Blue Helmet Blues

1 UNOSOM I (April 1992-March 1993) was mandated to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and to provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at seaports and airports and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution points in the city and its immediate environs. In August 1992, it was strengthened to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. In December 1992 (S/RES/1992/794) the Council authorized member-states to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, working in coordination with UNOSOM I. The UNITAF Chapter VII operation (`Operation Restore Hope') was led by the USA with participation by military units from 24 other member-states. It was highly successful in its mission. In May 1993 the transition was made from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, mandated to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a safe environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. It was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life. Unfortunately, the security situation was unpredictable and unrest ongoing. The deaths of 23 Pakistani peacekeepers led to a revision of the mandate to include the apprehension of those responsible. The disastrous US Rangers raid in October 1993, where several US servicement were killed, led directly to the withdrawal of US troops. The fact that the troops involved in the raid were under US command was obscured by a US Administration deeply alarmed by domestic public reaction to the deaths. UNOSOM II was finally withdrawn in early March 1995.

2 William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993), pp. 3-7.

3 The 1970s was the period in which a rather militant nonaligned movement dominated the General Assembly, undermining US internationalism with such antics as dancing in the aisles at the overturning of US support for Taiwan's occupation of the Chinese seat; passing resolutions equating Zionism with racism; insisting on a New International Economic Order and so forth.

4 The decline in the number of major armed conflicts around the world-from 33 in 1992 to 25 in 1997 - is not commensurate with a drop from 80,000 to 14,000 peacekeepers in the same period. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1998 (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 20.

5 In 1995 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended that the implementation of enforcement mandates be delegated to coalitions of willing member-states and that regional organizations assume a more active role in conflict management (Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (A/50/60-S/1995/1, of 3 January 1995), paras. 33; 80; 85-87).

6 Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (A/51/950, of 14 July 1997), para. 107.

7 S/PRST/1998/28, of 16 September 1998.

8 Kofi A. Annan, `UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO', NATO Review, no. 5, September-October 1993.

9 Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations.

10 Ibid., Article 51.

11 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (see note 5 above), para. 86.

12 From 16 January to 28 February 1991, a coalition of UN member-states led by the USA, acting in accordance with S/RES/678 (29 November 1990) but not under the control of or direction by the UN, conducted Chapter VII offensive military operations against Iraq to force its withdrawal from Kuwait.

13 See note 1 above.

14 In S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council authorized member-states to form a multinational force to facilitate the restoration of the democratically elected President and the Government of Haiti, to be assisted by the pre-existing UNMIH operation. This multinational force consisted of 28 countries and was led by the USA. It was deployed on 19 September 1994 and had completed its mandate and made a full transition to UNMIH by the end of March 1995.

15 At the end of February 1997, following the collapse of pyramid schemes in which many Albanians had invested their life savings, the country was swept by a wave of looting and violence. In S/RES/1101 (28 March 1997) the Security Council accepted Italy's offer to lead a multinational protection force to facilitate and protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The operation was authorized under Chapter VII and limited to a period of three months.

16 On 31 January 1997, an inter-African force (MISAB) was established in the Central African Republic. Its mandate was aimed at restoring peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and conducting operations to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals. On 8 February 1997, MISAB was deployed in Bangui, comprising a total of some 800 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali and later from Senegal and Togo, under the military command of Gabon and with the logistical and financial support of France. The Security Council, by S/RES/1125 (6 August 1997), welcomed the efforts of the member-states participating in MISAB, approved the continued conduct of the operation, and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorized the member-states participating in MISAB and the states providing logistical support to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel. This authorization, which was extended by the Council on three occasions, ended on 15 April 1998.

17 Following the April 1994 genocide in Rwanda and prior to the complete deployment of the re-strengthened UNAMIR, a French initiative, Opération Turquoise, was launched to establish a `humanitarian protected zone' in southwestern Rwanda. The operation was only nominally multinational, with token troop contributions by approximately 5 Francophone countries. It lasted from 23 June to 21 August and was authorized by S/RES/929 (22 June 1994).

18 On 15 November 1996, by S/RES/1080, a Canadian-led multinational force was authorized to rescue Hutu refugees trapped in the fighting in eastern Zaire and to defend itself under Chapter VII. Plans for the mission were aborted, however, in the wake of a massive exodus of refugees back to Rwanda.

19 In S/RES/934 (30 June 1994), the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping operation to monitor the ceasefire in Georgia, alongside the pre-existing UN observer mission (UNOMIG), was noted by the Security Council. The military component of the CIS force is exclusively Russian, with six other CIS members contributing non-militarily.

20 The ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by Nigeria in all cases, militarily intervened in the Liberian conflict in 1990, in Sierra Leone in 1997 and in Guinea-Bissau in November 1998. While the former two interventions were ultimately successful in restoring democracy (although, at the time of writing the situation in Sierra Leone remains precarious) many questions were raised about the methods, deployment, command and control and the underlying motives of the intervening troops. This was particularly the case in Liberia where, at least prior to April 1996, ECOMOG was widely regarded as having become a party to the conflict, even prolonging efforts at conflict management, engaging in looting and backing some of the warlords against the others. Nevertheless, the USA and other leading UN member-states financially supported ECOMOG throughout these operations.

