The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Force and the Middle East Peace Process

1 For a detailed account of the Vanunu revelations, see Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London, 1991); Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1991).

2 Shai Feldman, `Israel's Changing Environment: Implication for Arms Control', in Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1994), p. 196.

3 Ibid.; Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (New York, 1994), p. 43.

4 David Pervin, `Nuclear Weapons and the Arab-Israeli Peace', in Arabic, Al-Siassah Al-Daouliah, April 1995, p. 99.

5 For an explanation of Israel's ambiguous posture, see, for example, Y. Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (New York, 1994), p. 270; Shlomo Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1961-1991, An Israeli Perspective (New York, 1992); S. Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York, 1982).

6 On 24 December 1965, the Israeli minister of labor was quoted as saying that `Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but it will not be the second either'. On 7 September 1975, Yitzhak Rabin is reported to have said that Israel was `a non nuclear country' and `it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area'. Yet President Katzir declared in 1974 that Israel had the potential to build nuclear weapons and could do so within a reasonable period of time; see United Nations, Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament (UN Doc. A/37/434, New York, 1982, p. 17). Rabin's declarations were understood by specialists to mean that Israel would not be the first to test such weapons or to reveal their existence publicly; see Marvin Miller, `Israel', in E. Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation (SIPRI, 1996), p. 63. Shimon Peres, the former Israeli prime minister, is reported to have said that `Israel would be willing to give up the atom once the region was at peace'; see Reuter's Textline, Middle East, 9 April 1996. Syrian diplomats characterized the Israeli statements as forming `a deceptive cover-up'; see the letter of 29 July 1987 from the chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General (UN Doc. A/42/434).

7 Gerald Steinberg, `Middle East Arms Control Regional Security', Survival, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 126-141.

8 S. Feldman, `Israel's National Security: Perceptions and Policy', Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts, paper presented at a workshop in Cyprus, 17-19 August 1995, p. 33. Feldman states that the Israeli posture of nuclear ambiguity must be preserved to `enhance peace by dissuading peace-prone states from abandoning the peace process and by deterring “rogue states” from challenging the peace established'; see p. 37.

9 Louis René Beres, `The “Peace Process” and Israel's Nuclear Strategy', Strategic Review, Winter 1995, p. 38.

10 Walter Schilling, `Israel's Nuclear Strategy in Transition', Aussenpolitik, vol. IV, 1995, p. 323.

11 L. R. Beres, `The “Peace Process”...', p. 36.

12 On the Israeli perspective on the relationship between the potential establishment of the State of Palestine and the need for Israel to preserve its nuclear force, see, for example, L. R. Beres, `Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 22, no. 2 (1991), pp. 227-234; L. R. Beres, `After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East', Strategic Review, Fall 1991, pp. 48-55.

13 On the Iranian nuclear threat, see, for example, Peter Reulherade, `Iran, Nuclear Conundrum', The Middle East, July/August 1994. In a report issued on 30 April 1992 by the task force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee of the US House of Representatives, it is stated that `currently Iran is known to have the following nuclear weapons: Two warheads for a SCUD-type ballistic missile, each 40Kt. strong. These warheads can be fitted in any SSM that has been derived from the basic SCUD. These warheads are in operational status. One aerial bomb of the type carried by a MiG-27. The performance range of standard Soviet nuclear bombs for MiG-27s is between 1,000-2,000 kg, with a tonnage of between 50-500 kts. The bomb is in operational status. One nuclear artillery shell that is 0.1 kt strong. The weapon's current operational status is not known.' According to the report, the source of the warheads is Kazakhstan. The report is quoted by L. R. Beres, `Israel, Iran, and Prospects for Nuclear War in the Middle East', Strategic Review, Spring 1993, endnote 2, p. 58. Beres specifically asserts that `congruence of such capabilities and intentions may well portend preparations for a genocidal war in the region, a war that would have grave consequences for the Middle East, for the United States, and for the world as a whole' (p. 52); the same information is reported by Mohammed Abdel Salam, `The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly', working paper presented to the seminar on the Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly held in Cairo on 14 October 1995, in Arabic, Al-Moutakbal Al-Arabi, no. 208 (June 1996), p. 83.

