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References
1.
1 This does not make the conflict in former Yugoslavia a religious conflict; strictly speaking it is a political conflict that utilizes religious and cultural differences among communities with a shared ethnicity. Cf. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (new edition, Penguin, 1993), p. 172.
2.
2 Cf. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia , pp. 32,42. For an account of the constitutional crisis which preceded the break-up, see Branka Magas, `Recent Political History of Yugoslavia,' Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1992 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1993), pp. 285-290; and Richard Iglar, `The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self Determination', Boston College International and Comparative Law Review , vol. 15, no. 1, 1992, pp. 213-39.
3.
3 The Fall of Yugoslavia , p. 19.
4.
4 Spelt as “Kosova” by the territory's ethnic Albanian majority.
5.
5 The 1981 census put the Albanians at 77.4% while Serbs made up 13.2%. Hivzi Islami, Demographic Reality in Kosova (Prishtina: Kosovo Information Centre, 1993), p. 31.
6.
6 See Keesing's Record of World Events 1991 , p. 38081.
7.
7 For details, see M. E. Salla, `The Nonviolent Struggle Continues,' International Journal of Nonviolence , vol. 1, no. 1 (1993), pp. 82-85.
8.
8 Gene Sharp refers to this as non-violent intervention where the aim is to obstruct the functioning of the targets of a non-violent campaign. The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 357-432.
9.
9 Kosovo Information Center, Albanian Democratic Movement in Former Yugoslavia: Documents: 1990-1993 (Prishtina, 1993), p. 6. Information in the following paragraphs on the elections is from the same source.
10.
10 For a more detailed discussion of Kosovo's parallel institutions than what follows, see M. E. Salla, “Ex-Yugoslavia's Forgotten Conflict - Nonviolence in Kosovo', Social Alternatives, vol. 14 , no. 3 (1995), pp. 37-40.
11.
11 Statistics and information concerning the parallel education system come from an interview with Abdyl Rama, Member of the Kosovo Assembly and member of the LDK Presidency, Prishtina, 26 December 1995. Statistics provided by the Humanitarian Law Centre confirm that 360,000 students attend 830 elementary schools and 62 secondary schools. There are seven post-secondary schools or colleges which cater for 1815 students, while 5875 attended 12 university departments. Spotlight Report No. 16: Kosovo Albanians II. (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre), 1995, p. 3.
12.
12 According to Kosovo Information Centre sources, 121,000 Albanians have been dismissed, from the 164,210 Albanians formerly employed by the state.
13.
13 Statistics supplied by Director of the Mother Theresa Foundation in an interview in Prishtina, 28 December 1995.
14.
14 See Spotlight Report No. 16, pp. 3-7.
15.
15 For demographic changes in Kosovo, see Islami, Demographic Reality in Kosova (Prishtina: Kosovo Information Centre, 1993), p. 31.
16.
16 This is part of a statutory decree issued by the governments of Serbia and Montenegro in January 1995. See Kosova Daily Report #532 (Prishtina, Kosovo Information Centre, 17 January 1995).
17.
17 See Submission to the 46th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (Prishtina, 1994), p. 5.
18.
18 Colin McIntyre, `Serb Crackdown on Kosovo Albanians Reported', Reuters, Prishtina, 14 June 1994.
19.
19 For statistics on subversion charges in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia more generally, see Spotlight: Report No. 16 , pp. 22-23.
20.
20 Interview with Sami Kurteshi, Executive Director for the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, Prishtina, 1994, p. 5.
21.
21 See Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: Police Violence against Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo Province (London, April 1994).
22.
22 Private interview in Prishtina, 27 December 1994.
23.
23 For a typology of different forms of non-violent action, see Ralph Summy, `Typology of Non-violent Politics', Australian Journal of Politics and History , vol. 31, no. 2, 1985, pp. 230-42. This is not to suggest that King's and Gandhi's followers shared their leaders' principled non-violence. Many recognized, as do Kosovo's Albanians, that organized violence was simply not a feasible option.
24.
24 For a definition of conflict that distinguishes between a conflict situation, attitudes and behaviour see Johan Galtung, `Conflict as a Way of Life', Essays in Peace Research., vol. III (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1978), pp. 484-507; and Christopher Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (Hampshire: Macmillan, [1981] 1989), pp. 15-17.
25.
25 Isolated instances of Albanians attacking police appear to be forms of retaliation for acts of police brutality, rather than politically motivated acts.
26.
26 See Reuter, `Yugoslav Output Down 10.1 pct', Belgrade, 17 May 1995.
27.
27 `Principles of Nonviolent Action: The Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis' Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), pp. 13-34.
28.
28 `Direct dependency' refers to a dependency that the target of a non-violent campaign has upon non-violent actionists. See Ralph Summy, `Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent', pp. 169-74 in Michael Salla, Walter Tonetto and Enrique Martinez, eds, Essays on Peace: Paradigms for Global Order (Rockhampton, Queensland: Central Queensland University Press, 1995)
29.
29 For discussion of various petititions highlighting dominant Serb perceptions, see Branko Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 49-52.
30.
30 Keesing's Record of World Events 1988 , p. 35796.
31.
31 Some of these figures included the mayor of Belgrade, Zivana Olbina; the editor-in-chief of the Belgrade television service, Mihajlo Eric; and the director of the Politika publishing house, Ivan Stojanovic. For further details and an account of Milosevic's rise to political power, see Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia , pp. 31-61.
32.
32 Ibid., pp. 39, 68. Glenny goes on to point out, however, that after first appearing as a nationalist ideologue prepared to use whatever means necessary to further the `Serbian nation', Draskovic has `revealed a genuine commitment to dialogue for solving constitutional and political problems'.
33.
33 Spotlight Report No. 16 , p. 31
34.
34 For criticism of the decision to bestow recognition on Slovenia and Croatia, and of the role of Germany and Austria, see Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 52.
35.
35 See Jan Oberg, `Conflict Mitigation in the Former Yugoslavia', in Michael Salla et al., Essays on Peace , p. 118.