Representing the World

1 See A. Aust, `The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council Today', in The Development of the Role of the Security Council. Workshop 1992, The Hague Academy of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1993), pp 365-374; Birger Heldt, ed., States in Armed Conflict 1990-91 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1992); Birger Heldt, Peter Wallensteen, Erik Melander and Kjell-Åke Nordquist, `Major Armed Conflicts in 1992', SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (Oxford University Press, 1993); Karin Lindgren, States in Armed Conflict 1989 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1993); J. David Singer, `Peace in the Global System: Displacement, Interregnum, or Transformation?' in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace. Contending Explanations and Projections (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 56-84; Peter Wallensteen, `The Security Council in Armed Conflicts, 1986-1991' in Birger Heldt, States in Armed Conflict 1990-91, pp. 11-27; and Peter Wallensteen, `UN Peacekeeping Interventions in Conflict Situations', 43rd Pugwash Conference, Stockholm, 9-15 June 1993.

2 An other important group is G-7, which brings together the world's strongest economic states. It does not deal directly with military security although it has made statements on foreign policy issues. G-7 does not have a permanent secretariat of its own.

3 See A. Aust, `The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council Today'.

4 This is not to say that the UN is always present where it might be expected to be. For instance, the UN played no role in the talks leading to the interim agreements between Israel and PLO on 13 September 1993.

5 See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. (New York: United Nations, 1992). For recent research on the conditions for durable peace see Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Peace after War. On Conditions for Durable Inter-state Boundary Agreements (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1992).

6 See Ramses Amer, The United Nations and Foreign Military Intervention. A Comparative Study of the Application of the Charter (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1992) and Richard Gott, `The UN cannot be reformed', Third World Resurgence, 1992, no. 32, pp. 30-32.

7 The impression is that member-states implement the mandatory decisions. With respects to sanctions, however, there are reported loopholes, and defection might increase with the increasing number of mandatory resolutions, as surveillance becomes more demanding and is, in fact, left to the member-states themselves.

8 The number of non-permanent seats has been changed as the General Assembly grew in numbers. In 1966 the Security Council was enlarged to its present 15 seats; see Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Second edition, 1988).

9 Small countries may, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld argued, have a greater need of the UN, as major powers will always be able to fend for themselves. Thus, the Secretary-General could be seen as a channel of influence for smaller countries. However, the Secretary-General is bound by the decisions of the Security Council. A hitherto unexplored idea is to make the Secretary-General an independent member of the Security Council with the right to vote, on an equal level with states. This would be parallel to the way Chief Executive Officers of major corporations are sometimes included on the boards of their companies.

10 Logically, we would expect also a category of non-permanent members with veto rights.

11 This conclusion builds on the record of UN inability to deal with central Cold War issues or matters close to particular permanent members.

12 See Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure..., pp. 201-209 for a discussion on the role of the veto, and on procedural issues as distinct from substantial ones. In 1945-1986, 203 proposals were vetoed.

13 A dispute may arise as to whether WEOS is entitled to a fifth seat or South America to a fourth one. Mathematically both regions would have 2.4 non-senatorial seats. The assumption here is that power prevails and that the seat is taken by WEOS.

14 Table 3 retains the formula for regional distribution from Table 2. Moving in a more `geo-democratic' way by using the present non-permanent membership formula for the entire Security Council would in effect only give veto to the Africa-Asia group. In a rich-poor polarization, however, both sides would be able to exert a veto.

15 See Bruce M. Russett et al, Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).