This article identifies the dynamics of the national security syndrome and the pendulum swing between security and liberalization that are embedded in the Turkish political system. It then explores how these are reflected in the problematic and conflictual processes of Turkish policy formulation with regard to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the post-violence era. The article presents evidence of a new impasse surrounding Turkey's southeast/Kurdish question. While Turkey is having difficulties in designing post-terror policies, the PKK appears unprepared to fully disarm and give up. The only route remaining seems to be one of political struggle. After identifying Turkey's structural limits to addressing the issue, the article discusses the implications of these on the future of the conflict, on Turkey's foreign relations with the West, and on the increasingly torn domestic political situation.
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References
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* Ersel Aydinli is an Instructor in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara, Turkey. The author can be reached at aydinli@bilkent.edu.tr. The author would like to thank the referees and editor for their helpful suggestions.
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Ismet G. Imset , `The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey' (Istanbul: Turkish Daily News Publication, 1992)
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2 Even recent works do not fully analyze this structural aspect of the issue. See, for example, Michael Gunter, `The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Ocalan's Capture', Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 5, October 2000, pp. 849-869.
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3 During the Ottoman modernization periods, it can be proposed that the bureaucrats were able to force great changes on the Sultans - such as power-sharing or even a constitutional monarchy - by arguing that the Sultans were failing to provide adequate security. In this sense, power relocation was forced upon the system to ensure that stronger figures handled security issues.
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4 One of the most obvious examples of this occurred when the increasingly powerful modernizing Ottoman bureaucracy dismissed Sultan Abdulaziz and replaced him with Murat V, with the ostensible intention of initiating a constitutional monarchy. The following dialogue was recorded between Suleyman Pasha and the then prime minister: `If we are not going to declare the constitutional reform, why did we overthrow the Sultan... just to get a new one?' `The state trusts you [bureaucrats]. Would you rather go ask the ignorant Turks of Anatolia about the destiny and security of our state?'; Tevfik Cavdar, Turkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950 [The History of Turkish Democracy 1839-1950] (Ankara: Imge-Ankara Kitabevi, 1999).
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5 One significant understanding of the concept of national security has been the idea of national unity, or keeping the country from being divided. Turkish fears of being divided have often been referred to as `the Sèvres Syndrome', referring to the 1920 Sèvres agreement that officially ended the Ottoman Empire and divided the Anatolian lands, creating an Armenian state and a Kurdish autonomous region with the possibility of independence in the future. The Turkish Independence War halted and made void the agreement. Nevertheless, since the Sèvres agreement was imposed by Western powers, its goal to divide the country continues to weigh heavily in the common memories of the Turkish state and society.
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6 Then prime minister Fethi Okyar is reported as having said, `I will not shed blood unnecessarily', TBMM Tutanaklari, Parliamentary archives, v. 2, s. 13, 1924.
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7 The new government, led by hawkish Ismet Inonu, introduced an emergency law called `Takrir-i Sukun' (Reconstruction of the Order), which gave every authority to the state in order to curb anything it considered dangerous to its internal stability. The tribunals took advantage of this new law and shut down the party.
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8 Recorded in the memoirs of Free Party leader Ahmet Agaoglu, Serbest Firka Hatiralari [Free Party Memoirs] (Istanbul: Baha Matbasi, 1969, p. 63-64).
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9 The rebellion took place in a small town in Western Anatolia, where the support for the Free Party was highly visible.
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10 PKK Presidential Council member Mustafa Karasu stated that the PKK would keep its armed forces intact and ready until the `democratic conditions' in Turkey were ready for them to return (Ozgur Politika, 28 March 2000), while the PKK Presidential Council declared that the threat potential of these armed groups could be altered only `if Turkey abolishes the death penalty, declares general amnesty and expands liberties' as preliminary concessions (Ozgur Politika, 28 March 2000). Finally, another Council member and brother of Abdullah Ocalan, Osman Ocalan, noted that these forces are trained for `political motives' in order to adapt to a projected `democratic expansion' in Turkey (Ozgur Politika, 12 March 2000).
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11 The figure of 300 and related information were reported in Ozgur Politika in reference to a police report submitted to the Turkish National Security Council, 27 February 2000.
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12 Milliyet, 22 March 2000.
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13 Turkish Daily News, Milliyet, Hurriyet, Sabah, 18 January 2000.
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14 Financial Times, 17 February 2000.
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15 Turkish Daily News, 22 February 2000.
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16 Sabah, Milliyet, 23 February 2000 and New York Times, 25 February 2000.
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17 NTV - Turkiye'den Haberler, 25 February 2000.
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18 Orhan Kilercioglu, quoted in the Turkish Daily News, 25 February 2000.
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19 Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, who is in charge of Turkey's accession to the EU, stated that Kurdish television and education was not only necessary for entering the EU but was also a domestic need to be met. Sabah, 8 December 2000.
