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References
1.
1 For an example of this type of reassessment, see David J. Myers, ed., Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991).
2.
2 See, for instance, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, & Laurence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
3.
3 See, for instance, Adam Meyerson, `Brave new hemisphere: Latin America's democratic renaissance', Policy Review no. 32 (Spring 1985): pp. 24-27.
4.
4 For an excellent discussion of `imperial overstretch', see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).
5.
5 For a good illustration of this populist phenomenon, see Gamaliel Perruci, Jr., & Steven E. Sanderson, `Presidential Succession, Economic Crisis, and Populist Resurgence in Brazil', Studies in Comparative International Development no. 24 (Fall 1989): pp. 30-50.
6.
6 Augusto Varas, `Civil-Military Relations in a Democratic Framework', in Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S. R. Mendelson, & Juan Rial, eds, The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America , (Lexington, MA.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), p. 212. The most recent events in Guatemala illustrate the power of the military in shaping the democratic process. When President Jorge Serrano Elías announced in late May 1993 that he was dissolving the Congress and suspending the constitution, his seizure of power seemed to have strong military backing. But after a few days following this self-coup, the military switched sides and ousted President Serrano. See Tim Golden, `Guatemala's Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face', The New York Times , 3 June 1993, p. A3.
7.
7 See, for instance, Jorge Boaventura, `A Doutrina de Segurança Nacional', in Eliézer Risso de Oliveira, ed., Militares: Pensamento e Ação Política (Campinas, Brazil: Papirus, 1987), pp. 45-51.
8.
8 For good reference sources on these and other developing countries, see Edward A. Kolodziej & Robert E. Harkavy, eds, Security Policies of Developing Countries (Lexington, MA.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982); James Everett Katz, ed., Arms Production in Developing Countries (Lexington, MA.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984); and James Everett Katz, ed., The Implications of Third World Military Industrialization (Lexington, MA.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986).
9.
9 Successful military industrialization in Europe shattered the US monopoly over Latin America's arms procurement policy. The race for more sophisticated military fighter aircraft is an excellent example of the United States' weakened position in the region during the late 1960s. For two decades (1950s and 1960s), the United States had attempted to keep Latin America from `breaching the supersonic barrier'. Peru's 1968 purchase of the supersonic Mirage 5 from France undermined US arms control policy toward Latin America.
10.
10 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, 1990 Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 248.
11.
11 For a good review of the Inter-American security system, see George Fauriol, ed., Security in the Americas (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989).
12.
12 In the more extreme case, the Brazilian military regime canceled in 1977 the military assistance agreement it had signed after World War II. See Clóvis Rossi, `Denúncia é resposta às pressões dos EUA', O Estado do S. Paulo , 12 March 1977, p. 13.
13.
13 For instance, Southern Cone countries have been involved since 1991 in the development of a common market, called Mercosur, to be in place by January 1996. See James Brooke, `Free Trade Fatefully Near For Paraguay's “Hong Kong” ', The New York Times , 25 March 1991, p. A1.
14.
14 Brazil and Argentina, for instance, in 1985 signed the Iguaçu Declaration, under which Presidents Raul Alfonsin and José Sarney committed their respective countries to develop nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful ends. See Isaac Caro G., America Latina y el Caribe en el Mundo Militar (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, 1988), p. 37. In 1985-86, several high-level meetings between Chile and Peru took place during which both sides sought arms reduction.
15.
15 Neves died before taking office, and his vice-president (José Sarney) went on to serve a full term, despite controversies about his association with the party that had been in power during the military regime.
16.
16 In Chile, the Pinochet regime hung on to power until the last possible minute before handing it over in March 1990 to a civilian government. Paraguay remains the only South American country still controlled by a military government. General Andrés Rodríguez seized power in 1989 from General Alfredo Stroessner, who had held the reins since 1954. A new constitution was drafted, and presidential elections were scheduled for 1993.
17.
17 Honduras was responsible for introducing in 1975 the first high-performance jet aircraft into Central America (the Super-Mystère B-2 fighters from France). Its air superiority prompted El Salvador to launch a major expansion of its armed forces in 1977. See Harold P. Klepak, Security Considerations and Verification of a Central American Arms Control Regime , Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers, no. 5 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, August 1990), pp. 17-18.
18.
18 As quoted in Kasey Vannett, `Central Am summit focuses on social issues', Times of the Americas , 25 December 1991, p. 1.
19.
19 Stable defense expenditures are contrasted with a precipitous decline in major weapons imports since 1982 with the onset of the `debt crisis'. Foreign exchange scarcity has limited foreign weapons consumption in all the major militaries in Latin America. For data on specific countries' military expenditures, see SIPRI's 1990 Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 195. For data on specific countries' imports of major weapons, see SIPRI's 1990 Yearbook , pp. 250-251.
20.
20 One of the detained coup leaders in Venezuela was quoted as saying that the military rebellion sought to `rescue the Venezuelan people from politicians, from demagoguery and bureaucracy'. As quoted in `Venezuela Crushes Army Coup Attempt', The New York Times , 5 February 1992, p. A6.
21.
21 James Brooke, `Marxist Revolt Grows Strong in the Shantytowns of Peru', The New York Times , 11 November 1991, p. A1.
22.
22 In a widely circulated memorandum to President Bush, Former President Richard Nixon expressed concern that the United States was not taking the steps necessary to secure the democratic transition in Russia. In Nixon's view, failure of the current reforms could bring back despotism that might prove more dangerous than the Communist threat was during the Cold War. See William Safire, `The New Despotism', The New York Times , 12 March 1992.
23.
23 In responding to Nixon's memo, President Bush cited his own budgetary limitations on expanding foreign aid at a time of domestic economic hardship. See Thomas L. Friedman, `Bush Cites Limits on Aid to Russia', The New York Times , 12 March 1992, p. A1.
24.
24 Ricardo Balthazar, `Fábricas de armas estão falidas', O Estado de S. Paulo , 8 December 1991, p. 5.
25.
25 Estimate from Thomas Scheetz, `Military expenditures in Argentina, Chile and Peru', in Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, eds, The Economics of Defense Spending: An International Survey (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 242.
