Entry into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention

1 Conference on Disarmament, `The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction', Document no. CD/1170, 3 September 1992.

2 47 UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/39 (30 November 1992).

3 SIPRI Yearbook 1993 World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 732.

4 In chronological order of ratification those states are Fiji, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sweden, Norway, Australia, Albania, Maldives and the Cook Islands. A current listing of the states which have signed the CWC (including an indication of ratifying states) is provided in Appendix 1.

5 The PrepCom consists of a Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) and member-states, which are all states having signed the Convention. Each member state has one representative in the PrepCom who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The function of the PrepCom is to establish the infrastructure of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW - the new organization which will administer the CWC after the Convention enters into force) and to develop procedures for the CWC's implementation. The PrepCom will continue until the conclusion of the first Conference of States Parties, which is to be convened no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Convention.

6 For example, at the Seventh Plenary meeting of the PrepCom on 27 June 1994, it was suggested by one delegation that the delay in the ratification by such a large number of signatories was a consequence of unresolved issues within the PrepCom.

7 For example, see J.P. Perry Robinson, `The CWC - One Year Later', The ASA Newsletter, no. 94-1, February 1994.

8 At one stage, there were suggestions in The Hague that the USA and members of the European Community would not deposit their instruments of ratification until the Russian Federation had ratified. However, the recent ratifications by Germany and Spain as well as the anticipated imminent ratification of the USA discredit this suggestion.

9 R.J. Mathews & A. Taubman, `Preparing for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Progress During 1993' in J.B. Poole & R. Guthrie, eds, Verification 1994 (London: Brassey's Ltd, 1994) p. 111.

10 Article I(1) of the Convention imposes this obligation and states that: `Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons; (c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

11 Although extra-territorial requirements are not common in multilateral treaties, the criminal justice systems of most states include legislation which has an extra-territorial effect and international law has long recognized nationality as a valid basis for domestic jurisdiction.

12 The CWC contains the details of managed access which allow the inspected State Party to impose certain limitations on the scope and activities of the challenge inspection.

13 The CWC establishes the verification regimes for specified chemicals (in three distinct categories) and for the facilities which produce them. For more details about the verification regimes see R. J. Mathews, `Verification of Chemical Industry Under the Chemical Weapons Convention', in J.B. Poole & R. Guthrie, eds, Verification 1993: Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the Environment (London: VERTIC, 1993), p. 41.

14 That is what Australia has chosen to do, for example. Sections 86-89 of the Australian Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994 refer to the new Chemical Weapons Convention Office but indicate that the body will be designated by Ministerial decision.

15 For a more detailed discussion of the requirements and functions of the National Authority, see H. Fox and R. J. Mathews, `The Future Chemical Weapons Convention and its National Implementation', in J. B. Poole and R. Guthrie, eds, Verification Report 1992 (London: VERTIC, 1992), p. 173.

16 It is our view that for many small States with no chemical weapons and no declarable chemical industry, an individual governmental official with access to the appropriate expertise of other officials on an `on-call' basis may well be sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the National Authority.

17 See Article VIII(48)-(51) and Part II, Section B of the Verification Annex of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

18 All Member States of the UN Organization, for example, are obligated under Article 105 of the UN Charter to extend privileges and immunities to the Organization. Australia's generic legislation on this issue is the Privileges and Immunities (International Organisations) Act, 1963 (as amended 1982).

19 The CWC establishes a detailed regime for the regulation of the transfer of chemicals to both states parties and non-states parties. For more details about the regime see R. J. Mathews, `Verification of Chemical Industry Under the Chemical Weapons Convention', in J.B. Poole & R. Guthrie, eds, Verification 1993: Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the Environment, 1993, p. 41.

20 Australia's export controls on goods and technology are covered by the Customs Act 1901 through the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations. These regulations will be amended to incorporate the CWC's requirements.

21 In Australia, ratification of treaties is an act of the executive arm of Government and is not dependent upon approval by Parliament.

22 That is, within three years after entry into force for the State Party - see NPT Article III.4.

23 A summary of the major multilateral arms control agreements is contained in the relevant sections of the SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 759-791.

24 However, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) required states parties which possessed biological weapons and related facilities to either destroy them or convert them to peaceful purposes within nine months after entry into force.

25 A view shared by others, including J.P. Perry Robinson, `The CWC - One Year Later', The ASA Newsletter, no. 94-1, February 1994.

26 Chemical Weapons Bulletin, no. 24, June 1994, p. 8.

27 Chemical Weapons Bulletin, no. 23, March 1994, p. 21.

28 Various PrepCom activities have been initiated to promote effective implementation. Initiatives under PTS auspices include a National Trial Inspection Seminar, Chemical Industry Meetings, a National Implementation Seminar, and a number of Regional Seminars (in, inter alia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, South East Asia and Africa). The PTS has also been consulting with non-member states (that is, those states yet to sign the Convention). External initiatives welcomed by the PTS have extended to regional consultations, legal analysis, industry consultations, and other scholarly input by individual governments and non-governmental organizations, including the Australian Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative, the `Kellman Group' of International Legal Experts, the Harvard Sussex CBW Programme and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).