21 The OAU has engaged in diplomatic activities for the political settlement of conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Western Sahara and in observer missions in Burundi, Rwanda and South Africa. ASEAN recently made quite influential diplomatic efforts to settle the ongoing crisis in Cambodia. The OSCE has been very active on the peacemaking and prevention front in several Eastern European and former Soviet countries, including Bosnia, Estonia, FYROM (Macedonia), Georgia, Latvia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh. The OSCE and the EU conducted sanctions assistance missions in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine. The OAS has provided electoral assistance to a large number of countries and has engaged in human rights monitoring through the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). These are just some examples. For a comprehensive overview of cooperation between the UN and regional, subregional and interregional actors see the forthcoming study by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit, Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations. Suggested Principles and Mechanisms. Also see Thomas G. Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting. Task Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) for a comparative look at subcontracting to regional organizations and to NGOs. For further information on the growing role of private security firms see David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention (Adelphi Paper 316, February 1998), and David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Mercenary Firms (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, November 1997).

22 By S/RES/1031 (15 December 1995) the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized member-states to establish a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) to help ensure compliance with the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. IFOR was composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations and was authorized to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords and to defend itself. IFOR took over from UNPROFOR on 20 December 1995, after which the latter's mandate was terminated. In December 1996 IFOR was replaced by a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR's mandate is to continue the work of IFOR and to maintain a secure and stable environment, actively supporting civilian implementation and the work of the IPTF and UNMIBH.

23 Under S/RES/1037 (15 January 1996), IFOR was authorized to provide the new UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) with close air support. IFOR - and SFOR, its successor - assisted in the establishment of a safe and secure environment in the relevant area, thus enabling UNTAES to proceed with the implementation of its mandate. The fact that UNTAES was backed by a credible military force is widely regarded as having contributed quite substantially to the success of the mission. UNTAES was terminated in January 1998.

24 S/RES/678 of 1990 called on member-states to take `all necessary means' to effect both the resolution demanding Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and 'all subsequent resolutions to restore international peace and security in the area.' When the Council established in S/RES/687 (1991) the terms for the ceasefire ending the Desert Storm operation, it neither rescinded this authorization nor terminated sanctions. Twice in 1998 (February and November) Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with UNSCOM weapons inspectors to the extent that the USA, supported by the UK, felt compelled to threaten military action. The USA chose to read the 1990 resolution as providing continuing authority for enforcement measures to ensure Iraq's unconditional fulfilment of the terms laid out in 687, including cooperation with the inspection regime designed to guarantee elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Russia and France, along with many other UN member-states, disagreed that this authority existed.

25 `A Policy Struggle Stirs Within NATO', The New York Times, 28 November 1998.

26 Following months of threats and entreaties to President Milosevic to cease his military campaign against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), during which the UN and Security Council were sidelined almost entirely, NATO finally issued an activation order for airstrikes on Serbian military targets on 13 October 1998. There followed a flurry of diplomacy conducted by Richard C. Holbrooke, US Special Envoy, as a result of which President Milosevic agreed to comply with S/RES/1199 provisions on a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Serbian security forces and Yugoslav army, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, commitment to a genuine political process and the return of the disaster relief agencies (S/1998/978). As part of the agreement an OSCE verification mission was established. NATO was to support this mission from the air (Operation Eagle Eye) and with a contingency extraction force (Operation Determined Guarantor) based in FYROM. NATO decided to maintain its forces in a state of high readiness and to keep the activation order in place, with execution subject to a decision by its highest decisionmaking body, the North Atlantic Council, thereby ensuring its readiness to act should the crisis re-erupt. On 24 October 1998 the Security Council passed S/RES/1203 welcoming these developments. The OSCE mission had not yet been deployed at the time of writing, and concern was being expressed at the delay (The New York Times, 6 December 1998, p. A14). Sporadic fighting was occurring in Kosovo, despite the winter weather.

27 On 16 December 1998, the USA, supported by the UK, launched military strikes against Baghdad. This action was taken without consulting the other members of the Security Council and on the questionable pretext that the latest UNSCOM reports, which noted a lack of cooperation by the Iraqi authorities, left no other choice. Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and China's President Jiang Zemin condemned the `unilateral' action, agreeing that it represented a `direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council and its member states.' France distanced itself from the US action, saying that it had wanted to avoid military action `at all costs'. Reactions from other UN member-states were mixed, but a clear disapproval for the total bypassing of the UN and the Security Council by the USA and the UK was expressed by many (BBC newswires of 17 December 1998; UN Press Release SC/6611, of 16 December 1998).

28 It can be said that neither any P5 country nor any troop-contributing nation participates in peace operations for entirely altruistic motives. Nevertheless, the ulterior motives at play in recent subcontracted operations are a particular cause for concern. When the Security Council lends even token legitimacy to operations that are simply exercises in regional hegemony, for example, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are severely undermined, and the credibility of the UN with all the players in the country or region is frequently irreparably damaged.

