Reassurance versus Deterrence

1 Much of the discussion of Iranian threat perceptions in this article is based on Saideh Lotfian, `Threat Perception and Military Planning in Iran: Credible Scenarios of Conflict and Opportunities for Confidence Building', and Shahram Chubin, `Arms Procurement in Iran: Ad Hoc Decision Making and Ambivalent Decision Makers', in Eric Arnett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

2 Submissions are due every April. Iranian Foreign Ministry officials have said that the delay is due to lack of cooperation from the Defence Ministry. Personal communication, November 1993. The then-defence minister, Mohammad Foruzandeh, says that purchases from North Korea would have been reported if there had been any. Xinhua, 31 December 1995, cited in FBIS-TAC-96-001, 26 January 1996.

3 Personal communication, September 1998. The 93+2 programme is the IAEA's response to the failure of safeguards in Iraq. Part I safeguards are meant to improve the IAEA's ability to use its existing legal authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Measures include environmental sampling and no-notice inspections at declared facilities, as well as retroactive access to records and automated monitoring between inspections. Part II safeguards require additional transparency and access. Measures include expanded data declarations and access to additional facilities, including environmental sampling.

4 Personal communication, April 1995.

5 According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, they were most likely delivered between 1991 and 1993, but were not mentioned in Iran's submissions to the UN Arms Register.

6 Chubin (see note 1 above).

7 Iranian officials condemned the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, but expressed support for Pakistan. For a discussion of the Iranian leadership's positions on norms related to weapons of mass destruction, see Eric Arnett, `Norms and Nuclear Proliferation: Sweden's Lessons for Analysing Iran', Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 2, Winter 1998, pp. 32-43.

8 Personal communication, March and April 1995.

9 Such statements were made by Phil Gramm, Richard Haass, Henry Kissinger, Charles Krauthammer, John McCain, William Safire, Brent Scowcroft and Paul Wolfowitz, among others, in the Republican security policy brain trust. For a useful short review of the incident, see James Fallows, `The Panic Gap: Reactions to North Korea's Bomb', National Interest, Winter 1994/95, pp. 40-45.

10 See, for example, the testimony of General Patrick M. Hughes, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in US Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad, S. Hrg. 104-510 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 205; David Albright, `The Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal', Nonproliferation Review, vol. 2, no. 3, Spring-Summer 1995; Mark Hibbs, `Iran Has “No Program to Produce Fissile Material”, US Envoy Says', Nucleonics Week, 2 February 1995, p. 7; and Elaine Sciolino, `Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants but No Atom Arms', New York Times, 14 May 1995.

11 Albright (see note 10 above).

12 The ballistic missile programme was reinvigorated with a $600 million budget in 1995, around the time an Iranian official said that the country did not need such a capability. `Iran Successfully Tests Medium-Range Missile', Tehran Times, 26 July 1998.

13 The single-stage Shahab 3 apparently completed its boost phase before being destroyed. It remains to be seen whether Iran will be able to equip the missile with appropriate technology for re-entry and guidance.

14 Shamkani also said Iran had a policy of not using missiles first. E. Blanche, `Shahab 3 Launch Success Spurs Israeli Response', Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 August 1998, p. 18.

15 Some Iranian officials evoke deterrence as a laudably defensive alternative to seeking capabilities useful for aggression, rather than a provocative alternative to reassurance, but it is not clear that such a distinction is any more discernible to outside observers in the contemporary Gulf region than it was during the Cold War.

16 A negative security guarantee is a promise not to attack. A positive security guarantee is a promise to help in defence.

17 White papers in east Asia are seen as an important CBM. They are discussed in Kang Choi & Panitan Wattanayagorn, `Development of Defence White Papers in the Asia-Pacific Region', in Bates Gill & J. N. Mak, Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).