This article sketches out the nature of legal responses to humanitarian intervention in general and the Kosovo intervention in particular, with particular attention given to arguments that were not made. Though some possible arguments appear to have been omitted through oversight, the nature of the discussion suggests a view of international law as one policy justification among others. These debates are then situated in a broader historical context by drawing parallels between the current international framwork and earlier historical periods in which no body comparable to the Security Council existed. It is argued that developments since the end of the Cold War, and in the past few years in particular, suggest a reversion to pre-Charter paradigms, where the council exists merely to advise member-states and international order is contingent, once more, on the goodwill of the powerful. The reluctance of the Great Powers to submit themselves to law may yet have a more lasting effect on the international order than NATO's decision to wage war on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
* Simon Chesterman is a Senior Associate at the International Peace Academy, New York, where he directs the project on Transitional Administrations. He is the author of Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and the editor of Civilians in War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
2.
1 See, for example, Neil A. Lewis, `The Rationale: A Word Bolsters Case for Allied Intervention', New York Times, 4 April 1999.
3.
2 UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report: Kosovo (23 May 2000), para. 132; available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2813.htm.
4.
3 Legality of Use of Force Case (Provisional Measures) (ICJ, 1999) pleadings of Belgium, 10 May 1999, CR 99/15 (uncorrected translation).
5.
4 See further Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 213. Some passages in the present article are drawn from this book.
6.
5 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford, 23 October 2000), p. 4; http://www.kosovocommission.org.
7.
See also Ramesh Thakur, `Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS', and J. Peter Burgess, `The Foundation for a New Consensus on Humanitarian Intervention' (Reference Review), Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 3, September 2002, pp. 323-340 and 383-384, respectively.
8.
7 See also Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, `Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law', in J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
9.
8 UN Charter, Article 2(4).
10.
9 UN Charter, Article 51.
11.
10 See generally Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 112-218.
12.
11 For the most sustained (if ultimately fruitless) effort to locate such a right, see Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edn (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational, 1997).
13.
12 See Anjali V. Patil, The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990: A Complete Record and Case Histories of the Security Council's Veto (London: Mansell, 1992), pp. 189-196.
14.
13 GA Res 377A(V) (1950).
15.
14 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 700-701.
16.
15 GA Res 498(V) (1951).
17.
16 GA Res 997(ES-I) (1956); GA Res 1000(ES-I) (1956).
18.
17 SC Res 157 (1960); GA Res 1474(ES-IV) (1960). See further Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 118-119.
19.
18 UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report: Kosovo, Minutes of Evidence - Volume II, HC 28-II, 18 January 2000, Question 178 (Prof. Adam Roberts); available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/0011806.htm.
20.
19 James Rubin, `Countdown to a Very Personal War', Financial Times, 30 September 2000.
21.
20 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
22.
21 See Simon Chesterman, `Rethinking Panama: International Law and the US Invasion of Panama, 1989', in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan A. Talmon, eds, The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 61-62.
23.
22 It is arguable that the use of force was first outlawed by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact; see Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 83-89.
24.
23 This section will confine itself to the late 19th and early 20th centuries; for a discussion of earlier periods, see Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 7-24.
25.
24 See Brownlie (note 22 above).
26.
25 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction into the International Law of Peace, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 285.
27.
26 See Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 36-38.
28.
27 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
29.
28 William Vernon Harcourt, Letters by Historicus on Some Questions of International Law: Reprinted from `The Times' with Considerable Additions (London: Macmillan, 1863), p. 14.
30.
29 See, for example, John Norton Pomeroy, Lecture on International Law in Time of Peace (Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Riverside, 1886), pp. 244-245.
31.
30 William Edward Hall, Treatise on International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884), p. 265.
32.
31 Ibid., p. 266.
33.
32 Ibid. See also T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 6th edn (Boston, MA: D. C. Heath, 1915), p. 129.
34.
33 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1905), vol. 1, p. 186.
35.
34 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
36.
35 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law, 8th edn (London: Longmans, 1955), p. 312.
37.
36 Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 48-53.
38.
37 Flick Case (1947) 6 CCL 10 Trials 3, pp. 87-89 (Telford Taylor for the Prosecution).
39.
38 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
40.
39 See Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 114-121.
41.
40 UN Charter, Article 43. See Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 78-81.
42.
41 UN Charter, Article 47(1).
43.
42 Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the Security Council, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), p. 274.
44.
43 Chesterman (note 4 above), p. 118.
45.
44 Security Council Summit Statement Concerning the Council's Responsibility in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN Doc S/23500 (1992), (1992) UNYB33.
46.
45 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (1995), para. 30.
47.
46 Walter Clarke, `Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia', in Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, eds, Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), pp. 3-19.
48.
47 SC Res 794 (1992), para. 8, referring to S/24868.
49.
48 SC Res 794 (1992), para. 12.
50.
49 On NATO's characterization as a regional arrangement, see Chesterman (note 4 above), p. 177.
51.
50 Ibid., pp. 175-179.
52.
51 See, for example, `Misguided Relief to Sudan', New York Times, 6 December 1999.
53.
52 SC Res 1054 (1996). These sanctions were terminated shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC: SC Res 1372 (2001).
54.
53 Burns H. Weston, `Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy', American Journal of International Law, vol. 85, no. 3, July 1991, pp. 516-535, on pp. 523-525.
55.
54 Ibid., p. 524.
56.
55 Thomas L. Friedman, `How US Won Support To Use Mideast Forces', New York Times, 2 December 1990.
57.
56 David Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 107.
58.
57 Australia's role in securing authorization to lead INTERFET in East Timor fits a similar model; see Chesterman (note 4 above), pp. 149-150.
59.
58 S/PV.988 (1961) paras 130-131 (US) (referring to UN inaction in the face of the Indian invasion of Goa).
60.
59 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992).
61.
60 `Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit', 11 September 1990, in (1990) 1 Bush Papers1219.
62.
61 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10.
63.
62 Richard A. Falk, `The United Nations and the Rule of Law', (1994) 4 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems611, p. 628.
64.
63 See Amos S. Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law (New York: Macmillan, 1918), pp. 95-96.
65.
64 Strobe Talbott, address delivered in Bonn, 4 February 1999; quoted in Bruno Simma, `NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', European Journal of International Law, vol. 10, no. 1, March 1999, pp. 11-18.
66.
65 Ibid., p. 11.
67.
66 Ibid., p. 18. See also UN Charter, Article 103.
68.
67 E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 264.
