Is There Still a Rational North Korean Option for War?

1 Although strategies of engagement and containment are often juxtaposed, in this article, I use the term `engagement' in a conditional sense, meaning engagement policy tools that are used in conjunction with - not in lieu of - basic containment strategies. Thus, characterizing US policy toward North Korea as engagement does not necessarily entail an abandonment of deterrence. In this sense, the spectrum of choice really ranges from unconditional containment (i.e. an unadulterated `stick' policy) to conditional engagement (i.e. a containment-plus-engagement or `carrot and stick' policy).

2 Robert Scalapino, North Korea at a Crossroads, Hoover Institution Essays on Public Policy No. 73 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1997), pp. 16-17. While the points of departure for Scalapino's work and this article are different, they arrive at similar conclusions regarding the need for engaging the North.

3 Ibid., p. 16.

4 On both points, see The DPRK Report, No. 7, May-June 1997, distributed through NAPSNET@nautilus.org.

5 Randall Schweller, `Domestic Structure and Preventive War', World Politics, vol. 44, no. 2, January 1992, pp. 235-269; and Jack Snyder, `Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1985).

6 Nicholas Eberstadt, ` “National Strategy” in North and South Korea', NBR Analysis, vol. 7, no. 5, 1996, p. 14.

7 Bruce Cumings, `Feeding the North Korea Myths', The Nation, 29 September 1997, pp. 22-24.

8 Chôsôn Ilbo, 20 March 1997, reprint of Kim Jong-il's 50th anniversary speech at Kim Il-sung University; and The DPRK Report, No. 7, May-June 1997, distributed through NAPSNet@nautilus.org.

9 The contours of this debate are well known. Arguments against engagement focus on its futility in the face of DPRK intransigence. In short, the regime is still bent on subverting the South and will not respond positively to conciliatory gestures by Seoul; rather, it will perceive such gestures as signs of weakness, which in turn will only reinforce the position of hardliners in Pyongyang. As a result, cooperative behavior is best elicited through containment policies that, in conjunction with the North's dire internal situation, press the regime to capitulate. Pro-engagement arguments start from many of the same premises, but reach different conclusions. The North is in dire straits, but hardline containment is likely to elicit rash and dangerous reactions rather than conciliatory ones. The primary obstacle to North-South dialogue is no longer the Cold War, but the legacies of this four-decade struggle manifest in deeply rooted mutual distrust and animosity. Conciliatory acts help to dissipate these barriers and open a road to confidence building.

10 The 1972 principles were (1) national consensus - under a civilian, democratically elected government, policies toward North Korea would reflect the true will of the people; (2) peaceful coexistence and prosperity - unification would be preceded by a period of mutual recognition of `two systems, one nation', wherein non-intervention and joint prosperity would be promoted; and (3) national well-being - the top priority in integrating into `one nation, one system' would be the people's welfare, and not that of a particular ideology or system.

11 See Kim Young-sam's 15 August 1996 Liberation Day speech, reprinted in Korea Observer, vol. 27, no. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 485-491.

12 `S. Korea President Warns Invasion by North More Likely', AP-Dow Jones News Service, 12 March 1997; and Joongang Ilbo, 23 October 1996.

13 Inaugural address of Kim Dae-jung, 25 February 1998, reprinted in Korea Update, vol. 9, no. 2, 2 March 1998; also see Korea Times, 28 March 1998.

14 See Laney's comments as cited in Chae-jin Lee, `US Policy Toward North Korea: The Dilemma of Containment and Engagement', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 1996, pp. 359-360.

15 Victor Cha, `Kim Dae-jung's Northern Policy', Chôsôn Ilbo (op-ed), 5 June 1998; and the author's interviews at the Ministry of National Unification, 3 June 1998, Seoul, and at the South Korean Embassy, Washington DC, 5 April 1998.

16 `Sunshine Policy Set to Shine', Korea Newsreview, 15 August 1998.

17 For an eloquent argument to this effect, see Thomas Henriksen, `Time to End Sanctions against North Korea', Washington Times, 27 April 1998.

18 For example, in the October 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations, the United States stood firm on the inclusion of a clause on North-South dialogue despite Pyongyang's 11th-hour threats to scrap the entire agreement over this issue. In the ensuing 1995 Kuala Lumpur negotiations on the light water reactor contract and the 1996 submarine incursion incident, the United States also stood fully behind Seoul's demands for ROK-design reactors in the former case and an apology from the North in the latter.