14 W. Schilling, `Israel's Nuclear Strategy...', p. 323.

15 L. R. Beres, `The “Peace Process”...', in Strategic Review, Winter 1995, p. 41.

16 As Reuven Pedhatzur put it in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz in September 1994, a comprehensive and stable peace will be possible only `when the Arabs realize that they must accept Israel's nuclear capabilities as a vital component of the process of compromise with Israel'; quoted in P. R. Kumaraswamy, `Egypt Needles Israel', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1995, p. 13.

17 For a Syrian perception of threat, see Abdulhay Sayed, `Overcoming Prejudice: A Syrian Perception of the Israeli Threat in the Arab-Israeli Region of Conflict', National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East, UNDIR, 1995, United Nations Publications, Sales no. GV.E.95.0.24, pp. 61-82. For a Syrian perspective, see M. Z. Diab, `A Proposed Security Regime for an Arab-Israeli Settlement', in Steven Spiegel, ed., The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace, pp. 159-172; see also Tahsin Hassan, `Frankly Speaking, No Need for Peace, say Israelis', Reuters Textline, Money Clips, Saudi Gazette, 2 April 1996.

18 Y. Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (New York, 1994), pp. 217, 221.

19 See the observation of Ambassador Mahmoud Karem at the seminar on the Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly, op. cit., p. 121.

20 See, for example, the observations of Mohammad Sayed Ahmad at the seminar on the Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly, op. cit., p. 91.

21 The metaphor of the carrot and the stick is borrowed from the observations of Mohammad Sayed Ahmad at the seminar on the Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly, op. cit., pp. 117-118. Sayed Ahmad used the metaphor to highlight the problem of the Israeli search for a modus vivendi between the nuclear dimension (the stick) and peace (the carrot). For the purposes of this article, the metaphor is employed to highlight the contradiction in Israeli policies regarding peace.

22 Wahid Abdel Magid, `The Peace Process and the Dilemma of the Israeli Nuclear Force', in Arabic, Al-Siassah Al-Daouliah, April 1995, at p. 105.

23 It has been said that the potential Iranian nuclear threat has been exaggerated to justify the maintenance of Israel's ambiguous posture. The information on whether Iran may be close to developing its own nuclear weapons is so contradictory that it is unverifiable; see W. A. Magid, `The Peace Process and the Dilemma...', p. 105.

24 Ibid., p. 103.

25 While some argue that Israel possesses 100-200 atomic bombs and several H-bombs of yields not exceeding 200 kilotons (see, for example, F. Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb..., p. 25); others believe that the total number of nuclear weapons exceeds 300 bombs (see S. Hersh, The Samson Option..., p. 198). Many may argue that Hersh's estimates are exaggerated. However, it has been submitted that Hersh's book should be seriously considered in terms of `worst case' planning; see Leonard Spector, `Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: The Next Chapter Begins', in Efraim Karsh, ed., Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities (Oxford, 1993), at p. 154; see also, in the same volume, Geoffrey Kemp, `Arms Control and the Arab Israeli Peace Process', p. 247.

26 S. Hersh, The Samson Option..., p. 198; W. Burrows, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Super Weapons in a Fragmenting World (New York, 1994), p. 308.

27 Arab states would find it hard to accept any Israeli nuclear force as a stabilizing deterrent. There would be continuous Arab fear, concern, and discomfort regarding the Israeli nuclear force; see Mohammed Abdel Salam, `The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly', p. 59.

28 Mohammad Abdel Salam, `Israeli Nuclear Warheads', in Al-Siassah Al-Daouliah, 1994, pp. 1106-1128.

29 G. Steinberg, `Middle East Arms Control Regional Security', p. 128; S. Feldman, `Israel's Changing Environment...', p. 202; S. Feldman, `Security and Arms Control in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective', in Shelley A. Stahl & Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York, 1991), p. 86.

30 Shalheveth Freier, A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East and its Ambiance, UNIDIR, project on `Confidence Building in the Middle East', p. 4; on the Israeli position, see also Mohammed Abdel Salam, `The Israeli Position on Nuclear Non-Proliferation', in Arabic, in Al-Siassah Al-Daouliah, April 1995, p. 74.

31 The position of the Israeli government is that `Israel needs to be assured that war has been removed as a viable option for settling differences'; see Israeli Statement in International Atomic Energy Agency, Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East, Report by the Director General, GC (XXXVII) 1072, 6 September 1993.

