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References
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1 Published in NPT/CONF.1995/32 Final Document (Part I) as /DEC.3 and presented to the Conference by the President as NPT/CONF.1995/L.6. Reproduced in Security Dialogue , vol. 26, no. 2, 1995, pp. 235-238.
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2 Published in NPT/CONF.1995/32 Final Document (Part I) as /DEC.1 and presented to the Conference by the President as NPT/CONF.1995/L.4. Reproduced in Security Dialogue , vol. 26, no. 2, 1995, pp. 235-238.
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3 Published in NPT/CONF.1995/32 Final Document (Part I) as /DEC.2 and presented to the Conference by the President as NPT/CONF.1995/L.5. Reproduced in Security Dialogue , vol. 26, no. 2, 1995, pp. 235-238.
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4 Published in NPT/CONF.1995/32 Final Document (Part I) as /RES.1 and presented to the Conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 sponsored by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Reproduced in Security Dialogue , vol. 26, no. 2, 1995, pp. 235-238.
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5 NPT/CONF.1995/L.2
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6 This set of objectives is very similar to that described by Jonathan Dean, mainly in the bilateral Russian Federation-United States context, as `neutralization'. `The neutralization of nuclear weapons would consist of actions by all states with nuclear arsenals to irreversible reduce their arsenals to a minimum number and to render this remnant unusable for surprise attack by separating warheads from delivery systems and placing them both under international monitoring on the territory of the owner state.' Washington Quarterly , vol. 17, no. 4, Autumn 1994, p. 32.
