Impact of the Northern Tier on the Middle East

1 For views of other Iranian scholars see The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, a publication of the Tehran-based Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS).

2 Since the mid-1980s there has been a considerable inflow of Arab capital resources via the establishment of branches in Turkey of such financial institutions as Bank Mellat, Al Baraka-Turk, Kuwait-Turk, Faisal Finance and many others. According to Serif Egeli, Chairman of the Foreign Trade Association of Turkey, Turkish and Arab businessmen developed an important network of goodwill during the 1980s. (See Kemal Kirisci, `Turkey's Search for Security in the Middle East', Perceptions, Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, vol. 1, no. 1, March-May 1996, pp. 151-168.) Moreover, in the same period, millions of Arab tourists have, in a sense, invaded the big cities of Turkey, especially Istanbul, Bursa and Konya where one can still see traces of Ottoman Islam culture.

3 A political as well as a scientific discussion of these matters is reproduced, as an extract of a PhD dissertation in progress, by Aysegul Kibaroglu, `Prospects for Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin', in P. Howsam and R. C. Carter, eds, Water Policy: Allocation and Management in Practice, (London: E & FN Spon, 1996, forthcoming).

4 Interview with Özden Bilen, former Director of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) of Turkey.

5 Ebulfez Elcibey, the former pro-Turkish president of Azerbaijan, in his first interview with a Turkish reporter on September 18, 1995 (Hurriyet), criticized Turkey for not supporting him during the rebellion of Suret Huseinov which led to his deposition and eventual replacement by the pro-Russian Haidar Aliev, the current president of Azerbaijan. Elcibey said `Russia is simply a blown-up balloon... and Turkey must not be so timid in supporting the Turkic republics and must be in the forefront'. For details, see Robert Olson, `The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkey versus Russia since the Gulf War', Middle East Policy, vol. 4, no. 3, March 1996, pp. 106-118.

6 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States participated in the CSCE negotiations that took place within the framework of the Minsk Group. The function of the Group was to define the emergency measures required to ensure cessation of hostilities. Later, the Minsk Group monitored the ceasefire imposed by UN Security Council resolution 882, of which Turkey was a co-sponsor together with Russia and the United States.

7 Turkey encouraged and fully supported the formal applications of Turkic republics to these organizations in order to let them be either full-fledged or associate members. For extensive chronological coverage of Turkey's relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia, see Heinz Kramer, `Will Central Asia Become Turkey's Sphere of Influence?', Perceptions, March-May 1996, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 112-127.

8 BSEC project, which at the beginning did not receive much attention in the political circles, was reinvigorated following the demise of the Soviet Union. Several former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were invited to join the ranks of economic cooperation alongside the Russian Federation and the Balkan states such as Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. This cooperative arrangement was officially inaugurated in Istanbul, in June 1992.

9 A striking example is Russian President Boris Yeltsin's message on New Year's 1994: `We are committed and determined to protect Russian interests in the near abroad. Our fate and historical links make living apart impossible and people will never permit such a thing.' A simple documentation of similar declarations would require thesis-like studies. See, Anthony Hyman, `Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics', Conflict Studies, no. 273, August 1994, p. 24.

10 The world's largest proven resources of oil and natural gas are contained mostly within the territories of the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, namely Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Such multinational companies as the British Petroleum and Ramco of Great Britain; Amoco, Pennzoil, Unocal, and McDermott of the United States; Statoil of Norway; Delta-Nimir of Saudi Arabia; and the state oil company TPAO of Turkey are very interested in the socalled `deal of the century'. The deal of the century is considered one of the underlying causes of confrontation between Turkey and Russia. See Robert V. Barylski, `Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub', The Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 217-232.

11 In a trip to the Persian Gulf states in autumn 1994, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Defense Minister Grachev emphasized their desire to fulfill their obligations toward Iran in the areas of armament and nuclear energy exploitation. See, Mehrad Mohsenin, `Iran's Relations With Central Asia and the Caucasus', The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 834-853.

12 The protocol outlines a wide range of assistance including the supply of nuclear material, and training of approximately 500 Iranian technicians as well as some 20 graduate students and PhDs annually at Russian academic institutions, and cooperation in building low power research reactors for instructional purposes. Among a plethora of articles documenting the nuclear engagements of Iran see, for example, David Albright, `The Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal', The Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring - Summer 1995, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 49-51.

13 In a private conversation, during an international conference in Lund, Sweden in June 1995, Dr. Hadjihusseini of the IPIS told me that Iran was undergoing `serious economic crises since the drastic falls in the oil prices, and also suffering from a considerable decline in the generation of electrical energy'. Hence, according to Dr. Hadjihusseini, `Iran had no other option but to revitalize its Bushehr project, only for civilian purposes, in which already USD 4 billions have been spent'.

14 Beyond its limited mandate, the IAEA has no authority to conduct inspections in undeclared sites unless the host state gives permission for such inspections.

15 For an assessment of the relations of the states in the Middle East with the `superpowers' during the Cold War, see Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, `Turkey's Security and the Middle East', Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983, pp. 157-175.

16 In a visit to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Laos in December 1994, Alexander Vengrovski, deputy to Russia's state Duma, stated that most of the Islamic and Pacific Ocean states wished to prevent US pressure and influence in different parts of the world, and he mentioned Iran as a strong country whose political stability, especially during the Soviet crisis, would be beneficial to all. See Mohsenin, ibid.