Peace-Keeping as a Challenge to European Borders

1 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev presented this scheme in his sensational CSCE speech in December 1992 and later added a comment: `I bear in mind part of our enlightened liberal public, including some former democrats, who seriously believe that the zone of former USSR can be taken beyond the confines of the CSCE actions'. See `Andrei Kozyrev stuns his colleagues in Stockholm', Moscow News, no. 51, 1992. Three months later President Yeltsin appealed to the UN to recognize Russia as `the guarantor of peace and stability in the regions of the former USSR'. The future of this Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine remains to be seen.

2 See J. Fitchett, `Balkan Crisis Forces Europe to Reconsider Defence Cuts', International Herald Tribune, 5 February, 1993. On German debates see H. Maull, `Germany: There Are Two Sides to the Battle of the Bundeswehr', International Herald Tribune, 11 February 1993.

3 Such a break in the nuclear disarmament trend could be provoked by deep feelings of insecurity (which are feeding also the Ukrainian desire to preserve semi-nuclear status) and by the ambitions of the post-Yeltsin regime to support the great power status as well.

4 See Rene Van Beveren, `Military cooperation: what structure for the future?', Challiot Paper 6, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1993.

5 During his visit to Moscow in January 1993 General Shali-Kashvily, the Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces in Europe, tried to establish cooperation related to peace-keeping operations, including joint training of special forces. Despite the General Grachev's cordial consent, strong suspicions remain that neither side takes these plans seriously.

6 Francois Heisbourg, starting from a different point of departure, has arrived at the same conclusion: `NACC has exacerbated rather than alleviated the problems of broadening NATO to the countries of Central Europe'. See `The European-US alliance: valedictory reflections on continental drift in the post-Cold War era', International Affairs, Autumn 1992, p. 676.

7 As Christopher Donnelly reasonably pointed out, `large bureaucratic institutions continue to function irrespective of the lack of government... As of mid-1992, the armed forces hierarchy was increasingly determining its own agenda'. As of mid-1993 this point remains highly relevant. See `Evolutionary problems in the former Soviet armed forces', Survival, Autumn 1992, p. 37.

8 See George Kennan, `Building Stability in Russia and the Baltics', International Herald Tribune, 10 November 1992.

9 Due to the publication cycle, it is not possible to follow the development of this crisis further than 1 April. Up to this date the self-restraint of the Army contributed substantially to the preservation of democratic procedures. But the decision not to interfere was obviously taken on the basis of calculations, and should not be taken as a test of adherence to democratic values.

10 The Economist, in its Survey of Defence in the 21st Century, argues: `If Russia does go wrong, it will not become a serious danger again overnight.' So the `bare bones' of the `watch on Russia' forces are estimated as 25 divisions, each 1/3 full-time, 2/3 reserves. See The Economist, 5 September 1992, pp. 10-11.

11 Tom Nairn argues eloquently in a recent essay: `... the most impressive fact is surely not how much the transformation has cost in terms in either life or social and economic destruction. It is how astoundingly, how unbelievably little damage has been done'. See `Demonising Nationalism', London Review of Books, 25 February 1993.

12 The report Strategy for Russia published by the influential Council for Foreign and Defence Policy put these ideas in the nutshell: `It's highly possible that the territory of the former USSR will become a zone where military power will play an essential political role. The danger of militarization of inter-state relations dictates the necessity to rely on the Armed Forces, modernized accordingly to new realities. To deter and prevent conflicts, Russia could need a clear superiority in power'. Translated from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 August 1992.

13 As the authors from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst have pointed out, `Once any conflict breaks out, it is quite likely to spread as other states perceive the possibility to take advantage of their adversaries' difficulties to enforce their own demands'. See C. Dick, J. Dunn, J. Longh `Pandora's box. Potential conflicts in post-Communist Europe', International Defence Review, no. 3, 1993, p. 205.

14 A remarkably consistent theoretical approach could be found in A.B. Fetherston, `Toward a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping', Peace Research Report no. 31, February 1993, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. Invaluable practical experience of the International Negotiation Network at the Carter Center of Emory University is described in State of World Conflict Report 1991-1992 (Atlanta: The Carter Center of Emory University, 1992).

15 Several versions of these principles have one common source - the fundamental concept of Brian Urquhart. See, for example, `The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?' Adelphi Papers 265, `New Dimensions in International Security' Part I, Winter 1991/92. Among the conditions for success of peace-keeping operation Urquhart put `no imposition of an external will or solution'; while Galtung and Eide indicated the `conspicuous demonstration of power' as a factor of failure. See J. Galtung Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research vol.II (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), p. 256.

16 See Johan Jørgen Holst, `Enhancing peace-keeping operations', Survival, vol. 32, no. 3, 1990, pp 264-275.

17 John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra proposed the term `second generation multinational operations', even using it as the title of their article in The Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 113-131.

18 For a most relevant critique of this document see Thomas Weiss, `New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace', The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1993, pp. 51-66.

19 More on this in Pavel Baev `Russia's Rapid Reaction Forces: Politics and Pitfalls', Bulletin of Arms Control, no. 9, February 1993, pp. 12-17.

20 William Safire popularized this term: `Peoples who are the ethnic majority in any given area are reshuffling the deck of nations'. See `Borders: How to Draw the Line', International Herald Tribune, 2 February 1993.

21 Shireen T. Hunter has drawn attention to the issue that `removal of Saddam Hussein may not be compatible with the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity'. See `Two Years After the Gulf War', Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 1, March 1993, p. 34.

22 See UN Document S/23592, 15 February 1992. Formally there was no departure from point that `no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable' fixed in Resolution 713 of the UN Security Council, 25 September 1991.

23 Lee Bryant has argued that the `long-term effect of such an approach which is not often discussed is that it would ultimately strengthen the grip of the ethnic parties over Bosnia, because it would leave them in full control of individual provinces'. See `The Vance-Owen Plan: Apart at the Seams', Balkan War Report, January 1993, p. 13.

24 See, for example, Jane Sharp & Vladimir Baranovsky, `For a NATO-Russian-UN Intervention to End the War in Bosnia', International Herald Tribune, 26 February 1993.

25 In an interview he declared: `The day when the “peace-keepers” are withdrawn, I'll start seriously preparing for the war'. Translated from Izvestia, 26 February 1993.

26 Victor Kuvaldin, `Caucasian options for Russia and Georgia', Moscow News no. 43, 1992.

27 See `Ethnic cleansing comes to Russia', The Economist, 28 November 1992, p. 38.

28 See Mark Galeotti, `A Military Future for Cossacks?', Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1993, pp. 104-106; Lester Grau, `The New Russian Cossacks: A Force in Time of Chaos', Military Review, December 1992, pp. 2-13.

29 Bruno Schoch, `To Strasbourg or to Sarajevo? On Nationalism in the Postcommunist Transitional Societies', Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF Reports no. 28, December 1992.