Avoiding New Myths: US-Japan Security Relations

1 A phrase originally attributed to then-US ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield in the early 1980s and alluded to by every US ambassador, secretary of state, and president since that time.

2 See, for example, Okinawa Governor Masahide Ota, `No Bases: A Good Idea for Okinawa', Japan Times, 11 February 1997, which responds to my own editorial, `Gov. Ota's “No Bases” Campaign: A Bad Idea for Okinawans', Japan Times, 5 February 1997.

3 `US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century', 17 April 1996. For the complete text, see Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet Newsletter, no. 17, 26 April 1996.

4 For a more comprehensive review of the status of relations between these four states, see Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), published as no. 51 in the McNair Paper series produced by the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

5 South Korea, at least officially, professes to share this objective, although one can question the vigor with which Seoul is willing to pursue this outcome or the potential success of some of its current tactics in achieving it.

6 The document's formal title is the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, February 1995).

7 Ibid., p. 10.

8 President William Clinton, Address before the Korean National Assembly, 23 July 1993.

9 In the fall of 1995, three US marines stationed in Okinawa were accused of abducting and raping a 12-year-old Japanese schoolgirl just outside one of the Okinawa bases. They were tried and found guilty in a Japanese court and are now serving sentences in a Japanese prison. Tensions remained high during the trial even though US authorities fully cooperated with Japanese investigators and Americans from the president on down, including the three accused marines, expressed sincere regrets over the incident.

10 See, for example, `US Should Examine One-Sided, Archaic Military Pact with Japan', Washington Times, 17 November 1995, citing Cato Institute analyst Ted Galen Carpenter. The Cato Institute has long advocated a complete US military withdrawal from Northeast Asia.

11 See, for example, Chalmers Johnson & E. B. Keehn, `The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 4, July / August 1995, pp. 103-114.

12 Japan is a charter member of the ARF, and its Foreign Ministry-sponsored research institute, the Japan Institute for International Affairs, serves as the Secretariat for the Japan member committee of CSCAP. A retired Japanese ambassador, Nubuo Matsunaga, serves as co-chair of the CSCAP International Steering Committee. Japan is also a founding member of APEC and participates in the quasi-governmental Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, focusing on stability on the Korean Peninsula.

13 For a review of how these emerging multilateral security dialogue mechanisms affect the alliance, see Ralph A. Cossa, The Japan-US Security Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analysis, January 1995).

14 EASR, note 6, pp. 12-14.

15 Richard L. Armitage, `Issuing a Challenge for the US-Japan Security Alliance', paper presented at the 1996 San Francisco Security Conference, 16-18 January 1996. This conference is an annual, off-the-record, nongovernmental security forum co-hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS and the Japan Institute for International Affairs and involving current and former US and Japanese government officials, business people, and security specialists.

16 The Joint Declaration also states: `The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.'

17 As discussed below, the Joint Declaration has also been greeted by a certain degree of skepticism and concern among China's security analysts and officials, who are constantly seeking evidence of an evolving US `contain China' policy. North Korean statements traditionally contain a strong anti-Japanese theme. Therefore, Pyongyang's negative reaction to the Joint Declaration comes as no surprise.

18 Son Key-young, `Seoul Shows Mixed Reactions to US-Japan Security Declaration', Korea Times, 18 April 1996, p. 2.

19 Oh Young-Jin, `South Korea Keeps Head Cool As Japan Looms as Regional Military Power', Korea Times, 23 April 1996, p. 3, citing Dr. Song Yong-son of the Korean Institute of Defense Analyses in Seoul.

20 Ibid.

21 National Defense Program Outline in and after FY1996, released by the Government of Japan on 28 November 1995, outlines current downsizing plans. Japan's three non-nuclear principles prohibit the manufacture, possession, or introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons. For more on Japan's nuclear attitudes and the connection between the non-nuclear principles and the US `nuclear umbrella', see Cossa, note 13.

22 As cited in `China's Foreign Minister Turns Assertive', Wall Street Journal, 16 October 1996, p. A15, based on a staff interview with Qian.

23 For information on Hashimoto's Southeast Asia visit, see Lam Peng Er, `New Direction in Japan's Foreign Policy', and Ralph A. Cossa, `A Revitalized US-Japan Alliance Should Cause No Alarm in Asia', both in Trends, no. 78. Trends is a monthly publication of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) and is printed in The Business Times, Weekend Edition. No. 78 was in the 22-23 February 1997 edition.

24 See section 7 of the Joint Declaration, note 3.

25 EASR, note 6, p. 15.