29 At the very least, Italy was aware of the opportunity to oppose a permanent Security Council seat for Germany.

30 The New York Times Week in Review, 6 December 1998.

31 This interpretation was rife among diplomats in New York at the time. It was the subject of an editorial in The Seattle Times on 15 November 1996, entitled `Canada's Peacekeepers Atone for Past Behavior', which commented that `Canada's willingness to lead a multinational humanitarian force to eastern Zaire has to be a combination of tradition and guilty conscience...Dispatching peacekeepers was a source of Canadian pride until the country's self-image was rocked by accounts of murder, torture and racism in Somalia, and profiteering and assaults on mental patients in Bosnia.'

32 Robert A. Mortimer, `ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa'; Margaret Aderinsola Vogt, `The Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia's Peacekeeping', in Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild, eds, Africa in the New International Order (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), 1996.

33 Speech given by the Secretary-General at Ditchley Park, UK, 26 June 1998 (Press Release SG/SM/6613).

34 Press conference of the Secretary-General following third high-level meeting between the UN and regional organizations, 29 July 1998 (SG/SM/6656).

35 `Subsidiarity' is the principle that a central authority should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a local level. In other words, policymaking authority should reside at the level most appropriate to the problem being addressed. This principle is frequently espoused by the institutions of the European Union.

36 Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.

37 `Guatemala Looking to OAS for Peacekeepers', The Sun-Sentinel, South Florida, 12 January 1997.

38 The ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone was launched at the beginning of February 1998 but not acknowledged by the Security Council until 26 February, in S/PRST/1998/5.

39 S/PRST/1998/35 (30 November 1998).

40 See note 25 above.

41 Sir Brian Urquhart recently noted that the blame for the setbacks in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, unfairly assigned to the Secretary-General and civilian and military UN commanders in the field, more properly lies with the `weak original mandates for action and the timid and often confused guidance' provided by the Security Council and its leading members. (Brian Urquhart, `Looking for the Sheriff', New York Review of Books, 16 July 1998).

42 `The United Nations Regrets', The Economist, 3-9 October 1998, p. 19.

43 Words to Deeds: Strengthening the UN's Enforcement Capabilities Final Report of the International Task Force on the Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions, UNA-USA, December 1997, pp. 46-47.

44 S/RES/1197 and S/PRST/1998/28 (18 September 1998).

45 See note 39 above.

46 Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (A/51/950, 14 July 1997).

47 Private interview conducted by the author with an independent consultant in the region.

48 The Weekly Defense Monitor, vol. 2, no. 40, 8 October 1998 (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information).

49 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (A/53/1 of 27 August 1998), para. 41.

50 Chantal de Jonge Oudrat, `The United Nations and Internal Conflict', in Michael Brown, ed., International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 489, 516.

51 Many commentators would argue, however, that Nigeria's role subsequent to April 1996 was primarily positive, creating the conditions in which democratic elections could eventually take place.

52 Alan K. Henrikson, `The UN and Regional Organizations: King Links of a Global Chain'. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 35-70.

53 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (see note 5 above), para. 87.

54 Although Article 43 of the UN Charter envisioned that member-states would `make forces available to the UN Security Council on its call', the negotiations to formalize these arrangements have never been completed. In their absence, attempts have been made to catalogue the resources a member-state can provide to peace operations on a stand-by basis. The SBAS, established in 1994, is a database of the specific resources individual states have agreed to provide to the UN within an agreed timeframe for a Security Council-authorized peace operation. This database enables the UN to determine its available resources for upcoming missions. Seventy-one states are currently participating in the SBAS.

55 The idea behind the RDMHQ, conceived in 1996 (derived from earlier work initiated by Canada in 1994), is that a cohesive group of essential civilian and military personnel would be available for deployment to a mission area immediately upon the authorization of a new operation, for a period of three to six months in order to manage the deployment and initial phase. The current funding crisis has, however, severely hampered progress towards implementing the idea of this nucleus headquarters, and the restructuring of its financing remains embryonic

56 SHIRBRIG, initiated by Denmark in 1995 and finalized in 1997, involves ten countries at present (Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Denmark) and is intended to allow for the rapid, limited (six months maximum) deployment of a brigade to the mission area. Participation in SHIRBRIG is limited to small and medium-sized countries already participating in the UN SBAS with the will and ability to finance their own participation and with capable units at the necessary level of readiness. The composition of the brigade has proven to be a politically sensitive topic, with many of those countries that cannot afford to participate perceiving it as a predominantly Western initiative. Furthermore, at the most recent session of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the `C34'), many delegations expressed concern at the erroneous perception of SHIRBRIG as a UN initiative.

57 See George Archibald, `White House Backs Standby UN Army', The Washington Times, 23 April 1998.

58 See note 39 above.

59 The Council has held open debates on protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations (21 May 1997; 29 September 1998), on children and armed conflict (June 1998) and on post-conflict peacebuilding (December 1998).