Facing Genocide:

1 See Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. vol. 2 (Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996); Alan J. Kuperman, `The Other Lesson of Rwanda,' SAIS Review, vol. 16, no. 1, Winter-Spring 1996, pp. 221-240; Linda Melvern, `Genocide behind the Thin Blue Line', Security Dialogue, vol. 28, no. 3, September 1997, pp. 333-346; Michael N. Barnett, `The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda', Cultural Anthropology, vol. 12, no. 4, 1997, pp. 551-578. A Belgian parliamentary commission of inquiry had worked throughout 1997 and was expected to complete its report by the end of the year. Summary reports of its extensive hearings are available from the Senate, Commission d'enquête parlementaire concernant les événements du Rwanda.

2 Permission to use and cite from the Chronique has been granted by Col. Joe Dewez, commander of the 2nd ParaCommando battalion that served in Kigali, and editor of the Chronique. Col. Dewez subsequently had 600 copies of the manuscript printed and made available through the battalion shop, with the proceeds going to a benefit fund. This article is based on the complete version of the manuscript.

3 The Chronique is organized chronologically according to events and movements of the battalion units, hence this article uses these coordinates rather than page numbers when referencing is appropriate.

4 For an authoritative analysis of the first three days and the killing of Habyarimana, see Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire (Brussels: Institut africain-CEDAF; Paris: Harmattan, 1995).

5 General Dallaire had in January 1994 received reliable intelligence information that extremist forces around the President were preparing to provoke a fight with the Belgian forces and kill some of them in the expectation that this would trigger a UN withdrawal. See Adelman and Suhrke, 1996, p. 37. The example from Somalia probably played a role. In a widely publicized set of events, the death of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993 made the US terminate its military mission in the country.

6 The weapons information is from Alexandre Goffin, Rwanda 7 avril 1994: Dix commandos vont mourir (Brussels: ASBL, 1995), but is consistent with other information in the Chronique.

7 Col. Marchal denies having said this. Written communication from Col. Marchal to the author, 12 December 1997. The quotation is recorded as recalled by a radio operator. Written communication from Col. Dewez to the author, 5 December 1997.

8 This account is mainly based on author's interviews with General Dallaire (March, May 1995 and June 1996), and a documentary produced by Frederic François for the Belgian French-language television (RTBF). The documentary, called Les oubliés de Kigali, was shown on RTBF on 21 February 1996 and used among other sources a two-hour taped, background interview with Dallaire.

9 Les oubliés de Kigali.

10 Ibid.

11 Written communication to the author, 5 December 1997. Emphasis in the original.

12 `An update on the current situation in Rwanda and military aspects of the mission', coded cable from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kigali addressed to Annan/Goulding, New York, 8 April 1994, with the military assessment written by Dallaire.

13 Chronique, p. 1.

14 The French evacuation force had 190 men, the Belgian force 250.

15 Coded cable from Dallaire/UNAMIR/Kigali to Baril/DPKO/UN New York, `Request for Protection for Informant', 11 January 1994.

16 Reuters, Brussels, 13 April 1994.

17 The first RoE dated October 1993 is clearly marked as a draft. Apart from minor editing changes it is identical with the next version, dated 19 November, which is marked `interim'.

18 Scott R. Feil, A Rwandan Retrospective: Developing an Intervention Option (Washington DC: The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts, 1997), p. 36.