Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World Order

1 For a general discussion of the concept of regime see Stephen Krasner ed, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Oran Young, `International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', World Politics, 32, April 1980, pp. 331-356. For a discussion of regime as applied in the case of non-proliferation see Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Lawrence Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1985).

2 For a comprehensive introduction to the nature and scope of international safeguards see David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (Stockholm and London: SIPRI and Taylor and Francis, 1985).

3 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, A. II.

4 Ibid., Article III.

5 For analysis of the decision-making in several critical non-nuclear weapon states see Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

6 Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT as reproduced in Jozef Goldblat, Twenty Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Implementation and Prospects (Oslo: PRIO, 1990), Appendix XII.

7 See John R. Redick, `Argentina and Brazil's New Arrangement for Mutual Inspections and IAEA Safeguards', (Washington DC: Nuclear Control Institute, February 1992) for a discussion of the Foz de Iguaca agreement and the Argentine-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material.

8 See Jon Jennekens, `IAEA Safeguards - Emerging Issues', Fourth International Conference on Facility Operations - Safeguards Interface', (Albuquerque, NM, 29 September-4 October 1991).

9 This is managed in the case of safeguarded material by use of interim inspections conducted at sufficiently frequent intervals to be able to detect a diversion of such material. The timeliness goal for detecting the diversion of spent nuclear fuel which, if reprocessed, would yield separated plutonium, is currently three months.

10 It is significant that Iraq chose a totally clandestine approach rather than relying on diversion of safeguarded nuclear material. This suggests that Iraqi nuclear personnel were of the view that IAEA safeguards would detect a diversion.

11 It cannot go unsaid that the Iraq situation was exceptional in the sense that its action against Kuwait had been universally condemned, and it was under severe Security Council sanctions when the Board met to consider findings regarding the Iraqi program, and that under more ambivalent circumstances Board action might not have been so clear. But neither might Security Council action be as determined and unanimous under less egregious conditions. It may also be noted that while the Board of Governors has endorsed a number of measures to strengthen safeguards, a number of states have done so grudgingly and with concern that they may be opening a Pandora's box.

12 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article XII.A.6.

13 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), para. 73.

14 GOV/INF/613, June, 1991.

15 In some cases, access may be denied for reasons other than non-compliance with safeguards undertakings, such as safety-related considerations: but this does not release the state of its obligation to satisfy the verification authority that all material and facilities that should be reported and placed under safeguards in fact have been.

16 United Nations Security Council, S/23500, 31 January 1992.

17 See IAEA Press Release PR 92/12, 26 February 1992.