The 1995 NPT Conference

1 If a vote was taken in the early part of the conference, either during or after the delivery of plenary speeches by Foreign Ministers, it could occur with them present. Their collective decision to extend the Treaty would enhance the status and authority of both the NPT and the extension decision in the eyes of the world. It would also mean that individuals with considerable plenipotentiary powers would be present while the decision was being taken, thus obviating the need to refer changes of national position to capitals and possibly make it easier to reach a decision involving the minimum of dissent.

2 It is probable that a majority of states can be assembled to vote for the option of an indefinite extension. However, this knowledge may also enable those opposed to this option to maximize the vote against it, as some states may feel free to engage in `tactical voting' against this option, secure in the knowledge that an extension will occur despite their negative vote. An attempt to take the decision by consensus would be preferable if it were seen to demonstrate the underlying support for the Treaty. However, it seems likely that such a procedure would be possible only if it was incorporated in the Final Document. This would open the door to states demanding trade-offs between the wording of that document and support for the duration option which had majority support. Since agreement on such wording may be impossible to obtain, complete consensus on an extension option is unlikely to be achievable by adopting this path, but it could minimize the number of states seen to be opposed to the duration option eventually chosen. This is why adopting this route may mean that procedural and substantive issues would become inextricably intertwined.

3 For a detailed analysis of these and other procedural issues confronting the NPT conference, see George Bunn, Charles Van Doren & David Fischer, `Options and Opportunities: the NPT Extension Conference of 1995', PPNN Study, no. 2 (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies for PPNN, 1991).

4 The 1995 NPT conference is scheduled to last from 17 April-12 May, and will have been preceded by four separate meetings of its Preparatory Committee, or PrepCom. PrepComs took place in New York from 10-14 May 1993 and 17-21 January 1994. Further meetings will be held in Geneva from 12-16 September 1994 and in New York from 23-27 January 1995. These PrepCom meetings are intended to settle outstanding procedural issues. The conference itself will consist of three sequential elements: a period of 5-10 working days in which heads of delegation make formal opening statements in plenary session; a period of 5-10 working days in which the conference will split up into several `main committees', which may meet simultaneously, to negotiate the language of the elements of a report on the implementation of the Treaty; and a final period of 5-7 working days when a drafting committee, the `Friends of the President' and other ad hoc groups will attempt to agree on an integrated text of this report, usually called the Final Document.

5 For a brief description of the NPT review conferences of 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 and the Final Documents produced by some of them see J. Ginnifer, `The NPT and its review conferences' in D. Howlett and J. Simpson, eds, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Reference Handbook, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 23-28 and pp. 331-360. On individual review conferences see relevant chapters in the SIPRI Yearbook for 1976 and 1981 (London: Taylor and Francis for SIPRI), pp. 363-392 and 297-362 respectively; and the SIPRI Yearbook for 1986 and 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 469-494 and 555-584 respectively.

6 It can be convincingly argued, however, that other language in the NPT does commit the non-nuclear weapon states not to provide such assistance, and that this point is purely academic. But the absence of such a specific commitment is, to the purist, one of the flaws in the text of the Treaty, and constitutes an argument for seeking to amend or renegotiate it.

7 For texts relevant to these issues see Howlett & Simpson, 1992, pp. 281-288.