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References
1.
1 UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948.
2.
2 For the texts of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 BW Convention, the 1993 CW Convention and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (mentioned later), see Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (London: SAGE, 1994).
3.
3 UN General Assembly Resolution 1(I), 24 January 1946.
4.
4 UN document A/35/392, 12 September 1980 (updated in 1990).
5.
5 Report to Implement Resolution WHA34.38, World Health Organization, Geneva, 1984.
6.
6 Report of the UN Secretary-General, document A/43/351, New York, 1989.
7.
7 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1996.
8.
8 UN document A/RES/S-10/2, 13 July 1978.
9.
9 See note 2.
10.
10 NPT Review and Extension Conference document NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2, 11 May 1995, paragraph 3(c).
11.
11 International Court of Justice Communiqué, 8 July 1996.
12.
12 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/984, 11 April 1995.
13.
13 See note 10, paragraph 8.
14.
14 Reproduced in Arms Control Today , vol. 26, no. 9, November/December 1996, pp. 15, 18.
15.
15 Assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT (the so-called negative security assurances), as provided by UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), are conditional: the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia stated that these assurances would cease to be valid in the case of an invasion or any other attack on these powers, their territories, their armed forces or other troops, their allies, or on a state towards which they have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. The nuclear non-use assurances, as provided by the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, are understood by the nuclear powers (except China) to be subject to the same or similar conditions. The use of nuclear weapons against non-parties is not prohibited by any of the above treaties.
16.
16 Breakouts from the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the CW and BW conventions banning the use of chemical and biological weapons may be deterred with modern conventional means of warfare.
17.
17 See note 2, pp. 629, 637.