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References
1.
1 Derek Hopwood, Egypt, Political Society (London: Harper Collins Academic 1991, 5th edition), p.1.
2.
2 Joseph Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs (Boulder, CO: Westview 1990), p.45
3.
3 Ibid , p.47.
4.
4 P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), p.412.
5.
5 P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p.25
6.
6 Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury. The Assassination of Sadat (London: Deutsch, 1983), p.62.
7.
7 According to Heikal, Nasser told the Soviet leaders that he will not surrender to the Americans, and he will address openly his people, telling them that as he is not able to guarantee their security, due to the Israeli military superiority, made possible by the American support; he will turn over the authority to a person who can reach an accommodation with th U.S. Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), pp. 86-88.
8.
8 Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), p.287. Some interpretations were given to Sadat's decision; That if Egypt will launch any military operation, he wanted it to be regarded, on the level of planning and execution, to be exclusively Egyptian. Sadat might also have thought to give signal, particularly to the USA of his willingness to reach a political settlement. The lack of respons to his gesture, convinced him that something dramatic must be done to move the diplomatic stalemate. See Freedman, The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder, CO and London: Westerview, 1984)
9.
9 Joseph Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs , p.45.
10.
10 P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation , p.331.
11.
11 Ibid. , p.317.
12.
12 Joseph Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs , p.45.
13.
13 Robert Freedman ed., The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder, CO and London: Westview, 1984), p.173.
14.
14 Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), pp. 86-88.
15.
15 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, `The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post-Sadat Era', Foreign Affairs , vol. 60, no.4, spring 1982, p.769-788.
16.
16 Raymond Baker, Sadat and After (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1990), p.196.
17.
17 Robert Freedman ed., The Middle East Since Camp David , p.181.
18.
18 P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt , p.460.
19.
19 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, `The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post-Sadat Era', p.787.
20.
20 Mark Copper, The Transformation of Egypt (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p.182.
21.
21 Ali Abdelmoneim Said, `Egypt a Decade After Camp David', in William Quandt ed., The Middle East, Ten Years After (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), p.65.
22.
22 Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Role (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), p. 160.
23.
23 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Harvest of Egyptian Diplomacy in 1990 (Cairo: State Information Authority, January 1991), p.37. UNDUGU is the official name of a group of African countries belonging to the Nile basin, namely - Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Central Africa. In addition to these countries, Ethiopia and Tanzania joined as observers. The group was established in 1983, initially as a political forum to exchange views and information and to coordinate policies and issues of mutual interests, particularly on the Nile water resources. The term UNDUGU indicates in the Swahili language `brotherhood'.
24.
24 Thierry Fabre, `The Birth of the Mediterranean', Contemporary European Affairs , no. 2/3, November 1991, pp.29-35.
25.
25 Bulletin of International Organization Activities (in Arabic). (Cairo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1991).