Abstract
The `fighting march' was first defined and explored by the great Crusades historian R.C. Smail. The history of the tactic is a long one, dating back to classical times, and the Byzantine armies possessed tactical pamphlets instructing their gnerals how to manage them. These texts envisaged a hollow-square formation with `ideal' numbers of infantry and cavalry required to man it, so they can be construed as over-theoretical. The crucial factors for the crusaders were the co-ordination of mounted knights (and other horsemen) with close-ordered foot-soldiers using spears and missile weapons to keep the enemy at bay. They formed a shield to protect the horses, and with their bows, and crossbows especially, were able inflict significant casualties on opposing horse-archers. Arab commentators compared the formation to a `moving city', strikingly paralleling Anna Komnena's description of her father's `unprecedented' march in 1116.
The Military Orders provided instruction to crusaders new to eastern tactics, saving the French in Asia Minor in 1147 and contributing to good order on Richard the Lionheart's march from Acre to Jaffa in 1191. Guy de Lusignan, Regent and then King of Jerusalem, also proved competent in managing the formation. His 1183 `fighting march' kept Saladin's much superior forces at bay. Unfortunately, he is better remembered for the crushing defeat at Hattin, in 1187, when he set out into waterless terrain and allowed his horse and foot to be separated.
Good leadership was essential to maintaining necessary discipline for the success of the manoeuvre. Alexios Komnenos and Richard the Lionheart excelled at it and many others employed it successfully. It is possible that there was dialogue between military men of different crusading nations and the Byzantines as to how the `fighting march' should best be put into operation.
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