This article applies theories of foreign policy change to the question of Russia's `strategic realignment' following the events of 11 September. In terms of Russian foreign policy change, 11 September was not fundamentally significant. It simply made overt and explicit the underlying trends and pressures that shape Russia's strategic orientation. However, 11 September has allowed President Putin to consolidate Russia's decisive strategic realignment Westwards. And it has demonstrated the gulf, which had widened through the 1990s, between Russia's stated foreign and security policy objectives and preferences and its financial, military and institutional capacity to achieve those objectives. While accepting that a Russian strategic realignment has occurred under Putin, the article identifies its conditional nature and points to factors that could reverse the quality and depth, if not orientation, of such a realignment.
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References
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* Dr Graeme P. Herd is a Professor of Civil—Military Relations at the George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Ella Akerman is a Research Associate at the Scottish Centre for International Security (SCIS), Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen.
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1 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000.
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2 `How Far Can the West Afford To Ignore Russia?', Conflict Studies Research Centre, Occasional Briefing, July 1999; available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/ob69-cjd.htm.
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3 M. Ehsan Ahrari, `Iran, China, and Russia: The Emerging Anti-US Nexus', Security Dialogue, vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001, pp. 453-466, on pp. 465-466.
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4 For early assessments of the significance of 11 September, see Viewpoints, Security Dialogue, vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001, pp. 499-509.
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5 Many analysts have also adopted this interpretation. For example, the US political analyst Ariel Cohen has stated that the nuclear warhead reduction treaty signed by the USA and Russia in May 2002 `finally draws a line under the era of the 20th century as a whole and the Cold War in particular'. Russian Public TV (ORT), 24 May 2002. (Unless otherwise stated, all media reports cited were translated by the online BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, former Soviet Union, Part I.)
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6 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 46.
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7 Walter Carlsnaes, `The Agency—Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 3, September 1992, pp. 245-270, on p. 246.
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8 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 11.
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9 Charles F. Hermann, `Changing Course: When Governments Choose To Redirect Foreign Policy', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1, March 1990, pp. 3-21, on p. 12.
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10 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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11 Kalevi J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 3.
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12 Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 75-80.
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13 Holsti (note 11 above), p. 14.
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14 Kjell Goldmann, `Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Détente as a Problem of Stabilization', World Politics, vol. 34, no. 2, January 1982, pp. 230-266, on p. 241.
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15 Jakob Gustavsson, `How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?', Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 34, no. 1, March 1999, pp. 73-95, on p. 74.
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16 Ibid., p. 84.
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17 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 24 October 2001.
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18 Remarks by USA and Canada Studies Institute Director Sergei Rogov, NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), 26 October 2001.
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19 Remarks by Politika Foundation President Vyacheslav Nikonov, NEDB, 26 October 2001.
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20 Remarks by Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the State Duma Aleksei Arbatov, NEDB, 5 October 2001.
reminds us that Russia is ill-disposed to support a unilateral West, while Anatol Lieven, `The Secret Policeman's Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order After 11 September', International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, pp. 245-259, reflects on the limits of cooperation, the lack of shared interests.
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23 See Alan Aldis & Graeme P. Herd, `Russian Federal Stability and the Dynamics of the Twenty-First Century', in Graeme P. Herd & Alan Aldis, eds, Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength Through Weakness (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 275.
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24 Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, NEDB, 25 October 2001.
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25 Interfax news agency, Moscow, 28 May 2002.
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26 For an analysis of the power and potential of the `domestic opposition' to influence President Putin, see the remarks of Pavel Baev, Celeste Wallander, Martha Brill Olcott, & Margot Light in `Kremlin & the White House', RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, vol. 2, no. 17, 22 May 2002; http://www.rferl.org/rpw/2002/05/17-220502.html.
28.
27 For an analysis of Russian public opinion and foreign policy, see Vladimir Rukavishnikov, `New Threats and Old Phobias', paper presented at International Sociological Association Research Committee 01 (ISA RC01) on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution, ISA World Congress, Brisbane, Australia, July 2002.
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28 Graeme P. Herd, `Russia's Baltic Policy After the Meltdown', Security Dialogue, vol. 30, no. 2, June 1999, pp. 197-212.
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29 David Gowan, How the EU Can Help Russia (London: Centre for European Reform, December 2000), p. 48.
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30 `NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality', declaration by heads of state and government of NATO member-states and the Russian Federation, Rome, 28 May 2002; available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528e.htm.
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31 Emily Woodward, `Russia's Neighbours Affirm New NATO-Russia Framework', DefenseNews.com, 28 May 2002.
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32 Withdrawal from the CIS also facilitated the creation of a new subregional military—political—economic grouping with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (GUUAM).
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33 Nikolai Ulyanov, `Kremlin Is Not Going To Lose Influence on Central Asia', Russian Observer, http://www.russianobserver.com/foreign/relations/2001/10/02/1002036251.html (accessed 5 October 2001).
35.
34 Turkmenistan, however, has bucked the Central Asian trend in choosing not to up-grade its ties with the United States and other Western countries involved in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Instead, Turkmen President Sapamurat Niyazov repeatedly emphasized his country's official neutrality, allowing space for speculation about his rapprochement with Russia.
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35 Jonathan Stevenson, cited in Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan Balancing Relations with West, Russia, Radio Liberty, Prague, 7 December 2001.
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36 Interview with Nikolayenko in Moscow on 20 March 2002, in Sergei Blagov, `Russia Probes To Bolster its Authority in Central Asia', Eurasia Insight, 27 March 2002.
38.
37 Victoria Panfilova & Armen Chanbabian, `Moscow and Washington Again Play the Game of Superpowers in Central Asia', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 April 2002.
39.
For an excellent overview and assessment of this issues, see Julian Lindley-French, `Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September', Chaillot Papers, no. 52, May 2002; available at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai52e.pdf.