32 G. Steinberg, `Middle East Arms Control Regional Security', p. 130; Ariel Levite, `Israel's Security Concerns, Characteristics and Implications', in Shai Feldman, ed., Confidence Building and Verification..., p. 193.

33 Geoffrey Kemp, `Cooperative Security in the Middle East', in Janne Nolan, ed., Global Engagement (Washington, DC, 1994), p. 409.

34 Avner Cohen, `The Nuclear Issue in the Middle East in a New World Order', Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 16, no. 1, April 1995, p. 58.

35 On the Israeli position, see Mohammed Abdel Salam, `The Israeli Position on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation', p. 75.

36 Arab observers point out that at the present Israeli pace, any effective elimination of nuclear weapons would take at least 25 years; see Mohammed Abdel Salam, `The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly', p. 58.

37 The question whether Israel would allow inspectors of other Arab countries to inspect all of its nuclear facilities has been raised by Avner Cohen in the context of the potential implementation of the fissile cut-off proposal. Cohen specifically poses the question `Would Israel agree to a verfication system built on the principle of “managed access” which would allow others to inspect the entire Dimona facility and other senstive sites?' See A. Cohen, The Nuclear Issue..., p. 67.

38 The official Syrian position has been sensitive regarding a `privileged' status for Israel in the region. The Syrian representative to the IAEA general conference recently declared that `Israel's accession to the NPT was essential to the establishment of an area free of nuclear armaments and mass destruction in the Middle East. The issue had become extremely important, especially in view of the ongoing peace process in the Middle East, as it was unacceptable for one party to enjoy privileged or exceptional conditions at the expense of another party when delicate and fundamental matters relating to regional security were at stake.' International Atomic Energy Agency, General Conference, 39th session (1995), regular session, IAEA Doc. GC(39)/OR.5, para. 61.

39 The Lebanese foreign minister, Fares Bouez, has hinted at the double standard policy of the United States in approaching the nuclear issue in the Middle East. He specifically declared that `Lebanon does not possess nuclear weapons and it will not likely possess these weapons in 50 or 100 years; yet the United States requires us to sign the [NPT] treaty, and ignores the Israeli non-adherence to the treaty'; see Al-Hayat, 23 April 1995. On the Arab perception of the US policy on the Israeli nuclear force, see, for example, Mourad Ibrahim Al-Dessouki, `Between the Israeli Nuclear Weapon and the NPT', in Al-Siassah Al-Daouliah, April 1995, pp. 56-61. On the US policy regarding the Israeli nuclear issue, see A. Cohen, `Most Favored Nation', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1995, pp. 44-53.

40 Emily Landau, `CBMs in the Middle East: A Conceptual Framework', in Shai Feldman, ed., Confidence Building and Verification..., pp. 209-221; A. Levite, Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East, in Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East, UNIDIR (New York, 1994), pp. 93-102; S. Freier, A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone...

41 Abdulhay Sayed, `What About Peace with Israel for the New Arab Generation', in Arabic, in Al-Hayat, 4 February 1995, p. 16.

42 Johan Jørgen Holst, `Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', Survival, vol. 27, no. 1 (January 1983), p. 2.

43 United Nations, Study on Concepts of Security, Department of Disarmament Affairs (New York, 1986), p. 15.

44 M. Z. Diab, `Regional Arms Control in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Syrian Perspective', in Arabic, Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1994, p. 39; Mahmoud Karem, `Some Lights on the Egyptian Position from the NPT', in Arabic, in Al-Siassah Al-Daouliah, April 1995, p. 85.

45 United Nations, Study on Effective and Verifiable Measures Which Would Facilitate the Establishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the Middle East, Department of Disarmament Affairs (New York, 1991), p. 22.

46 Ibid.

47 As Ze'ev Schiff argued in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, `No Israeli government, even most moderate, will agree to make peace and simultaneously to weaken, in fact to dismantle, its chief deterring power. Such a peace will not be acceptable to the Israeli public and will be dangerous from the security point of view'; quoted in P. R. Kumaraswamy, `Egypt Needles Israel', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1995, p. 12.

