Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe

1 See David S. Yost, Nuclear Weapons Issues in France, in: John C. Hopkins, Weixin Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China (San Diego, CA: IGCC Publications, 1994) p. 40.

2 See Malcolm Rifkind, `The British Defense Strategy: What Role for Nuclear Weapons?', Speech delivered at the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, 16 November 1993.

3 See, for instance, the most recent party platform of the governing Christian Democratic Union.

4 In February 1995 a diplomatic initiative by the German government to convince the still hesitant members of the United Nations to agree to the indefinite extension of the NPT was strongly supported by the Social Democatic opposition.

5 For one of the few critics of that position see Uwe Nerlich, Toward a New Nuclear Weapons Regime (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993).

6 Indications for these concerns are, for instance, the US decision not to export even small amounts of weapons-grade nuclear material for a German research reactor, or the scepticism on the French and British side when Germany joined the Western efforts to provide technical assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons in the CIS.

7 There were reports in early 1992 of a leaked draft of a US Defense Planning Guidance document that implied that Germany might choose to seek nuclear weapons. See David S. Yost, Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, CSTS, 1993), p. 17.

8 It is worth noting that at the same time Germany was urged by its allies to leave its `observer status' in world politics and to show more international responsibility by permitting its armed forces to take part in combat operations beyond NATO's traditional boundaries. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, `The German Bundeswehr in out-of-Area operations: to engage or not to engage', in The World Today, vol. 49 (August-September 1993), p. 165.

9 It should be recalled that it was a German request to the United States to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, indirectly formulated by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his famous speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in 1977. When it came to a US-Soviet agreement on the withdrawal of these weapons in 1987, it was Germany that was most concerned about these nuclear reductions.

10 See Richard Hart Sinnreich, `NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma', Orbis, vol. 19 (Summer 1975).

11 Reprinted in Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit (Documentation on Disarmament and Security), vol. 1 (Bonn: Siegler 1966), p. 79.

12 It is worth noting that Great Britain was excluded from this project. For more details see Peter Fischer, `Das Projekt einer trilateralen Nuklearkooperation' (The Project of a Trilateral Nuclear Cooperation), in Historisches Jahrbuch (München: Alber, 1992) pp. 143-156. See also the memoirs of the former German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Strauß, Erinnerungen (Memoirs) (Berlin: Siedler, 1989) p. 313.

13 See Robert E. Osgood, The Case for the MLF: A Critical Evaluation (Washington DC: The Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1964), p. 37.

14 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., US Secretary of the Treasury, proposed a plan in 1945 for dividing Germany into several small de-industrialized agrarian states. Such a `pastoralization' would, he argued, prevent Germany from becoming once again a threat to the United States.

15 Parallel to signature, the German government published two documents on the NPT-an official note and a declaration - in which particular German interpretations of the NPT were codified. Reprinted in Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit (Documentation on Disarmament and Security), vol. 7 (Bonn: Siegler 1969), pp. 427-428.

16 A draft version of the German NPT declaration mentioned above contained an explicit reference to the nuclear components of a Western European defence. For political reasons, this reference was dropped in July 1968 by the German Inter-Ministerial Working Staff. See Mathias Küntzel, Bonn & the Bomb (London: Pluto Press 1995), p. 123.

17 See Helga Haftendorn, Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik (Politics of Disarmament and Détente) (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann 1974), p. 180.

18 The US Administration had assured Germany that an all-European federal state would not be bound by the NPT. This was implicitly stated in the declaration by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in a Senate hearing on the NPT on 10 July 1968. See Europa-Archiv, vol. 25, no. 1, 1970, p. d5.

19 For such a line of argument see Küntzel, Bonn & the Bomb, p. 166.

20 According to a close observer, Carte Blanche stirred the German press and the Bundestag more than any previous manoeuvre involving nuclear weapons, or any statement on the atomic defence of Europe. See Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War (New York: Row, Peterson & Company, 1957), p. 182.

