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References
1.
1 For an analytical survey of the NPT, see J. Goldblat, Twenty Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1990).
2.
2 The status of the implementation of the NPT is described in detail in J. Goldblat, The Non-Proliferation Treaty: How to Remove the Residual Threats (Geneva-New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992).
3.
3 The political and arms control effects of a CTB are discussed in Towards a Comprehensive Test Ban (Oslo: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992).
4.
4 These improvements may include replacement of the conventional high explosive, which compresses fissile material to produce a nuclear yield, with the insensitive high explosive unlikely to detonate in a majority of violent accidents; installation of the enhanced nuclear detonation safety system, which isolates the electrical arming components from energy sources, such as lightning or other electrical disturbances, that could cause accidental detonation; as well as use of the fire-resistant pit, designed to prevent the release of plutonium even if the weapon is exposed to high temperatures for a long period.
5.
5 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1993.
6.
6 UN document S/RES/255, 19 June 1968.
7.
7 Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT documents NPT/CONF. IV.
8.
8 Ibid
9.
9 Conference on Disarmament document CD/SA/WP.14, 3 August 1992.
10.
10 See, for example, G. Bunn, Ch. N. van Doren and D. Fischer, Options & Opportunities: the NPT Extension Conference of 1995 (Southampton: PPNN - Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1991).