlooks from his Group Commanders. Writing to Coryton on 23 February, he emphasized the ‘perpetual and persistent disputes which have characterised your relations with my operational Staff’ but matters had reached a climax owing to ‘the attitude you evinced to continue . . . politically necessary attacks on Berlin’. ⁸⁷ The episode substantiated the view that Harris ran his Command autocratically.

In fact, the following month saw a considerable effort of ‘politically necessary attacks’ against Berlin. Coinciding with Soviet victories in the Caucasus and eastern Ukraine (Operation Saturn), a force of 302 heavy-bombers was dispatched on 1/2 March. The total looked impressive but masked an important detail, namely, the Lancasters dispatched (156) were lower than the number sent on the earlier operations (190 and 170, respectively). Harris later wrote, ‘by March I still did not have enough Lancasters for the task’ and achieving the long-cherished force of 300 aircraft meant ‘I reluctantly had to send Stirlings and Halifaxes in spite of the great risk they ran from flak’ ⁸⁸ (see Supplemental Appendix IV). Nonetheless, the DB.Ops commented that bombing Berlin, in addition to opening the Battle of the Ruhr by attacking Essen, had demonstrated Bomber Command’s ability to ‘hit Germany in her most vital and heavily defended centres’, which ‘must inevitably’ have effected German morale. ⁸⁹ Above all, doing so allowed Churchill to once again send good news to Stalin. Stating the usual figure on the bomb tonnage dropped (he exaggerated here by claiming 700 tons when the figure was 665 tons), Churchill not surprisingly added the ‘raid reported most successful’, ⁹⁰ which was an assessment based purely on the symbolism of having dropped bombs on Berlin rather than on the level of destruction caused. In this regard, the raid had achieved Churchill’s primary aim of strengthening Anglo-Soviet relations for it drew an effusive response from the Soviet leader. ⁹¹ German withdrawals from the Rzhev salient saw a Berlin operation set for14/15 March, although this was cancelled ‘owing to bad weather’, in a week that had already seen heavy attacks on the ‘political’ targets of Nuremberg and Munich. ⁹² Only on 27/28 March was the German capital again bombed, with the considerable force of 396 aircraft instructed to attack in successive waves to heighten the Germans’ perception of the raid’s intensity. Undertaken because ‘Marshall Timoshenko’s offensive in the north was progressing well’, the AHB Narrative recorded, ‘further demonstrations against Berlin were considered worthwhile’. Although some bombs fell a worrying 17 miles from the aiming-point over the Alexanderplatz, ⁹³ Stalin could nonetheless be still informed the RAF had dropped more bombs on Hitler’s capital. Describing his enjoyment of a film on Stalingrad the previous night and how the situation in Tunisia had taken ‘a favourable turn’, Churchill wrote that Bomber Command had ‘flung 1050 tons on Berlin in fifty minutes’ (the figure actually being 883 tons), which was ‘the best Berlin has yet got’. ⁹⁴ But the overblown rhetoric and exaggeration all served a purpose, namely Churchill’s diplomatic strategy of creating a favourable impression in Moscow about Britain’s efforts, especially before the delivery of less favourable news to Stalin. Indeed, Bomber Command sent another 329 aircraft two nights later (the last attack on Berlin for nearly 5 months owing to the shortening hours of darkness), which Churchill believed was then ‘the moment’ to inform Stalin the Arctic Convoys were again being halted. ⁹⁵ It was small wonder the Soviets ‘never seemed much impressed’ by these Berlin efforts. ⁹⁶ For notwithstanding his telegrams to Churchill offering congratulations, Stalin perceived these bombing attacks as mere cover for British inability or unwillingness to do anything that mattered.

III. Conclusion

The development and implementation of Operation Tannenberg showed most clearly that Harris had several masters when it came to the bombing war. In this instance, the key figure was Churchill, who pushed for the bombing of Berlin owing to Grand Alliance politics, especially to maintain the wartime relationship with Moscow. This Anglo-Soviet factor in British bombing operations has continued to remain overlooked in the historiography. An exception is Hastings, who observed that as no British statesman ‘had forgotten the near-catastrophe’ following the Bolsheviks’ peace with Germany in 1917, the War Cabinet during 1942 believed Moscow ‘needed to be persuaded of British sincerity and support for the Russian struggle’. This seemed especially vital owing to the hostile Soviet reaction to the decision not to launch a Second Front in Western Europe in 1942 or 1943. Moreover, Red Army setbacks in southern Russia during summer 1942 gave rise to a feeling among Western statesmen that Stalin might be compelled into signing a peace treaty with Hitler. Consequently, Churchill travelled to Moscow in August 1942 but had little to offer, apart from promising to bomb the governmental heart of Hitler’s Empire, namely, Berlin. ⁹⁷ Doing so was perceived by the British as likely to produce telling reactions in both Germany and Russia ⁹⁸ and it was this political consideration, rather than the causing of vast material damage, that was the primary aim of Operation Tannenberg.

On the opposite side, Harris and the Air Staff had their own agenda to exploit Churchill’s enthusiasm for this operation. Determined to not be pressured into bombing Berlin in summer 1942, they – Sinclair, Portal and Harris – consistently maintained the position that Bomber Command was simply too weak for tackling this distant and stoutly defended target. The C-in-C in particular argued his force needed to improve, in both its quality and quantity, before it could be undertaken. Writing that ‘only Lancasters could be sent there with any reasonable degree of safety and economy of force’, ⁹⁹ Tannenberg intentionally became enmeshed in discussion on increasing heavy-bomber production. With Harris favouring a sole focus on Lancasters, Order No.167 had been designed to champion its virtues and highlight all too clearly that Bomber Command’s other aircraft could not reach Berlin, incorrect given the Stirling and Halifax’s later involvement on Tannenberg operations. Moreover, the production of these other types would continue. Nonetheless, Churchill’s enthusiasm for bombing Berlin was seen by Sinclair, Portal, and Harris as a great opportunity for securing the prime minister’s commitment to improve the front-line strength of Bomber Command. This secured during winter 1942/1943 Harris’ force, as Overy notes, became a ‘substantial’ one by spring 1943. ¹⁰⁰

In the final analysis, Operation Tannenberg, although carried out by a strategic bomber force, represented support of coalition warfare. Moreover, it set a precedent of appeasing the Soviets with politically driven bombing missions for the rest of the war. In 1944, for example, Portal pushed the US Fifteenth Air Force to carry out attacks in the Balkans, particularly against Bulgaria. For Bomber Command, the principle of assisting the Soviets took on a direct military dimension, with attacks on Stettin and Königsburg to interfere with supplies bound for the German army in Russia ¹⁰¹ and, later on, in assisting the Red Army’s advance into eastern Germany by attacking Dresden and Chemnitz under Operation Thunderclap.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-wih-10.1177_09683445211013567 – Supplemental material for ‘The termination of the long immunity from air raids’1: The bombing of Berlin under Operation Tannenberg, August 1942–March 1943

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-wih-10.1177_09683445211013567 for ‘The termination of the long immunity from air raids’1: The bombing of Berlin under Operation Tannenberg, August 1942–March 1943 by Richard John Worrall in War in History