A Surprising About-Face: Argentina and the NPT

1 Much of this draws on the author's book analyzing the NPT from the Argentine point of view, El desarme de los desarmados-Argentina y el Tratado de No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1987).

2 United Nations, XXII General Assembly, First Committee, meeting 1572nd, 22 May 1968.

3 United Nations, General Assembly, X Special Session, 5th plenary meeting, 26 May 1978.

4 Conference on Disarmament, plenary meeting of 28 February 1984.

5 Article IV of the NPT refers specifically to technology transfers, including a phrase: `all the Parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy'.

6 This author has always been doubtful about this argument. In fact, I never got a satisfactory answer to the following question, reiterated in informal talks and discussions: `How it was possible that states more advanced in the nuclear field than Argentina, like Canada, Germany and Switzerland, all subject to full-scope safeguards, do not seem to have problems with the preservation of their scientific and technological secrets?'.

7 David Myers, `Brazil: Reluctant pursuit of the nuclear option', Orbis, vol. 27, no. 4, Winter 1984, pp. 881-882.

8 See Julio C. Carasales, John Redick & Paulo Wrobel, `Nuclear rapprochement, Argentina, Brazil, and the non-proliferation régime', The Washington Quarterly, Washington, vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 107-22. Also Julio C. Carasales, `The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement', The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey (California), Spring-Summer 1995, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 39-48.

9 `Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material, and related technology' approved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Warsaw, April 1992, in Briefing Book, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) (Southampton, UK), vol. II,, p. J-27.

10 It is important to underline that the policies of Argentina in relation to Tlatelolco and the NPT were not at all the same. Argentina signed Tlatelolco but did not ratify it for a long time due to misgivings and difficulties with respect of some of its clauses; Argentine delegates stressed always that their country was in full agreement with the purpose of Tlatelolco and that it would not take any action contrary to its aims, in compliance with article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. By contrast, Argentina was particularly strong in criticizing the NPT in any relevant forum.

11 In Argentina, international treaties have to be approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

12 Illustrative of the rather weak position taken by the Opposition are the words with which the written opinion of the minority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ended. After repeating all the traditional arguments against the NPT, the minority report concluded that `the right moment to approve the NPT has not arrived yet' - when the logical conclusion should have been to reject accession totally. National Congress, Chamber of Senators, Foreign Relations Committee, Minority Report, 14 October 1994.

13 Outside Congress, accession to the NPT did not produce strong reactions either. This lack of public debate was also somewhat surprising. Perhaps this sort of indifference was due to the economic difficulties affecting the Argentine people, together with a high rate of unemployment. People may thus have concerns more to do with daily problems than with issues of international policy. On the other hand, indefinite extension of the NPT was the subject of reservations in some quarters. The Argentine branch of Greenpeace produced a document which said: `Argentine participation (in the Extension Conference) should mean support for a limited extension of the Treaty, with periodic renewals associated with advances toward nuclear disarmament and with the establishment of a new and more severe non-proliferation régime. This idea is supported by a good number of non-nuclear parties to the NPT. If the Argentine position is in agreement with the plans of the nuclear powers to give an “indefinite extension” to the NPT, its accession would be only a formal step which would serve to endorse nuclear proliferation and the atomic terror that the countries participating in the nuclear race seek to maintain indefinitely'. Greenpeace Cono Sur, December 1994.

14 The Foreign Minister of Argentina explained also, in a few words, the reasons of the change of attitude in relation to the NPT: `Our accession to the NPT, after twenty-five years of its existence, is the result of a combination of factors which originated, on the one hand, in a clear perception of the new international situation, and, on the other, in a updating of the Argentine foreign policy, adapting it to the new international circumstances'. Statement by the Foreign Minister of Argentina in the April, 1995, plenary meeting of the Conference on the Extension and Review of the NPT. Text distributed by the Argentine Mission to the United Nations, pp. 1 and 3.