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References
1.
1 Secession, the most radical form of separatism, is a unilateral and opposed act seeking complete independence for a region which constitutes metropolitan territory of a sovereign independent state. See Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 1. For two seminal works on secession from a legal and moral perspective respectively see: Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1978); and Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
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2 For such findings see Alexis Heraclides, `Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement', International Organization , vol. 44, no. 3, 1990, pp. 341-378, especially pp. 370-373.
3.
3 Istvan Kende, `Twenty-Five Years of Local Wars”, Journal of Peace Research , vol.8, 1971, pp. 5-22; Astri Suhrke & Lela Garner Noble, `Introduction', in Astri Suhrke & Lela Garner Noble, eds, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977); Heraclides, `Secessionist Minorities', pp. 341-78.
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4 See e.g. James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 89-113, 215-228, Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Rupert Emerson, `Self-Determination', American Journal of International Law , vol. 65, 1971, pp. 459-475; Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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5 On the role of peace-keeping in areas of the former Soviet Union see Pavel K. Baev, `Peace-Keeping as a Challenge to European Borders', Security Dialogue , vol. 24, no. 2, 1993, pp. 137-150, esp. pp. 140-145.
6.
6 Note that in previous decades this was not the dominant international attitude as to federations, such as with Congo-Leopoldville (Zaire) and Katanga and Nigeria-Eastern Region (Biafra), nor indeed East Pakistan. Furthermore, only three federations provided for a constitutional right of secession, that of the Soviet Union, more tentatively, of Yugoslavia and the Union of Burma between 1947-1974.
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7 The European Union's stance, based on the Badinter Committee, was that uti possidetis should apply. On the right of secession for units of federations see Dietrich Murswiek, `The Issue of a Right of Secession - Reconsidered', in Christian Tomuschat, ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), especially pp. 32-34.
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8 Buchheit, Secession . See also Heraclides The Self-Determination of Minorities , pp. 29-30.
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9 Christian Tomuschat, `Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World', in Christian Tomuschat, ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination , p. 9. See also in the same vein: Buchheit, Secession , p. 17 and passim; Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 168; Alexis Heraclides, `Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis', Journal of International Affairs , vol. 45, no. 2, 1992, pp. 409-412.
10.
10 Murswiek, `The Issue of Secession', pp. 36-37.
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11 Following several other similar attempts at a normative definition of ethnic or national minority we would suggest the following ingredients: (a) self-definition and wanting to retain the separate identity; (b) external discernible characteristics of difference which acquire the status of symbols of the distinctiveness; (c) non-dominant status, notably in the political and cultural spheres (its culture not being the dominant culture); (d) small numerical minority by comparison to the rest of the population, that is less than 10%; (e) sizeable; and (f) indigenous. Among the most problematic factors is the minimum number or percentage needed. Compact habitation is essential when it comes to the enjoyment of some minority rights, such as schools teaching in their mother tongue.
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12 Such as Buchheit, Secession ; Buchanan, Secession , (both passim).
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13 For the consepts of `acceptance' and `denial' in the context of ethno-national conflict see Alexis Heraclides, `Conflict Resolution, Ethnonationalism and the Middle East Impasse', Journal of Peace Research , vol. 26, no. 2, 1989, pp. 197-212, esp. pp. 198-199.
14.
14 For a `right to autonomy or self-government' or a `federal right of self-determination' see Tomuschat, `Self-Determination', pp. 13-15; Otto Kimminich, `A “Federal” Right of Self-Determination?', in Tomuschat, ed., pp. 83-100. Asbjorn Eide, `In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession', in Tomuschat, ed., pp. 170-73. For a related subject, the internal aspect of self-determination, see Allan Rosas, `Internal Self-Determination', in Tomuschat, ed., pp. 225-252.
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15 Note that changes of frontiers can only be based on peaceful means and agreement between the states concerned. See Principle I of the Helsinki Final Act (August 175), p. 78 (in English text). Furthermore transfrontier links and cooperation are aimed at promoting friendly relations. See CSCE Helsinki Document 1992. The Challenges of Change (July 1992), p. 61.
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16 For more details see Heraclides `Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention', pp. 410-15.
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17 On the problematique of preserving cultures via secession, see Buchanan, pp. 7 & 52-64.
18.
18 For details of this variable see Heraclides, `Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention', pp. 413-14. On similar lines see Buchheit, pp. 228-238.
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19 See on this question Buchanan, pp. 34-35 & 56; Jean Salmon, `Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination: Toward a Democratic Legitimacy Principle', in Tomuschat, ed., p. 260.
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20 As Buchanan argues, the burden in this case is on the state to prove that secession will cause harm in the moral sense, human misery and deprivation of fundamental rights and freedoms to third parties. See Buchanan, pp. 30-31.
21.
21 Tomuschat, pp. 18-19. Kimminich, `A “Federal” Right', p. 96-97; Salmon, `Internal Aspects', pp. 277-278. For scepticism regarding such a role for the international community see Benedict Kingsbury, `Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law', Cornell International Law Journal , vol. 25, no. 3, 1992, pp. 511-12.
22.
22 For these mechanisms see Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), especially pp. 12, 18-19, 77-80, 85-89, 100-105.
23.
23 On such solutions see Salmon, `Internal Aspects', pp. 277-278. Note that in the course of the Moscow Meeting on the human dimension of the CSCE (September-October 1991) a proposal had been made by Germany (and supported mainly by the United Kingdom and Greece) to halt normal relations with states that flagrantly violate human rights. On this see Alexis Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972-1992 (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 161-162.
24.
24 For details see Heraclides, `Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention', pp. 415-19.
25.
25 On such an approach see John Burton, Dear Survivors...Planning after Nuclear Holocaust (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), pp. 16-18, 64-74.