21 After harsh protest by the US military and by the European allies, the `Radford Plan' was finally cancelled.

22 See the fundamental study by Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983).

23 For an authoritative source see Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983).

24 See Karl-Heinz Kamp, Die nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen der NATO 1945-1991: Strategie und Politik (NATO's Short-Range Nuclear Forces 1945-1991: Strategy and Politics), (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 1993).

25 According to the results of the referendum of November 1994, Norway will not join the EU as originally scheduled.

26 For an advocate of a more existential model see Frederic Bozo, `A West European Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Issues', in Thomas J. Marshall & Jérome Paolini, (eds), What Future for Nuclear Forces in International Security? (Paris: IFRI, 1992), p. 81. For the traditional view see Roberto Zadra, European Integration and Nuclear Deterrence After the Cold War, Chaillot Papers no. 5 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1992), p. 29.

27 One of the few exceptions: Florian Gerster & Michael Hennes, `Minimalabschreckung durch die Kernwaffen Englands und Frankreichs' (Minimum Deterrence with Great Britain's and France's Nuclear Forces) in Europaeische Wehrkunde, vol. 34 (August 1990), p. 443.

28 It was France, now one of the major advocates of a European nuclear deterrent, which rejected the idea of extended deterrence right from the beginning. From the French perspective, nuclear weapons were only suitable to protect the nation which had the full command and control over the weapons. (`La nucléaire ne se partage pas'). However, there are signs that the French position is going to change.

29 A recent example is the performance of the European Union in the war on the Balkans which came down to a minimalist approach as the `lowest common denominator', limited by and large to humanitarian aspects. See Michael Brenner, `The EC in Yugoslavia: A Debut Performance', in Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 1992, p. 586.

30 See on this issue the fundamental analysis by Robert E. Osgood, NATO - the Entangling Alliance, (Chicago, IL:: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

31 In that sense US nuclear commitments, combined with the regime of nuclear nonproliferation, have been intended to freeze the given distribution of nuclear weapons, and to firmly and formally render NATO into an alliance of nuclear unequals.

32 `Let me remind you that Russia has little prospect of returning to the kind of conventional force structure that they had at the height of the Cold War due to the collapse of their economy and the change in their political situation. It is a less expensive and less demanding matter for them to return to a much more aggressive nuclear posture. If something goes wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge.' John Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, comments at press conference, news release by the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 22 September 1994, p. 7.

33 This holds particularly true for Germany, where there has been hardly any controversy on Germany's European course between Government and Social Democratic opposition.

34 See David S. Yost, Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons, p. 17.

35 It is telling that in the new White Paper of the German Ministry of Defence, European Nuclear Cooperation is not even mentioned.

36 Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, The Franco-German Corps and the Future of European Security: Implications for US Policy, (Washington DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1992), p. 2.

37 One of the `unknowns' is the question whether Germany will in future perceive even a `residual threat' in Europe that needs to be contained by nuclear forces. In an - admittedly most unlikely - scenario of a comprehensive democratization of the European continent with successful institutions and structures of collective security, the importance of the nuclear question would decrease significantly. If a contrasting long-term scenario should materialize, ending up in a nuclear-armed Ukraine and in a significant increase in nuclear weapons states all around the globe, the German position towards nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence might be completely different. However, this would require a fundamental change in German perceptions on nuclear weapons.

38 According to a public poll in Germany conducted by the American RAND-Corporation, only 14% of the Germans wanted their country to have its own nuclear capability. See Wall Street Journal, 16 February 1993.

39 For advocacy of that concept see Karl Kaiser, `From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control', in Survival, vol. 32, no. 6 (November/December) 1990.

40 It is worth noting that the perception of nuclear instabilities in the former Soviet Union with respect to the disposal of the nuclear legacy of the Cold War (nuclear smuggling, nuclear terrorism etc.) has kindled public interest in Germany in the issue of safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear forces, but it has not fuelled a German interest in European nuclear cooperation.