48 A. Cohen, `The Nuclear Issue...', p. 61.

49 Ibid., p. 64.

50 The expression was used by Yuval Neeman, a former Israeli science minister, in reaction to the fissile cut-off proposal. It was reported by G. Steinberg, `Israel and the Changing Global Non-Proliferation Regime: The NPT Extension, CTBT and Fissile Cut-Off', Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 16, no. 1 (April 1995), p. 79.

51 Ibid.; A. Cohen, `The Nuclear Issue...', p. 67.

52 Abdulhay Sayed, The Future of Security in the Arab-Israeli Region: A Critical Appraisal, paper presented to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict conference on `A Future Security Architecture in the Middle East', Cyprus, August 1995, p. 5.

53 The Syrian official newpaper Tishrine once noted that `if the International society is interested to provide the basis of peace and stability in the region, it is required to pressure [Israel] to remove Israeli nuclear weapon and put an end to the Israeli nuclear threat. And if that not achieved then the region will witness more of arms race, escalations and dangers of the eruption of new wars' (Reuter's Textline, Middle East, 2 April 1996).

54 Following a recent minor earthquake in the Middle East region, with its epicenter in the Gulf of Akaba, and which was felt in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and parts of Syria, growing information has surfaced on a possible radioactive leak from the 30-year-old Israeli Dimona nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert. Arab concerns intensified because the Dimona reactor is old and has never been put under IAEA safeguards. Egyptian monitors have conducted missions at the Israeli-Egyptian border to check radiation levels there (Reuter's Textline, Middle East, 27 March 1996); Syrian President Assad consulted several times with his Egyptian counterpart on the dangers of such a leak (Reuter's Textline, Middle East, 27-29 March 1996); Israel denied any claims of a leak from the reactor (Reuter's Textline, Middle East, 29 March 1996); an Arab League council emergency meeting noted, in a resolution, the importance of `drawing the attention of the security council and the IAEA to the latent and possible dangers from a radiation leak from the Israeli Dimona reactor and other Israeli reactors in the absence of any international supervision of the Israeli nuclear program and because of Israel's continuing refusal to join the NPT' (Reuter Textline, BBC Monitoring Service: Middle East, 11 April 1996).

55 According to Syrian experts, Israel should follow the example of South Africa, which destroyed its entire nuclear capability and adhered to the NPT (see International Atomic Energy Agency, Statement of the Syrian Representative to the General Conference Mr. Ibrahim Haddad, GC(XXXVII)OR. 358, 29 September 1993, 5 January 1994, p. 16); see also Waldo Stumpf, `South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement', Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996, pp. 3-8.

56 On the Mubarak proposal, see, for example, Mohamed Shaker, `Prospects for Establishing a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East', Director's Series on Proliferation, 1994, no. 6, pp. 21-31.

57 UN Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, UN Doc. S/RES/687.

58 Article 4(7)(b) of the treaty stipulates as follows: `The parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly toward the following.... the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill'; Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 128.

59 Al-Hayat, 1 May 1996, p. 7.

60 Syria seems to have demanded, during the preparation of the draft convention, that Turkey be included in the area under consideration; see Al-Hayat, 1 May 1996, p. 7. Press reports revealed the existence of some differences between Egypt and Syria on the content of the draft convention and the timing of its consideration. The late ambassador Mouafak Al-Alaf, the former Syrian chief negotiator and the deputy secretary-general of the Arab League, specifically declared that `reaching a comprehensive and just peace and the acceptance by all regional states [including Israel] to get ride of all weapons of mass destruction are necessary preconditions to implement the treaty.... Arab states must be reassured that no threats exist.... This draft treaty will only succeed in the context of a security balance, in which the Arab states who will agree to give up their military capabilities are reassured on their securities'; Syria Times, 17 May 1996, p. 2; Al-Hayat, 16 May 1996, p. 7.

61 Al-Hayat, 16 May 1996, p. 7; see also the observations of Haytham Al-Kilani at the seminar on the Future of the Israeli Nuclear Monopoly, op. cit., p. 122.

62 Mahmoud Karem, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, Problems and Prospects (New York, 1990), p. 121.

63 P. R. Kumaraswamy, `Egypt Needles Israel', pp. 11-13; Jane Hunter, `Egypt and the Non-Proliferation Treaty', Middle East International, no. 497, 31 March 1995, pp. 17-18.