Arms Control in the Middle East

1 A third track is sometimes referred to: international, ad hoc events such as the Amman and Casablanca Economic Summits and the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting.

2 The regional participants in the peace process are (in alphabetical order) Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, the Palestinians, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Lebanon and Syria have chosen not to participate in the multilaterals. Libya, Iran and Iraq do not participate in the peace process.

3 For more on this process, see R. J. Bookmiller & K. N. Bookmiller, `Behind the Headlines: The Multilateral Middle East Talks', Current History, January 1996, pp. 33-38, and J. Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996). See also P. Jones, `The Middle East Peace Process in 1995', SIPRI Yearbook, 1996 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996). For more on ACRS, see M. Yaffe, `An Overview of the Middle East Peace Process Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security', in F. Tanner, ed., Arms Control, Confidence-building and Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East (Malta: University of Malta, 1994), pp. 93-100, and B. Jentleson, `The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Talks: Progress, Problems and Prospects', IGCC Policy Paper #2, September 1996.

4 It should be noted, however, that these states are participants in the peace process and do recognize the right of Israel to exist. They are thus playing the normalization card for primarily tactical reasons. Iran, by contrast, does not officially recognize Israel's right to exist. There is thus a critical difference between the two positions regarding normalization.

5 See, for example, President Assad's comments on the matter to the Egyptian daily al Ahram, translated in the 11 October 1995 edition of MidEast Mirror, p. 16.

6 See M. Karem, `The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of Ballistic Missiles', in C. Oudraat, ed., United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1994), pp. 39-50.

7 See A. Levite, `Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East', in ibid., pp. 97-103.

8 For more on this reasoning, see T. L. Friedman, `Identity Jolt for Egypt: It's Special, but Not as Special as Before', International Herald Tribune, 16 February 1995, and Jentleson, op. cit., p. 12. See also The Arms Control Reporter, 1995 (Cambridge, MA), pp. 453.B.189-190, for more on the Israeli-Egyptian dispute over the NPT.

9 The first discussions of the ACRS Statement preceded by a few months the process launched by the Steering Committee of the multilateral track to develop an overall `Vision Paper' of the Middle East at peace. Each Working Group was eventually asked to develop a paper for inclusion in this larger `Vision Paper'. The ACRS paper became part of this larger effort.

10 Canada was asked to act as mentor of the maritime work; Turkey, on military notifications; and the Netherlands, on the development of the communications network. Australia was eventually asked to facilitate work on the conflict prevention centre/regional security centre.

11 More on the Maritime CBM talks may be found in P. Jones, `Maritime Confidence-building in the Middle East', in Maritime Confidence-building in Regions of Tension (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996).

12 The idea behind the activity is discussed in J. Downing, `Flying the Flag for Peace', Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 March 1995, p. 30.

13 The text is reprinted in The Arms Control Reporter, 1994, pp. 453.D.17-20.

14 See J. J. Lok, `Security in Numbers on the OSCE Network', Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 January 1996, p. 27.

15 This proposal was made in an Israeli paper submitted to a meeting of the Conceptual Group in Paris in October 1994. See The Arms Control Reporter, 1994, pp. 453.B.182-183.

16 A detailed discussion of the development of this paper may be found in Jentleson, op. cit., pp. 8, 10.

17 Egypt presented a proposal along these lines at the October 1994 Conceptual Basket Group meeting, calling for an agenda comprising five items: conventional arms control; weapons of mass destruction; missiles and ABMs; space and high altitude surveillance and reconnaissance systems; and CBMs. Discussion of this proposal was inconclusive. See The Arms Control Reporter, 1994, pp. 453.B.182-183.

18 The Doha plenary is discussed on pp. 453.B.176-177 of The Arms Control Reporter, 1994.

19 Announcements of the adoption in Tunis of the CBMs worked out in ACRS may be found in The Arms Control Reporter, 1994, pp. 453.B.186-187, and `New Confidence-Building Measures Emerge from Middle East Talks', Arms Control Today (Washington, DC), January/February 1995, p. 26.