The demobilization and reintegration of military personnel in Mozambique was recognized as a crucial aspect of the country's successful transition from war to peace. On this basis, the international community embarked on one of the most comprehensive reintegration programmes ever attempted in the context of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, involving four different approaches and a diversity of implementing agents that aimed to facilitate reintegration of the targeted population of ex-combatants. With the formal conclusion of the programme, reintegration was declared by all major observers to have been a resounding success. Despite this generally accepted assessment, there remain many unexamined issues, including the degree to which reintegration in fact was achieved; particular successes (or failures) associated with a given methodology; the interface between the international community's approach to reintegration and the process of reintegration experienced by ex-soldiers; and the role played by Mozambican society and tradition in facilitating this process. This article critically assesses the international community's involvement in reintegration in Mozambique and extrapolates the `lessons learned' for other reintegration programmes.
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References
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* Dr Chris Alden lectures in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He would like to express his appreciation to the US Institute for Peace for its financial support and to Mike MacDonald and Charmaine Della-Vedova for their assistance in Mozambique.
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1 World Bank, `Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies', Africa Regional Series Report, No. IDP-130, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), p. 2.
3.
Dolan & Schafer cite the work of Creative Associates, among others, as a source for this definition. For a definition that echoes the World Bank's focus on the reintegration process, see Kees Kingma, `Assessing Demobilization: Conceptual Issues', in Kees Kingma, ed., Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 28.
4.
For a general account of the period under question, see Chris Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
5.
4 The Commissao de Reintegracao (CORE) was the official body created to deal with this issue; it was superseded by the Commissao Nacional para Reinsercao Social e Economica following CORE's dissolution in 1995. In fact, the Ministry of Labour was the principal interested party within the government.
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5 Stephan Chan & Moises Venancio, `Towards Elections', in Stephan Chan & Moises Venancio (with contributions from Chris Alden & Sam Barnes), War and Peace in Mozambique (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 62-66.
7.
6 For example, Portuguese language audio tapes were to have been played over the camp broadcast system to educate the soldiers in, among other things, basic citizenship, but this measure neglected to account for the fact that most soldiers - and especially Renamo combatants - had only a rudimentary knowledge of Portuguese at best.
8.
7 See ONUMOZ, `Problems/Incidents in Assembly Areas and Other Areas', Cease Fire Commission, Maputo, 8 September 1994.
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8 This was later upgraded to MT 85,000 for the lowest ranks and downgraded to MT 700,000 for the highest ranks.
10.
9 Interview with Tim Born, USAID, Maputo, 25 May 1994.
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10 Interview with Tim Born, USAID, Maputo, 12 June 1996.
12.
In the words of one evaluation, `social reintegration into civilian life has been attained by more than 85% of the DS [demobilized soldiers]'; United Nations Development Programme, `Reintegration for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique', Maputo, March 1997, p. 59.
13.
12 Creative Associates International (note 11 above); UNDP (note 11 above); Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), `Impact Assessment of GTZ Open Reintegration Fund Program', Maputo, August 1998.
14.
13 Interviews with 182 ex-combatants in Gaza, Maputo, Sofala, Nampula and Inhambane provinces, November 1997, February 1998, April-May 2000 and April 2001.
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14 Interviews with 18 community leaders in Gaza, Maputo, Sofala, Nampula and Inhambane provinces, April-May 2000 and April 2001.
16.
15 This was the common expression for an approximation of the number of troops left out of the ONUMOZ demobilization process.
17.
16 Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 13 (appendix).
18.
17 Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 20; UNDP (note 11 above), p. 35.
19.
18 UNDP (note 11 above), p. 37.
20.
19 Ibid., p. 47.
21.
20 Ibid., p. 59.
22.
21 GTZ (note 12 above), pp. 1-2; World Bank, `War-to-Peace Transition in Mozambique: The Provincial Reintegration Fund', Findings (Africa Region), no. 90, July 1997; available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find90.htm.
23.
22 Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 19.
24.
Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 7.
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24 For example, a report on coordination in the area of reintegration between the donors, the UN and the Mozambican government's Ministry of Labour said, `Central level arrangements have yet to function in the envisaged manner and no general sectorial policy has been presented by the government in this area. In contrast, Provincial level coordination appears to be functioning closer to the anticipated moulds.' UNDP, `Situation Brief: Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers', Unit for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Maputo, May 1996, p. 5.; see also Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 11.
26.
25 Indian Ocean Newsletter654, 14 January 1995.
27.
26 See Chris Alden, `The United Nations, Elections and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique', in Chan & Venancio (note 5 above), pp. 78-82.
28.
27 Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 26.
29.
28 International Migration Organization, IRS evaluation, Maputo, 1997, p. 26.
30.
29 Creative Associates International (note 11 above), p. 27.
31.
30 Interview with an ex-military officer, Nampula City, Nampula, 5 April 2000.
32.
31 This was in conjunction with other disaffected ex-combatants within the region; Virginia Gamba & Martino Chachiua, `Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Reflections on the Extent of the Problem and Its Management Potential', ISS Monograph Series, no. 38 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), p. 10.
33.
32 To be fair, there are particular programmes targeting disabled war veterans, but international observers as a whole tended to neglect this category of ex-soldier, though one USAID cable reported that `several thousand disabled have caused considerable trouble (kidnappings, closing of major roads, looting and killing)'; `Subject: Demobilization in Africa: Response', AIDAC, E.O. 12356, 1994.
34.
33 See Jessica Schafer, `A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled: AMODEG and the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, March 1998, pp. 207-222.
35.
Carolyn Nordstrom , A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 145-147.
36.
35 The author had many conversations with representatives of international NGOs in 1995 and 1996 who proposed this as an explanation for the apparent and, in their view, unanticipated reconciliation between the ex-combatants.
37.
36 Lundin (note 34 above), p. 111.
38.
37 Interviews with ex-combatants in Gaza, Maputo, Sofala and Nampula, April-May 2000 and April 2001.
39.
37 Interviews with 18 community leaders in Gaza, Maputo, Sofala, Nampula and Inhambane provinces, April-May 2000 and April 2001; interviews with demobilized soldiers in Gorongosa, Sofala and Nampula City, Nampula, April 2000.
40.
38 Dolan & Schafer (note 2 above), pp. 48-54.
41.
39 This point was elaborated upon by Jessica Schafer, `Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-Socialization or Re-Socialization?', African Affairs, vol. 100, no. 399, April 2001, pp. 233-235.
42.
40 Interview with Tim Born, USAID, Maputo, 12 June 1996.
43.
41 Presentation by senior UN administrator with UN mission to East Timor, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, December 2001.
44.
42 Richard Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 129.
45.
43 Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper no. 303 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 59.
46.
44 Interview with Eric Lubin, ONUMOZ, Maputo, 27 May 1994.
47.
45 See Alex Vines, `No Democracy Without Money: The Road to Peace in Mozambique (1982-1992)', CIIR Briefing Paper (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, April 1994).
