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References
1.
1 Press Communiqué S-1 (91) 85 , (Brussels: NATO), 7 November 1991.
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2 Press Communiqué M.NPG-2 (92) 83 , (Brussels: NATO), 21 October 1992.
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3 The author is particularly indebted in this context to material and advice provided by Sir Michael Quinlan, Director of the Ditchley Foundation.
4.
4 For example, Henri Conze and Jean Picq, `L'avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire', Revue de Défense Nationale , Paris, February 1993.
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5 The use made of the term `existential deterrence' in this and the closing section of the article owes much to the work of Roberto Zadra in `European Integration and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War', Chaillot Papers no. 5, November 1992, (Brussels: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies).
6.
6 Conversely, if one or more republic(s) should decide not to adopt non-nuclear weapons status, as some within Ukraine are advocating, implementation of START I and START II would be put at risk and the NPT could be weakened. Up to now Belarus and Kazakhstan have ratified START I and the Belarus Supreme Soviet has voted to accede to the NPT. Russia has said that entry into force of START I is conditional on fulfilment of all Lisbon Protocol commitments: ratification of START I and accession to the NPT by Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
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7 Johan Jørgen Holst, `European Security in the Era of Ambiguity', address at the Leangkollen Conference on Security Policy, Norway, 1 February 1993, FD-Informasjon , no.2, 1993, pp.1-6, (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence).
8.
8 France has chosen to deploy fewer ballistic missile submarines than planned, and Britain has confirmed that its four Trident submarines will carry a maximum of only 128 warheads each. At sub-strategic level France has abandoned development of the Hadès missile and delayed the development of the M5 missile for use on its SLBMs. The UK has cut its nuclear-roled strike aircraft squadrons from 11 to 8, cut its holdings of free-fall nuclear bombs by more than half and eliminated its maritime tactical nuclear weapon capability altogether.
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9 Formally conveyed at the Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland, 20-21 October 1992. Press Communiqué M-NPG-2 (92) 83 , (Brussels: NATO), 21 October 1992.
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10 President Mitterrand in a speech at the Palais des Congres, Paris, on 10 January 1992 defined the possibility of `une doctrine [nucleaire] européenne' as `une des questions majeures de la construction d'une défense européenne commune'.
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11 At the Defence Colloquium on Nuclear Deterrence.