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References
1.
1 All figures as of 31 October 1993.
2.
2 Inis L Claude, Jr., `Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', International Organisation vol. 20, no. 3, 1966, p.367.
3.
3 Ibid, p.368. [Our italics.]
4.
4 See Ramesh Thakur, `UN Authority and US Power', in Anthony McDermott & Kjell Skjelsbaek, eds, The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-84 (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 116-117.
5.
5 For example, in 1987 the Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) was initiated under the terms of Chapter VII.
6.
6 The broad philosophy of peacekeeping was originally outlined by Dag Hammarskjöld, following the establishment of UNEF I in 1956. See `Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary General' (UN Document A/3943, 9 October 1958); also The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1990), pp.5-7.
7.
7 The term `wider peace-keeping' has been adopted by the British Army in order to denote the doctrinal distinction between the two principal variants of peace-keeping. See also United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, 1993), pp.8-9, for a discussion of the evolving character of peace-keeping.
8.
8 Ibid, p.9. See also A. B. Fetherston, `Toward a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping', Peace Research Report no. 31, (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, February 1993).
9.
9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace , (New York: United Nations, 1992), para. 3.
10.
10 Eighth Report of the Committee on External Affairs and Trade, Canadian House of Commons (February 1993), quoted in the Third Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Expanding Rôle of the United Nations and Its Implications for United Kingdom Policy , vol. 1 (London: HMSO, June 1993), para. 239.
11.
11 See François Jean, ed., Life, Death and Aid: The Médecins Sans Frontières Report on World Crisis Intervention (London: Routledge, 1993).
12.
12 The Expanding Rôle of the United Nations , para. 228. The Committee's discussion on force generation concludes: `If [`earmarking'] means that Member States should always use their best endeavours to respond to the Secretary-General's request for troops, as the UK has indicated it would, then we believe this is the right approach.' (Para. 229).
13.
13 `Any consideration of reorganising the military operations of the Organisation should bear in mind the difficulties of attempting anything which involves Charter revision, as our predecessor Committee concluded in 1991.' (The Expanding Rôle of the United Nations , para. 241).
14.
14 The legal basis for their creation is Article 29 of the Charter, which states: `The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.'
15.
15 Besides placing limitations on duration of deployment, experience in Somalia suggests that many nations will also impose limitations on the functions to be undertaken by their forces, and even on the locations where they may deploy.
16.
16 Article 47.1 of the UN Charter.
17.
17 Such developments might include unexpected intervention by a third party, or transborder attacks that fell outside the existing Security Council mandate. In the case of a change to the Rules of Engagement, the work of the SCG could include the negotiation in advance of `dormant' rules with the Council, which the Chief of Staff would then be empowered to authorise under pre-agreed circumstances at the request of the Force Commander.
18.
18 We have adopted the name suggested by Admiral Sir James Eberle GCB LLD in his article `Military Aspects of An Agenda for Peace ” contained in Memorandum on An Agenda for Peace , (London: United Nations Association, 1993), p.36.
19.
19 We have drawn on Admiral Eberle's list of tasks that need to be carried out in New York. Ibid , p.35.
20.
20 Military information is a vital function that is greatly complicated by national sensitivities (particularly with respect to the protection of sources) and by `cultural' resistance within the UN Secretariat against the use of such information per se. These difficulties must be overcome if the UN is to enhance its ability to manage peace support operations. In time it is possible that the military information function of the IMSS could be developed to embrace strategic level `fact-finding', thereby assisting the Security Council to identify situations liable, if not addressed, to develop into full-blown threats to international peace and security.
21.
21 Existing NATO SOPs could provide a good starting point.
22.
22 The need to balance political realities with practical military concerns is not new either to the UN or other organizations with wide international membership. For instance, the nationality of major NATO Commanders (MNCs) is determined predominantly by political factors.
23.
23 Benjamin Rivlin & Leon Gordenker, eds, The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making `The Most Impossible Job in the World' Possible (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), p.vii.
24.
24 See, for instance, Jeane Kirkpatrick, `Commander Butros [sic] Ghali? No, the Title Does Not Become Him' (International Herald Tribune , 15 March 1993).