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References
1.
1 Based on data from The Middle East Military Balance 1992-1993 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1993) pp.440-41. According to these data, a combined Arab ground force including Syria, Jordan, Palestinian forces, and partial participation from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would outnumber the standing Israeli army by 4:1 in personnel, 2:1 in tanks, and 3:1 in guns and mortars. When all forces are fully mobilized, the personnel ratio can be reduced to 3:1, or less, depending on the size of the commitment of Iraqi forces. See also The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p.225.O
2.
2 Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992) (Appendix IV: `Israel's Strategic Geography').
3.
3 Ibid.
4.
4 Michael Eisenstadt, `Arming for Peace? Syria's Elusive Quest for “Strategic Parity” ', Policy Paper no. 31 (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).
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5 The Middle East Military Balance: 1992-1993 , p.438.
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6 General Yisrael Tal, cited by Arye Shalev in Shalom V'Bitachon B'Golan (Peace and Security in the Golan), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1993).
7.
7 Dov Tamari, `The Syrian-Israeli Balance of Forces and Strategic Parity', in Joseph Alpher, ed., The Middle East Military Balance: 1989-90 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).
8.
8 Ha'aretz , 9 April 1993, citing an article published in the New York Times .
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9 Initially, this project was not reported to the IAEA, in violation of NPT requirements, and it was only placed under safeguards after the construction had been detected by reconnaissance satellites. The reactor is reported to be 15 MW, with an upgrade potential to 40 MW.
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10 Jerusalem Post , 21 January 1993.
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11 Lawrence Scheinman, `Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World Order', Security Dialogue vol. 23, no. 4, December 1992, p. 42.
12.
12 Dore Gold, `US Policy Toward Israel's Qualitative Edge' Report no. 36, (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1992).
13.
13 Aluf Ben, Ha'aretz , 4 March 1993, p. 1b.
14.
14 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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15 Steve Rodan, `Target Ready', Jerusalem Post Magazine , 6 October 1993, pp. 6-10.
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16 Marvin Feuerwerger, The Arrow Next Time? Israel's Missile Defense Program for the 1990s (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991).
17.
17 Ha'aretz , 26 September 1993.
18.
18 Michael B. Oren, `The Tripartite System and Arms Control in the Middle East: 1950-1956', in Dore Gold, ed., Arms Control in the Middle East (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1990).
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19 Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres, at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993 (Jerusalem: Foreign Ministry).
20.
20 Ibid.
21.
21 Shalheveth Freier, `A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and its Ambience', unpublished manuscript (Rehevot, Israel: Weizmann Institute of Science, 1992)
22.
22 Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1992); and Alan Platt, ed., Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1992).
23.
23 See Gerald Steinberg, `International/Regional Verification Options in Nuclear Arms Control', in Dore Gold, ed., Arms Control in the Middle East (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1990).