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20 Prime Minister Ecevit also revealed his positive attitude towards the Kurdish education issue (Milliyet, 6 December 2000), while President Sezer is reported as saying that Turkey should take whatever steps necessary to bring it closer to the EU - a statement that can be interpreted as a positive stance towards the Kurdish television and education issue. Radikal, 9 December 2000.
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21 Devlet Bahceli, reported in Milliyet, 15 October 2000.
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22 See note 5 (above).
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23 Omer Izgi, reported in Hurriyet, 14 October 2000.
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24 NTV Television News, 21 December 2000.
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25 Salim Dervisoglu reported in Sabah, 1 December 2000.
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26 Mustafa Bumin reported in Cumhurriyet, 1 December 2000.
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27 Sedat Ergin, `Disisleri ve Kurtce TV' [The Foreign Ministry and Kurdish Television], Hurriyet, 2 December 2000.
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For a detailed analysis of the fault lines in Turkish domestic politics on this issue, see Ersel Aydinli & Dov Waxman, `A Dream Become Nightmare: Turkey's Entry into the European Union', Current History, vol. 100, no. 649, November 2001, pp. 381-388.
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29 Milliyet, 8 December 2000.
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30 Radikal, 12 December 2000.
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31 `NSC: No to Kurdish Television', Turkish Daily News, 24 December 2000.
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32 Cumhur Asparuk as cited in Financial Times, 17 February 2000.
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33 `PKK siyasallasamaz' [The PKK Must Not Be Politicized], Sabah, 17 January 2000.
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34 Ozgur Politika, 28 March 1999.
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35 Yavuz Donat, Sabah, 12 December 2000.
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36 These views were revealed in private interviews held in summer 1999 and spring 2000 between the author and several Turkish security officials, names withheld upon request.
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37 Ibid.
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38 From the annual report on internal security, Hurriyet, 8 December 2000.
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39 Ibid.
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40 Sabah, 12 December 2000.
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41 Bulent Ecevit, reported in Hurriyet, 16 January 2000.
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42 This suggestion was reportedly made at the end of 1999, and is referred to in Dogan Heper's column entitled `PKK bitti, simdi yatirim zamani' [The PKK Is Finished Off, This Is the Time for Investments], Milliyet, 17 February 2000.
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43 Sukru Elekdag, Milliyet, 21 February 2000.
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44 Sedat Ergin, `Guneydogu icin hukumetten beklenen' [What Is Expected from the Government for the Southeast], Hurriyet, 22 September 2000.
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45 Ergin raises doubts that the ANAP (Motherland) and MHP have demonstrated their clear commitment to the plan. Ibid.
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46 Ali Bayramoglu, Yenibinyil, 19 August 1999.
48.
Dogan Heper seems confident that a magical number of `42' businessmen - two per province - can save the region and solve its problems. Milliyet, 21 September 2000.
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48 For details, titles, and dates of the documents on these elements, see `Entellektuel Bakis', an interview with Bakir Caglar, Milliyet, 26 February 2000.
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49 Milliyet, Sabah, 19 November 1999.
51.
50 Mumtaz Soysal, `AB'nin Kurt Karti' [The EU's Kurdish Card], Hurriyet, 1 March 2000.
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51 The report names Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Germany, and France as making the same demands as the PKK. Cumhuriyet, 1 December 2000.
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52 The bureaucrat, Alain Servantie, later apologized, saying it had been a secretarial mistake; all major Turkish daily newspapers, 3 December 2000.
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53 Openly skeptical columnists used this opportunity to once again criticize the EU. Emin Colasan referred to this as an opportunity to see the true face of Europe. He also called the Turkish EU adventure a `dangerous dream'. `Bir Rezalet Daha' [One More Scandal], Milliyet, 3 December 2000.
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54 Sabah, 8 December 2000, and Hurriyet, 10 December 2000.
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55 It should be noted that some attempts to create non-PKK-influenced Kurdish political movements have suffered from the failure of the latter to emerge as influential powers. Others movements have not been considered as viable dialogue partners because they have employed a rhetoric equally or even more radical than that of the PKK itself.
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56 See, for example, Taha Akyol, who in his column wrote, `how can we trust HADEP if they don't pay respect to the common values of this nation?'; `HADEP Yanlista' [HADEP Is in the Wrong], Milliyet, 28 November 2000.
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57 Yenisafak, 30 November 2000.
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58 Whether or not the primacy of an economic diagnosis can prevail remains unclear, since the currently prescribed `master plan' to develop Turkey's southeast region is in fact the eleventh such plan, the previous ten of which have all been labeled as failures. There are indications already that this plan will also have problems, for example, the CEO of `East Holding' (created for this plan) resigned in early 2001, claiming that the plan lacked the full backing of the state and private sectors; Radikal, 6 January 2001.
