'Chairman Ekeus Sees Problems Disposing of Iraqi Chemicals', Diplomatic World Bulletin, Vol. 22, no. 8, 15–22 July 1991, p. 1.
2.
CliveCookson, 'Making a Clean Job of It', Financial Times, 3/4 August 1991, p. 9.
3.
'News Chronology', Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, no. 13, September 1991, pp. 10–11.
4.
LeonardDoyle, 'UN Refuses to Name Poison Gas Suppliers', Independent, 27 July 1991.
5.
FrederikLaurin, 'Scandinavia's Underwater Time Bomb', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991, pp. 11–15; Evangelischer Pressedienst, 'Giftgas in der Ostsee?', Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 October 1991.
6.
MartensH.MaginG., 'Chemical Agent Incineration Plant', in: Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Protection against Chemical Warfare Agents, Umea, Sweden, 11–16 June1989; Der Niedersächsische Umweltminister, Expertengespräch Rästungsaltlasten, 25–26 April 1989, Hannover, pp. 319–364.
7.
United States General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Army's Prototype Disposal Facility, July 1990, GAO/NSIAD-90–222, p. 29.
8.
The full text of the US-Soviet agreement is reproduced in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 21, no. 4 (December 1990), pp. 363–369.
9.
J. LundinS.StockThomas, 'Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1990', SIPRI Yearbook 1991, World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 98–99.
10.
Arms Control Reporter, September 1991, pp. 704. E-2.41–2.
11.
Deutsche Presse Agentur, 'Abrüstung mit der Atombombe', Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 May 1991, p. 1; see also Arms Control Reporter, September 1991, p. 704.E-2.41. Technically, the proposition amounts to concentrating all agents in remote areas where large underground caves are to be built and then destroying them by means of a nuclear explosive device.
12.
See e.g. the statement by the head of the UN chemical weapons destruction team quoted in Arms Control Reporter, September 1991, p. 704.E.-2.43–4.
13.
Security Council Resolution 699 of 17 June 1991 puts the burden of all costs resulting from the disposal of its weapons of mass destruction on Iraq.
14.
Such fears are increased by reports on the conditions of the Iraqi production facilities. Current estimates in UN circles point to a 10% casualty rate per year during production of chemical agents.
15.
Program Executive Officer – Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, Aberdeen Proving Ground (Department of the Army), January 1988, vols 1–3.
16.
HollyPorteous, 'Ridding Iraq of Chemical Weapons to Take Two Years', Jane's Defense Weekly, 28 September 1991, p. 557.
17.
Arms Control Reporter, June 1991, p. 704. E-2.36.
18.
Security Council Resolution 699 of 17 June 1991 charged Iraq with paying for the costs of the disposal but also urged other UN members to support the process with financial and technological means.
19.
In a letter responding to an earlier initiative of the authors on the issue, a senior official from the German Foreign Office pointed to the fact that such exports were possible only by circumvention of German export laws.
20.
KlausBeckmann, Deputy Minister (Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär) in the Federal Ministry of Economics; statement before the German Bundestag on 11 October 1991.
21.
Statement by Beckmann, 11 October 1991.
22.
In July 1991, Germany offered to assist the United Nations in detecting and disposing of Iraq's chemical weapons. Arms Control Reporter, July 1991, 704.E-2.39. Given the poor standards of existing disposal technologies described in this article, however, such a modest offer certainly falls short of resolving the problems of chemical weapons disposal in Iraq.
23.
AlexeyKireev,” 'Zena "Mirnogo Dividenda“' ('Price of “peace dividend” '), Mezdunarodnaja Zizn, July 1991, pp. 11–22.
24.
Ibid., pp. 16–17.
25.
Significantly, Kireev does not reveal the technical basis of his assessments of alternative cost estimates. Nor does he offer any hints as to which organizations provided the data necessary to produce the disparate estimates.
26.
R&D expenditures in these sectors, as a share of total national R&D expenditures, are markedly higher than in other OECD countries. Organization for Economic Cooperation and development, Basic Science and Technology Statistics, Paris 1991, Table 10.
27.
This proliferation threat through the migration of highly qualified scientists appears to be of growing concern. See e.g. Hans A. Bethe, Kurt Gottfried and Robert S. McNamara, 'The Nuclear Threat: A Proposal', New York Review of Books, vol. 38, no. 12, 27 June 1991, p. 50. The Berghof Institute for Peace and Conflict Research is starting a cooperative research project attempting to monitor the transformation and partial dissolution of the Soviet military R&D complex. Particular emphasis will be given to ensuing migratory processes.
