The End of Chemical Warfare

1 The text of the CWC, as well as statements by several countries, are included in Conference on Disarmament document CD/1170.

2 The Conference on Disarmament is an international negotiation forum that consists of five nuclear weapon powers, 34 other states, as well as some 40 observer countries. It has, under different names, convened on the premises of the United Nations in Geneva on a regular basis since the early 1960s. The question of chemical weapons was put on agenda of the Conference in 1968, but substantive negotiations started only in 1980. For an analysis of the history of the negotiations and the presently existing legal and political constraints on chemical weapons use and possession, see: Thomas Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation: Explaining International Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons, (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1993) (to appear in May 1993).

3 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the definition of chemical weapons in the CWC applies only to toxic chemicals that affect humans and animals. Plants are not mentioned.

4 Note that the ENMOD Convention, which prohibits certain techniques to modify the environment for war purposes, puts some - albeit weak - constraints on the use of herbicides in war. It prohibits such means of warfare if they would have widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects. The ENMOD Convention has attracted only a relatively small adherence, however.

5 The CWC defines `riot control agents' as follows: `Any chemical not listed in a Schedule (see below), which can produce rapidly in human sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure'.

6 Domestic riot control is considered to be a subset of law enforcement.

7 For example: efforts have been made in the USA to block, through lawsuits and legislative processes, presently envisaged CW incineration technologies. These efforts could necessitate a redesign of the US destruction program.

8 See Jozef Goldblat and Thomas Bernauer, `The US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement of June 1990: Its Advantages and Shortcomings', in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 21, no 4, pp. 355-362.

9 A few Schedule Two and Three chemicals can be regarded as chemical warfare agents. But most Schedule Two and Three chemicals are precursors for chemical warfare agents, i.e. key chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents.

10 `Protective purposes' means protection against chemical weapons: for example testing gas masks, protective clothing or detectors by exposing them to a chemical warfare agent.

11 `Other facilities' are facilities that during the previous calendar year produced by synthesis more than 200 tons of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, or that comprise plant sites which produced during the previous calendar year more than 30 tons of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals containing the elements phosphorus, sulphur, or fluorine.

12 Monitoring provisions for `other facilities' contain a few elements of the presumably more efficient approach mentioned, but both the range of facilities covered and the selection mechanism are quite different.

13 There are no explicit provisions on this subject in the Convention. But most states assume that the parties to the CWC may employ their national means to collect intelligence to assess compliance of other states and investigate complaints, as long as these means do not violate international law.

14 Israel has indicated that it may sign the Convention but will delay ratification until the problem with the Arab countries is solved.