Charles Townshend’s Advance on Baghdad: The British Offensive in Mesopotamia,September–November 1915

Abstract

This article examines Major General Charles Townshend’s offensive against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia during the autumn of 1915. It challenges the prevailing view that the offensive was destined for failure due to the numerical superiority of Ottoman forces in the region. Examining Townshend’s role in the battle of Kut-al-Amara in late September 1915, and focusing in particular on his conduct of the battle of Ctesiphon in late November, the article argues that Townshend was confident that his 6 Indian Division could defeat the Ottomans at Ctesiphon, and he devised a feasible plan to do so. Townshend’s decisions under fire, however, undermined the success of his force and contributed to the heavy casualties that led to its withdrawal from the battlefield and its subsequent retreat to Kut-al-Amara, where the division was besieged until its surrender in April 1916.