The Eighteenth Brumaire of Boris Yeltsin

1 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 11th Printing (New York: International Publishers, 1987 [1852]).

2 By juxtaposing these two historical figures I do not mean to suggest that Yeltsin's social position and legacy can be equated with those of Louis Bonaparte's. Neither do I mean to suggest that the economic lessons from 19th century France can be directly applied to the current revolution in Russia. The point of comparison is confined to the lessons of the relationship between nascent capitalist and democratic developments.

3 Herein lies the materialist thread: Russia's new material productive forces came into conflict with the existing Soviet relations of production.

4 Debt is not the only indicator of international influence. Foreign direct investment is also a force: several heavy industry, chemical and metallurgical firms have been purchased directly bought up by foreign capital.

5 In January 1991, Russia (in effect) began to default on repayments, so this is the usual cut-off period for dividing Russia's current and old debts.

6 Figures in this paragraph are from Quentin Peel & Tracy Corrigan, `Bankers to Discuss Debt Rescheduling', Financial Times, 24 September 1993.

7 This battle for the soul of the new Russian marketplace is probably the most important, yet least understood, struggle in Russia today. Nor are the interests between international and domestic capital necessarily conflictual, as I have suggested. If we assume the interests of domestic capital overlap with those of the Russian mafia, and if a single mob organization can come to dominate over large segments of Russian territory, it could easily be more efficient than any Russian state at securing stability and lowering transaction costs. The interest of international capital could multiply and prosper in such a market. It is only when national/mafia interests are themselves divided (along territorial and sectoral lines), often breaking out in open conflict, that international capital becomes squeamish.

8 See John Lloyd & Leyla Boulton, `Iron Fist and an Iron Glove', Financial Times, 15 September 1993. There they suggested that Ruslan Khasbulatov's insult concerning the drinking habits of the President was `crucial' to Yeltsin's storming of the Parliament.

9 See John Lloyd, `President Ready to Fight Election Next June', Financial Times, 24 September 1993.

10 See John Lloyd, `Days of Whine and Poses', Financial Times, 23 September 1993.

11 See Serge Schmemann, `Confusing Times for Russian Legislators', International Herald Tribune, 27 September 1993.

12 See, for example, Edward Mortimer, `West's Best Bet', Financial Times, 29 September 1993.

13 The problems of polling in Western countries are well documented. Polling figures cannot be substituted for electoral counts with any degree of certainty. The problems associated with polling in a revolutionary situation must be astronomical. For example, a recent (post-coup) poll by the Public Opinion Foundation in Moscow found nearly 20% of its 1600 sample-set unwilling to answer whether or not they supported the President. See `The Battle for Russia', The Economist, 9 October 1993, p. 27.

14 Generally, journalistic impressions refer back to the referendum in April, where 67% of those who voted answered Yes to the question, `Do you think it necessary to have early parliamentary elections?' See `All or Nothing', The Economist, 25 September 1993. However, none of the April questions asked whether voters preferred a dictatorial coup and the unilateral dissolution of Parliament. In the light of this fairly significant event, I would think that most observers would be somewhat wary of reading in too much democratic support for presidential powers.

15 This argument is probably the most common. It is also the most baffling. Mass support has never been a key ingredient in previous Russian political struggles. The Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 by mobilizing a few thousand soldiers and armed workers. Contrary to many recent recollections of the event, most Muscovites did not participate in the abortive coup attempt of August 1991. Estimates put the figure at 30,000 people — less than half of one percent of Moscow's population. For that matter, 15,000 people took to the streets in Moscow to support Rutskoi on 3 October 1993. Estimates of support for the recent dispute had supporters of Alexander Rutskoi representing 0.5% of Moscow's population; supporters of Yeltsin representing 1.5%. Considering the fear-factor associated with supporting the former, and the Russian media bias in support of the latter, surely this difference must be insignificant. Figures from Michael Dobbs, `Yelsin: A Democrat Like His Society, With a Long Way to Go', International Herald Tribune, 27 September 1993.

16 See Peter M. Johansen, `På diktat fra pengefondet' [Dictated by the IMF], Klassekampen, (Oslo) 24 September 1993.

17 See Peter Norman, `IMF Chief Urges West to Give Financial Support', Financial Times, 24 September 1993.

18 The following debt figures are from Quentin Peel & Tracy Corrigan, `Bankers to Discuss...'.

19 Ibid.

20 See Peter M. Johansen, `På diktat...'

21 See John Lloyd & Leyla Boulton, `Yeltsin Wins Support for Abolition of Parliament', Financial Times, 23 September 1993.

22 Ibid.

23 See Anders Åslund, `Gradualism Has Proven Ineffective in Russia, Financial Times, 12 April 1994.

24 See John Lloyd & Leyla Boulton, `Yeltsin Wins Support...'.

25 The tension between representative democracy and market reform was even reflected in the campaigning style of the market-based reformist party, Russia's Choice. Anders Åslund explained the dilemma in the following paradoxical terms: `No democratic party identified the people as its target group. They lectured people like old-style communists' (Quoted in `The road to ruin', The Economist, 29 January 1994, p. 27). Only Vladimir Zhirinovsky seemed to have campaigned with an eye (and an ear) to the interests of the public.

26 See John Lloyd, `Gaidar Quits Russian Government', Financial Times, 17 January 1994.

27 They are: Anatoly Chubais (privatization), Alexander Shokhin (economy), Sergei Shakhrai (regional and national issues) and Andrei Kozyrev (foreign affairs). In May, 1994, Shakhrai was dismissed from his post as nationalities minister.

28 Figures from `Inflation in Russia Slows to 15-month low of 8.7%', International Herald Tribune, 5 April 1994.

29 See Anders Åslund, `Gradualism Has Proved Ineffective in Russia'.

30 See John Lloyd, `The Conversion of Mr. Chernomyrdin', Financial Times, 18 March 1994.

31 See John Lloyd, `Yeltsin aide Wants Pledge to the IMF Relaxed', Financial Times, 4 May 1994.

32 See Leyla Boulton, `Yeltsin Acts to Stimulate Russia's Economic Reform', Financial Times, 24 May 1994.

33 See Alan Friedman, `Capital Flight From Russia is Escalating', International Herald Tribune, 14 January 1994; and Peter Norman, `Russia External Needs This Year Put at $34bn', Financial Times, 25 April 1994.

34 See John Lloyd, `Political Uncertainty Leaves the Rouble without a Prop', Financial Times, 20 January 1994.

35 See Jeffrey Sachs & Charles Wyplosz in `How the West Should Help Russian Reform', Financial Times, 11 January 1994.

36 See Serge Schmemann, `Confusing Times...'.